The controversial marriage and divorce of Massoud Rajavi with Abolhassan Bani-Sadr’s daughter, Firoozeh, is one of the issues that need to be studied in detail. That is because her divorce is concurrent with many organizational-related events including the so-called ideological marriage of Rajavi with Maryam Azudanloo, the consequent ideological revolution and disclosures about the scandalous, secret relations of Rajavi and Maryam. In this regard, the available evidences so far are only some remarks made by Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and statements by some detached members of Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCR, NLA).
Firoozeh’s divorce hardly attracted attentions since it was eclipsed by the announced ideological revolution immediately after Rajavi and Maryam marriage and only a short statement published in Mojahed announced Firoozeh’s divorce without any further explanation. Since then, Firoozeh Bani-Sadr only once and in a meeting with Ms. Batool Soltani made references about her relations with Massoud Rajavi and his voracious power-seeking. Although her revelations highlight some peculiarities of Rajavi’s character, but Ms. Soltan’s shocking disclosures about Rajavi’s sexual relations with members of the Leadership Council completely overshadowed Firoozeh’s comments. The fact is that Firoozeh’s silence in all these years on the reasons for her divorce and its aftermath is much questionable. Her silence might have been grounded on some personal considerations or the consequent frustration after the disclosures. But her silence does not seem to be much sensible, unless there are unwritten agreements and compromise, when we see that her role in Rajavi’s private life and being au courant of his relations with Maryam Azudanloo might help to illuminate one of the challenging chapters of the organization’s history. But the recent remarks of Abolhassan Bani-Sadr concerning Rajavi’s scandal refute possibility of any compromise and we have to look for causes behind Firoozeh’s silence somewhere else, the most obvious of which can be her fear of Rajavi’s retaliation.
But in relation to disclosures and statements of Ms. Soltani it should be asserted that they did not receive the attention they had to. Perhaps one reason is moral considerations and respect for reputation and honor of those who are still caught in the clutches of Rajavi’s cultic sexual exploitation. On the other hand, the audience and the critics are too shocked by her disclosures to make further queries and to examine them in detail and thus, her remarks were only publicized under a few articles of sex-themed.
But in his recent interview with Mohammad Hussein Sobhani concerning Firoozeh’s marriage with Rajavi, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr also made new references to Rajavi’s cultic exploitation. His assertions as a father indicate that he was not willing to wed his daughter to Rajavi:
You know, as a father I was opposed to their marriage, in fact, I was opposed to political marriage, to pervert marriage for political causes. But my daughter believed in independence and freedom, in political evolution. This guy (Rajavi) had talked to her in detail and they reached an agreement over a dowry of independence, freedom and nationalism. And she was also granted the right of divorce if Mr. Rajavi ever in future made a move to violate Iran’s right of independence, freedom of man and national peace.
According to the mutual agreement between Rajavi and Firoozeh stated by Bani-sadr, the divorce must have been a rational and reasonable outcome as we see Rajavi violated the conditions in practice:
And so it continued until one night when my daughter called me and I could hear her crying over the phone. She said this guy (Rajavi) had decided to move to Baghdad and had told her to make her mind either to come or divorce. I told her why are you crying? You married him on some agreed principles, now you have a choice to break your vow and go to Baghdad with him or keep it. She said she wouldn’t. I said well, right now you leave and come here and tomorrow we will apply to the municipality or anywhere else for divorcing this mister husband. You divorce him and it is finished, this guy goes his own way and you do the same.
But the second part of Mr. Bani-Sadr’s interview focuses mainly on Rajavi’s cultic exploitation, already asserted by Ms. Soltani, which can start a new theoretical and psychosocial study of his lusts and covets. Tacitly approving Ms. Soltan’s disclosures about Rajavi’s sexual exploitations, Mr. Bani-Sadr comments on the close link between sex and the absolute authority that will lead to the demise of totalitarianism at the end according to historical evidences. Since he has stressed that he has authored a new book on this subject, we hope that the book will work as a start to break the long silence and also motivate those interested in the subject to better illuminate the dark aspects. Concerning cultic authority and the destiny of peoples like Rajavi, Mr. Bani-Sadr states:
Breaking from the reality and being imprisoned in a world of fantasy fuels the urge for engaging in such activities and leads to madness. As a result, he [Rajavi] must connect to a kind of reality, an existing reality that can satisfy him. So he comes to say this is the cult that I have formed wherein any man and woman are my devotee. And he is satisfied to say I told them to divorce and they obeyed, I told them either they had to love the organization and its leadership or choose something else but they chose me. Suppose she [Ms. Soltani] is right, which I hope is not, about the sexual intercourse that took place, so it is the only fact and reality he has made a connection with in this cult, no other reality can be found beyond it because he has access to nothing else. ….. This man (Rajavi ) suffers when he has to think about any reality, and he has no other way but to retreat and seek asylum in his created world of fantasy to escape from the reality. And that is the destiny of people like Rajavi.
Remarks of Mr. Bani-Sadr are opening a new chapter on the subject of sexual relations among the cult leaders, and Rajavi in particular, and the reasons behind such unorthodox behaviors. This is a serious approach through which researchers can bring the subject onto the academic scene to study it from a variety of angles and to enlighten the public opinion about the cults’ threats. The taboo of avoiding such overwhelming plight among the societies must be broken as many western countries have already discriminated the necessity of investigation into the subject. Otherwise, people have to pay a heavy price before they come to know the threats of the cults. A predicament is just before our eyes, that is, we are witnessing one of the most inhuman cultic exploitations of the modern world and sexual enslavement of many men and women within the cult of Rajavi.
Bahar Irani
Man turns his look away from a photo of Massoud and Maryam in his hand, and a drop of tear rolled down his cheek to rest on the blue pillow. He let out a deep, long sigh and turned his head toward the window. The strong wind of the fall was twisting the branches together and blowing the half-dead leaves about; a strong inner turmoil and
Rajavi refuse Mehdi Fathi to return to France |
anxiety was churning up inside him. Through the trunk of the trees that seemed to get ticker every day he could see the stretched plain bordering the camp which in contrast to the trees seemed to be shrinking day after day. And he could realize his own image fixed among the autumn’s foliage.
It is now for months that he is bedridden like a piece of meat getting weaker and weaker. He is no more than a hollow-eyed man with black rings around them and hardly able to move his limbs. The past weeks were a grueling battle of death and life, a monotony of looking at his pale face in the mirror and the lengthened silence of his room made it more intolerable. The daylight filled him with delight although it ended with a sad nightfall, but the worse was an overwhelming pain that extended into the entire night. He had been told the previous day that they had done whatever they could to relieve the suffering pain that had filled all his cells. Rahman, his organizational senior in charge, had told him that brother Massoud (Rajavi) had been informed of his condition but all he had done to relieve the pain was to send a signed photo of himself and Maryam and a watch with an engraved logo of the organization instead of transferring him to a Hospital in Baghdad to receive due medical treatment. Perhaps it was the magic of the photo, said to be taken in the last days of brother Massoud and sister Maryam’s residence in Camp Ashraf, that was thought to bear the power to alleviate him! Watching him closely to see any trace of reaction, Rahman would say that it was a brand-new photo; and he only nodded without looking at Rahman who was quoting brother Rajavi saying it was the most serious juncture of the struggle against the regime and that they resisted transferring any patient to Iraqi hospitals unless the Iraqi authorities agreed to let interpreters accompany them to hospitals. And an agonizing pain ran through his body as he just listened, since he knew well that brother Massoud would never change his mind as he had never done before.
At dusk, a nurse came into the room carrying a tray of dinner and medicine. “How are you?”, she said. “Comrades did a terrific job today! They made it a hard day for the regime’s agents. Brother Olfat says they will clear out in two or three days if we continue as we did today. What do you say?” She did not wait for a response and began to prepare for an injection while she was eying him from the corner of her eye. And he turned on the bed to let her do her job.
He came to himself when he heard the door closing. The nurse had gone and he tried his best to sit on the bed. He gulped down the pills all with a glass of water and pushed away the tray of dinner. He reached out for the notebook next to the photo of Massoud and Maryam. He tried to write, as he always did at this same hour. The cover bore a smiling photo of brother Massoud and a quote that the daily “regular confessions”* had priority over the daily prayers. He took the black pen between his weak and bony fingers and began to write languorously: “Confession: today, I had some moments of doubt. I’m not well at all. The pain is killing. I do not know how this terrible and grueling condition can be overcome, but it can be made a little better than what it is. I do not know how long I can last out, but I also see no convincing reason to be kept in such a condition. Suffering from an incurable disease does not mean to sit and wait …”
A sudden dizziness overtook him and the pen slid out of his fingers. He opened his mouth to cry for help but no voice came out. His hand went to the small table beside his bed and knocked the photo and a jug of water over. He fell and his face hit the bed. He lost his consciousness.
***
He had a strange feeling of lightness, floating between the sky and the earth. It was a hard try to half-open his eyes to see many shadows moving around his bed. One in white was bending over him to examine his eyes with a flashlight. He could hardly understand what the doctor said but in the dimness he could see he was desperate and anxious. From under his half-closed eyelids he could see the oxigen tube inserted into his nose. He felt a stethoscope cold as a piece of ice gliding down his chest and heard the buzz of some medical equipment over his head. Little by little he came to realize where he was and why he was bedridden; a silent soliloquy began to form in his mind.
Damn these eyelids, they disturb me remaining half-closed! As it is the problem with my mouth, unable to utter a word, as I am frozen in a never-ending wonder. And this damn earsplitting bubbling of the tube in my nose! I cannot remember where I read you could go through your past when the death is near. Now I can only remember yesterday when Mahdi, Rahim, Rahman and other comrades were around my bed. Some tried to hearten me and others were joking, as if I was not to die in a few days. But I had no doubt about it and knew that I had no more than a few weeks or days to end it forever. Strangely, I cannot identify what passed yesterday with what I can now see through my half-closed eyelids! Now I see Rahman whispering something into the doctor’s ear; a meaningful smile appeared on their faces and they nodded to each other. I can hear Rahman asking the doctor “what percent” but the doctor was too vague to comprehend. And I can hear Rahman’s broken words: “unfortunately, … we have run of it, … you know, .. for the same reasons … brother Massoud … it can be turned into a frontline of resistance … to repulse the hirelings. For him it makes no difference to be today or next week, but it is critical for us at the moment. And brother Massoud has also found it right.”
What is he talking about? What reasons? What are they hurrying for? And again I hear Rahman saying: “I understand, but all are waiting, he is the key to open a stuck lock and the primer to blast a big bomb. He can provoke emotions and no doubt, works to disrepute Maleki and the regime”.
And questions one after each are boiling in my head. I see the doctor leaving the room angrily. Two more people that I do not know enter and approach my bed. What are they doing? One begins to draw out the inserted cannulas and the other detaches the wires from my body and a third one that I do not know takes the oxygen mask. What are they doing? I try to be optimistic. Perhaps I never needed all these tubes and equipment attached to me. Yes, maybe once more I have defeated the death and they are taking me to the ward where my other comrades are. They push a stretcher next to my bed but they do not seem to behave friendly.
Oh, why my eyelids feel so heavy. Everywhere is cold and white. All my body is numb and I feel sleepy. Rahman is looking into my eyes but his face is beginning to blur. Now I am entering a dark, endless tunnel and feel as light as a feather. Neither can I hear, nor see, nor understand, nor feel any pain. Anything is different; I am experiencing a new feeling, like a total transfer to a new thing, a new place, like waking from a horrible nightmare to pass into a sweet dream. Still I do not know what is really happening! All I feel is comfort and lightness and I am enjoying the beginning of a journey, an irresistible urge to cross the bounds of despair into the absolute happiness. The journey is tempting and I long to proceed into the fantastic world; I am much delighted, and with the same enthusiasm slowly I close my eyes.
*. “regular confessions” is a regular monitoring technique within the cult of Mojahedin to have the mind and behavioral changes of the insiders under control. Members are forced to write a daily or weekly confession and take part in inquisition sessions through which members have to confess before others of their thoughts and intentions and to renew allegiance to the ideology and the ideological leadership of the organization.
The transfer of the control of Camp Ashraf to Iraqi forces since 2008 and the Iraqi government’s determination to make a decisive decision about the residents of Ashraf has enraged Rajavi and his propaganda machine into a broad campaign against the Iraqi government. MKO’s first reaction was arranging a series of suicidal operations. On July 29, 2009 there was a report of deadly clashes between hundreds of Iraqi police forces and the members of MKO residing in Camp Ashraf that left 11 members dead and scores injured from the both side. While the reasons for the clash was said to be unclear at first, few knew that it was a pre-organized self-destruction plan by a number of Rajavi’s devotees to provoke Iraqi forces to trigger the clash that was well videotaped and broadcasted by the organization itself.
While the Iraqi forces and their commanders were still under the shock of the suicidal and violent behavior of the camp residents, MKO felt easy to feed its propaganda machine for months. Of course, after the events the Iraqi authorities, not acquainted with the group’s self-destructive tactics, were more cautious to adopt appropriate methods when dealing with MKO. The prudential measures were aimed first to secure the rightful demands and rights of Iraqi people and second, to restrict and prevent MKO’s misinformation apparatus and propaganda blitz as its adopted post-disarmament tactic. Despite all these efforts, Rajavi was, and is, focusing on an interlocking violent-political campaign to achieve two objectives; first, to draw attention of the international community through fraudulent claims and misinformation, most of which are distributed and circulated by the group’s paid or naïve political advocates. By rising tension at the camp against the Iraqi plans that are aimed at rightful measures to have more control over the camp, Rajavi also intends to show a martyred image of the residents to question the legitimacy and capability of the Iraqi government in holding the control of Camp Ashraf in an attempt to return the protection of the camp to the US forces.
Now, it has turned to be Rajavi’s short-term strategic goal and agenda. In this hostile and antagonistic behavior against the Iraqi government MKO is also invoking the support of many Western advocates who are engaged in an endless battle of condemning the Iraqi Government and calling for the establishment of US forces in Ashraf voicing that these forces have an obligation to provide the residents’ permanent protection. But they are not the sole means to accomplish Rajavi’s ends. The best means at hand are the members of the organization themselves who are victimized as human-shields to bulwark Rajavi’s cult bastion. However, as the international community is misinformed of what is really happening at the camp and its vicinity, Rajavi at the present grabs at two opportunities to accomplish the above stated objectives.
One is feeding his propaganda machine by making groundless claims following the continued and prolonged picketing of the families of the members outside the camp, families that are deprived of their rights and prevented to meet their enslaved children and relatives unconditionally and without his security monitoring. He blames the families of being a pack of Iranian and Iraqi agents tasked with torturing and disturbing the camp residents psychologically by installing multiple speakers around the camp. Of course, the truth is that the installed speakers are the only means the families have found working to have their voices heard by the insiders to counter Rajavi’s security measures and the falsely made claims.
The patients in the Camp Ashraf suffering from a variety of chronic and acute illness are also callously manipulated as the tools of propaganda. To baffle rightful judgment by perversion and to misuse humanitarian emotions of the world and evoking sympathy of outsiders toward Ashraf residents, Rajavi claims that the patients are prevented by the Iraqi forces to be transferred to Baghdad hospitals for receiving due treatment. Of course, Ashraf residents have no problem in transferring their patients to Iraqi hospitals and the Iraqi authorities have never ceased the entrance of medicine and other necessary medical facilities to the camp. What is opposed to is the exit of attendant agents that the Ashraf leaders insist to be accompanying the patients. On the one hand they voice concerns about the worsened condition of the patients suffering from cancer, cardiopulmonary, respiratory, and other deadly diseases, on the other hand they object to sending out patients unaccompanied and unsupervised.
To justify the escort of patients, it is stated that the patients need interpreters in hospitals to help them explain their illnesses and suffering. At the first look it sounds reasonable, but for those familiar with MKO’s system of control and security it means a strict, cultic method of control that contradicts disconnection of the members from the main body even for a short period of time. And you may become even more suspicious when you come to consider that the insiders, and the patients among them, are unable to express a few Arabic and English words after at least a two-decade long stay in Iraq. And a question for sure may form in the minds that who are these claimed interpreters so liable that nobody else in whole Iraq can undertake their job. What are the cult leaders really anxious about is not the precarious condition of the patients but losing their powerful cult grip over the life and minds of the enslaved individuals in case they leave the camp alone.
What the outsiders are not generally aware of is the methods and ploys Rajavi has developed to control the members’ lives. The watching and controlling measures that monitor the members even in their privacy never permit any risk of leaving a member alone with an outsider, be it a health caretaker or a member of his/her own family. That is why Rajavi objects to letting the member out of the camp or meeting their families alone and unsupervised. He knows well that the thought-reform atmosphere within the camp that is reinforced by a collective modeling behavior of the members prevents insiders from challenging his system, but any short contact with the world outside will open their eyes to the reality in a flash.
The death of a few patients, who have to otherwise risk their life as human shields even if healthy, benefits Rajavi’s system both in winning a propaganda warfare against the Iraqi government and safeguarding the internal integrity of its cult structure. Indeed, all humanitarian claims of Rajavi and bizarre games he plays are rooted in his personal concerns and his fear of organizational collapse that has so far survived even years after the collapse of his patron dictator in Iraq.
Over the past two centuries terrorism has been used for various reasons to achieve various goals. Terrorism has been used by a variety of social, religious and political zealots and ideologues and the historical development of terrorism shows that it is a tool mostly manipulated for a change. So far, and despite extensive academic and non-academic studies to examine the reasons behind the formation of terrorist groups, little has been done to investigate the role of the states in either the emergence of terrorist groups or sponsoring them. It can be examined at least from two perspectives; first, the role of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes in the emergence of violent underground and terrorist groups, and second, the catalyst role the terrorist groups play for some states.
Authoritarian and repressive governments and regimes are themselves a cause of terrorism since they routinely stifle civil liberties in order to maintain their hold on power and keep society in check. These regimes instigate public discord and cause the emergence of violent underground groups to fight for a change. As they are also corrupt governments, resources, privileges, and advantages are reserved for a select group of the people or ruling elite and thus, corruption encumbers the fair distribution of social services and adds another layer to the resentment caused by the lack of political participation. To combat the authority of the repressive regimes, the emergence of campaigners and groups, some already committed to pursuing their goals through nonviolent means, proves to be a necessary. At least in the past century it has been the cause behind emergence and formation of violent groups in Iran. Hardly can we distinguish between the political groups whose main approach is armed warfare and the terrorists because the very same political groups end to terrorism due to their infrastructural ideology of armed and militant struggle. Of course, there are few that make a revision and adapt to the made change and get advantages of their democratic potentialities to secure their political interests through peaceful means. We have the example of the both groups in Iran’s history of the past century; the People’s Devoted Guerrillas and the Mujahedin Khalq.
The People’s Devoted Guerrillas, the majority, made a thorough revision in the principles of its political and strategic struggle after a fairly realistic analysis of the Iranian post-revolution situation and became a political process. However, a few of the survivors remained loyal to the armed policy, but because of their extremist inclination to Leninist ended to the abyss of terrorism and, for several reasons like weakness in organizational structure and the like, accepted the hegemony of Mujahedin Khalq. Thus, a militant group formed to fight the ousted Pahlavi’s regime divided into two branches each dedicating itself to a separate path of struggle.
The second group surviving pre-revolutionary armed warfare was Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCR, NLA). Mujahedin insisted to continue their armed strategy and rejected new rules as they had their own interpretation and analysis of the post-revolution era. They refused to deliver their weapons over to the newly formed regime and instead opened a front of controversy that led them to pursue their goals through violent means that eventually culminated to terrorism. The role of Pahlavi’s authoritarian and repressive regime for the birth of the two challenging groups, among many other armed groups, was inevitable and the shaping of all these groups, because of the regime’s non-flexibility and quashing of the scattered opposition and opponents, could in some way counterpoise the draconian pressure of the regime. Here, we can well see the connection between dictatorial governance and the formation of an armed movement that was wholeheartedly transformed into a global terrorist group.
The catalyst role the terrorist groups play for some states has to be also explored. That is, some imperialist and colonizing states facilitate the formation of terrorist groups and provide for them under a variety of freedom fighting names in different part of the world in an attempt to secure their long-term strategic interests and objectives. While some counter-terrorist theoreticians highlight the need to understand the organizational, ideological, and financial aspects of a global threat as al Qaeda in order to defeat this global network of terror, little is said about the powers that fed it to become the notorious al Qaeda. There are proven evidences that the US government was funding and working with Al-Qaeda up to September 11, 2001. However, as these collaborator groups have their own expiry date, they are soon in disgrace with their sponsors. The outcome will be nothing but to turn them into global threats and become claimants of some power and authority.
Regardless of the manipulation of al-Qaeda by the US, terrorism is the outcome of both regional or global power imbalance and authoritarian influence. But what is of significant importance is that along with the birth of these purposeful terrorist groups other forms of violent groups pop out of the created chaotic situations. These parallel violent groups well fill the created social and political gaps and are even manipulated as puppet terrorists by rival political campaigners and the mafia-like criminal networks for a variety of purposes.
Natural enough, they can be also manipulated and sponsored by behind-the-curtain controlling powers that get their benefit from the terrorist-infected regions and countries.
Similarly, we can observe such an engagement in global relations. In an initiative to counter terrorism, some states arrange a blacklist of groups that are considered to have posed a threat not only against their nations but also against the global peace and security while the very same groups are proclaimed by some other states as freedom-fighters and even counter-terrorists. The duality before anything benefits the terrorists themselves who enjoy the support of their sponsors to survive. That is the present condition of MKO; it is a blacklisted terrorist group on the US terrorist list and considered a global threat while it is removed from the EU terror list believing to be a pro-democratic and freedom-seeker group. And MKO owes its survival much to these states, claiming to be policymakers of combating against terrorism that have made a compromise with the group under a multifaceted contract to advance their political goals. Words and policies are of no use and can help in no way to curtail terrorism unless there is a universal willingness to stop compromising with terrorists.
In part of her speech made at the International Conference in Paris and in explaining the necessity of the removal of the name of MKO from the State Department’s terrorist list and other similar lists, Maryam Rajavi addressed the audience saying:
… the biggest error in the policy of engagement, reflected specifically in the inclusion of the People’s Mojahedin in the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization list. Today, we need not discuss the substance of this label. The focus of our discussion is the critical impact of this listing, which has resulted in shutting down the engine for change in Iran. When you block the engine for change in Iran, how do you expect sanctions to be effective? (1)
Her words in short highlights two important points to ponder, points containing facts that she unconsciously opened her lips to admit, while she would deny in other occasions, as she was likely filled with the thrilling excitement of the very presence of some former American personalities and statesmen.
In her words “Today, we need not discuss the substance of this label” Maryam Rajavi simply prefers, instead of arguing and defending terrorist charges against the group, to question the inclusion of the group in the terrorist lists; a ploy that has so far failed to convince the State Department to remove the organization from its terrorist list. This is while many American supporters of MKO present in the conference have insisted on this point that the inclusion of its name on the list of terrorist organizations has its roots in political engagements and instrumental use of the list for political purposes, a move that, they calculate, was followed by other European governments to proscribe it alongside other terrorist organizations. But none of them ever asked that why should the European Union take the first step before the State Department to delist MKO while America has shown no flexibility in this regard? Besides, there are released evidences of untold aspects of cultic and terrorist activities about the organization in the State Departments’ report. Hence, such claims are baseless and are totally arbitrary.
What can be inferred from her speech is that Maryam Rajavi is trying to remark that keeping MKO on the terrorist list not only helps the US in no way to overcome its tensions and problems with Iran but also intensify and aggravate them more than before. In her classification of the existing problems of America and the West with Iran especially over the issues like Iran’s nuclear projects and the issue of Iraq, she asserts that ‘the United States has been standing on the wrong side’ by overlooking a potential alternative like MKO. And of course, the working resolution that may at least work to provide minimum benefits for Americans themselves is to remove MKO from the State Department’s terror list! A move that will also propel ‘the engine for change in Iran’. In fact, the tone and syllogistic manner of Maryam Rajavi is another version of her long begging to attract the attention of the US. However, the existing difference with MKO’s present and past efforts to find favor with the US is that in the past the group would enthusiastically speak and boast of daily perpetrated terror and military actions and dozens of explosions and terror-ridden situations. It would acknowledge itself as one of the most powerful armed underground organizations that had succeeded to spread violence and terror with no fear of being included in any list of terror. And as everything has changed today and it is facing a big problem for its past deeds, it is natural that the tone is also changing.
Another reason for her change of tone is the illusions she has undergone; first being motivated by a political simplicity that America has adopted a desired attitude against Iran and second, the organization has to regain its alternative priority if derogated from the status in anyway. In the past to convince, or better to say coerce, America to consider the sole alternative, MKO’s position takings and statements were totally different. Once, nearly two decades ago, Mehdi Abrishamchi actually warned Americans against espousing any other alternative rather than MKO:
The way we have come to negotiate [with America] we mean ‘we are’ and ‘you’ll have to negotiate with us’. Frankly and outspokenly we notify the imperialists that even if you have decided on a defeated counter-revolutionary and intend to repel us as an alternative, you must remember one thing that we will confront you inside the country. Fighting with American General will be much easier for us than fighting with the Ayatollahs. (2)
But the political fluctuations that compelled the organization to comply with the new regulations necessitated a change of language as well. As seen in the statement of a council member of the MKO, he takes a different position that is absolutely different with the past hostile tone:
It should be noted that the necessity of diplomatic activity in the framework of relations of states with states is expedient for an alternative that is at the verge of capturing power rather than continue to be a guerrilla group. Naturally, a guerrilla group has no obligation to worry about the impact of its activities, attitudes and slogans out of the borders. Mojahedin Khalq Organization, for example, how much could it be considered a serious threat to imperialism at the height of its military challenge against the symbols and indices of American imperialism in Iran when it had no idea of capturing state power in near future? Naturally, its deeds and slogans could also draw reactions in the same way. This very same organization today, however, working under its alternative of National Council in its framework of diplomatic relations as that of a state with other states has to defer to new obligations and has a thorough assessment of international reactions in any step it takes. Any unconcern in this regard leads to the marginalization and isolation of the alternative that operates as a government in exile. (3)
In conclusion, when Maryam Rajavi tries to undefile the terrorist reputation of the organizations and paves the way to delist it from the terrorist list, in a sense she is making an attempt to show the other side of a coin that two decades ago Abrishamch had shown its first as a warning to Americans. With the difference that at that time Mojahedin carried machine guns in fighting uniforms while today they are wearing stylish suits, ties and costumes to advance. Maryam Rajavi hops to make it known to Americans that if the United States has been long standing on the side of Iran and designated MKO as a policy of appeasement, now the time has come to turn to a direction of appeasing terrorists instead and provide for a promising result by removing MKO from the terrorist list as a show of challenging the Islamic Republic. That is the point where she intends to end the story when she does her best to transit from a once coercive diplomacy to a new diplomacy of begging.
References:
1 – Maryam Rajavi’s speech in International Conference in Paris, Friday, 24 December 2010.
2 – Revolutionary diplomacy and its difference with counter-revolutionary politics. Mehdi Abrishamchi’ s speech made for the Muslim Students Association in Italy.
3 – The Council’s Revolutionary Diplomacy, by Abdolali Maassoomi, the National Council Monthly, No. 24, P. 55.
Subsequent to the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals demanding the State Department to review designation of Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCR, NLA) and the move by a variety of its advocates to provide material support to the terrorist group, some have speculated about the possibility of the removal of MKO from the State Department’s terrorist list. But the seriousness of the subject requires focusing on the terrorism as a general concern rather than a certain case in the context. Thus, before any further speculation, one should have at least a basic understanding of what necessitated the approbation and introduction of the terrorist lists with an emphasis to have a basic analysis of the terms ‘terrorist crimes’ and ‘terrorist behavior’.
Designation of groups on terrorist lists plays a critical role in the global fight against terrorism and is an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to change their violent attitude and abandon terrorism. However, the terrorist lists have to be inevitably challenged, because there are entities that for some reason are removed or not designated at all. Regardless of many states that have prepared and keep a record of terrorist groups that believe have threatened the security of their territories, two top all others and are of greater importance, the State Department and the EU’s. There are groups that, because of their globally threatening violence, some states reach a consensus to designate while in some cases there is a difference of opinion. These lists are every few years or sometimes annually reviewed and revised and published for the public. But what facts and reason contribute to remove a name from some list is a matter of idealized ends that fit the policy of that state and government.
As a case at hand to be pointed out, MKO is one of those proscribed groups on the EU and the UK’s list that has been removed, although there are unfulfilled expectations to be removed from the State Department’s list as well. The fact is that this act of proscription and de-proscription of an active terrorist group in itself, regardless of the contradictions about ways to combat terrorism, fails to be grounded on objective and rational effectiveness with regard to global sensitivity. In the case of MKO, while the initial consensus was to designate it as a terrorist group that met defined criteria of terrorism, the subsequent decisions of the EU and the UK to de-proscribe it contains some contradictions and paradoxes for which they must provide convincing answers.
MKO has recurrently claimed that its inclusion in the terrorist lists has been the result a political bargain with the Islamic Republic regime. The claim proves groundless since we see that the State Department condemns the Islamic Republic of sponsoring terrorism alongside putting its opposition on its list. As there are many other countries that despite their semi-adversarial position against the Islamic Republic and dispute over Iran’s nuclear issue, continue to recognize MKO a terrorist group. However, the arbitrary use of terrorist lists and using them as a political lever for imposing political demands against a country contradicts the effectiveness of war against terrorism while the terrorist nature of a group like MKO is generally agreed on. Looking at it from this perspective, perhaps the legitimacy of all terrorist lists of the Western countries can be openly questioned, for any tottering policy in fight against terrorism will embolden terrorists to impose double costs.
There are also groups that are engaged in extreme apolitical crimes but are not designated terrorist groups mainly because they fail to be recognized a threat against the states. Their unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property in order to coerce or intimidate the civilian population in furtherance of social objectives categorizes them as criminals but never as terrorists. Mafia and trafficking networks that are specifically active in some South American countries can be the best example of these undesignated terrorist groups. Apparently, what is important for the governments to designate major terrorist groups is grounded on political ends and interests rather than the atrocities perpetrated against the civilians who are the real and direct targets of terrorists. However, the organizers of the terrorist lists do not feel any responsibility to recognize these criminals whose nightmare shadows a whole society. When the EU removed MKO from its terrorist list, it chiefly evidenced that the group had stopped its terrorist operation since 2001, as pronounced and defended by the group itself. It means that the Europe Union acquitted MKO of all its terrorist crimes and atrocities committed before the claimed date and ordered its name to be removed from the list. From this perspective, the EU’s ruling is devoid of due legitimacy as it has thoroughly disregarded the rights of all those victims of the group’s terrorist atrocities whose legal cases are open and in process before a variety of courts of laws. This ruling can also mean that the EU has granted the terrorist MKO a political legitimacy.
The third keyword that regardless of any political expediency prove or deny inborn terrorism is terrorist behavior. Terrorist behavior can be interpreted as resorting to a willful use of violence for strategic and political reasons and a group preferably selects terrorism as a course of action from among a range of perceived alternatives. It is a choice both for the some states or certain groups when they find terrorism useful. That is, a state or certain group/s in opposition to a government resort to terrorist deeds as reasonable choices.
Among instances of states about whom there was a global consensus was the ousted Iraqi Saddam. Now, if the international community for certain considerations voted that Saddam’s government was not a terrorist in row, did it really make any difference to the nature of his government? Saddam’s administration was recognized a terrorist state because of its countless internal and external terrorist assassinations and discovered mass graves. Or it was terrorist operations of September 11 and many of other terrorist behaviors of Al-Qaeda rather than inflicting financial loses and human casualties on the US administration that led it on the top of the terrorist lists. As it is also the case with MKO; it has accepted responsibility of twelve thousand lives and victims of terror, tens of recorded blasts and blind suicide and mortar attacks as well as numerous other acts of intimidation and instigation of public disturbances that led it to be recognized a terrorist organization not its inclusion in the EU or the UK lists of terror. It occupied a terrorist position not purely for political concerns but because it met all patterns of a violent, terrorist group with undeniable and available evidences before the eyes of the world.
What led to designation of MKO as a terrorists group are the existing several hundred handicapped and disabled citizens who are forced on the shoulders of their families or those whose loved ones, without any distinct political reason and as the direct targets of the terrorists’ blind operations, political lost their lives. Interestingly, despite all made claims that MKO has already abandoned armed and violent methods, a ploy that caused to be brought off the EU list, still it insists on the accuracy of its adopted armed strategy and waging terrorism and violence in the public to triumph. The focal point here is that it is not the status of a terrorist group like MKO on a terrorist list that calls for its recognition but the amount of its perpetrated atrocities including the actual acts, the perpetrators of acts of terror themselves and their motives in the past, present and future. Though there are states that consider MKO a terrorist group and are decisive in their decision, but the existing problem is lack of a general consensus on the definition of terrorist behavior first and in the next step, arriving at a universal consensus that may boost the legitimacy and importance of all terrorist lists and defend them against any challenge.
As already predicted, triumphalism was the order of MKO media and propaganda machine for nearly two weeks since the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the State Department review designation of Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCR, NLA) as a foreign terrorist organization. This was not MKO displaying itself as the winner of a petition but a terrorist organization shaking its fist at the world. However, now the cloud of the triumph subsided and anything returning to normal, it is time to have a review of the ruling to dig out the facts MKO were trying to bury under the heavy cloud of disturbing the usual pattern of events. Although improbable to be removed from the terror list, as the ruling has nothing to do with the issue, there are points in the ruling indicating that the State Department insists on the accuracy of its decision makings.
It has to be pointed out that the case in the question is not the first but the fourth through which MKO is challenging its designation as a FTO and bringing it before the court. And the State Department’s response in all the last threes has been nothing but to re-designate it, as it will be probably with this last one. Let’s see what remarkable points the organization has noticed specified in the ruling that may signify a triumph for it.
1. Stated in per curiam, it affirms that “This case is the fifth in a series of related actions challenging the United States Secretary of State’s designation of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) and its aliases as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The MEK, also called the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), has challenged its FTO status before this court three times”. Accordingly, the organizations attempts so far has proved unproductive against the State Department’s reasonable evidences.
2. MKO’s provided evidences to defend itself against the charges have been piles of letters of recommendations from its lobby in the Congress and other European parliamentarians. Asserted in the ruling, the State Department’s decision to keep MKO on the list as a FTO relies on sound classified and unclassified information. “The PMOI also thrice supplemented its petition with additional information and letters in support from members of the U.S. Congress, members of the UK and European parliaments and retired members of the U.S. military, among others. After reviewing an administrative record consisting of both classified and unclassified information, the Secretary denied the PMOI’s petition and published its denial in the Federal Register on January 12, 2009. She also provided the PMOI with a heavily redacted 20-page administrative summary of State’s review of the record, which summary referred to 33 exhibits, many of which were also heavily or entirely redacted.”
3. The court upholds that the Secretary resolved to designate MKO based on sound records and evidences. “We are to uphold the Secretary’s determination unless it “lack[s] substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified information submitted to the court.”
4. The court asserts that in all his/her previous responses, the Secretary has shown no satisfaction that the organization has permanently renounced terrorism and that, it might resume such activities in future. “In my view, (Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge) the classified portion of the administrative record provides “substantial support” for her determination that the PMOI either continues to engage in terrorism or terrorist activity or retains the capability and intent to do so and, consequently, for her denial of the PMOI’s revocation petition.”
5. The State Department in its explanations for keeping MKO on the list argues that there is no evidence to confirm that the organization has permanently renounced terrorism since its present circumstances are the same as the previous. The State Department relies on sound facts rather than claims. “To seek revocation, an FTO “must provide evidence in that petition that the relevant circumstances . . . are sufficiently different from the circumstances that were the basis for the designation such that a revocation with respect to the organization is warranted.”
It adds that “While the Secretary may revoke a designation at any time, the statute directs that she shall revoke a designation if she finds that either “the circumstances that were the basis for the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation,” or “the national security of the United States warrants a revocation,” She wrote that “in considering the evidence as a whole, the MEK has not shown that the relevant circumstances are sufficiently different from the circumstances that were the basis for the 2003re-designation,” and that “[a]s a consequence, the MEK continues to be a foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity . . . or terrorism . . . or retains the capability and intent to” do so.
Accordingly, America has concluded that in spite of the cease of open military operations and the voluntary surrender of arsenal and weapons to the occupying forces in Iraq, MKO does not seem to have adopted a total non-aggressive attitude. The militarism potentiality submits that the continued proscription of MKO has not been unjustified.
6. The ruling admits that “although the Secretary must give the PMOI an opportunity to rebut the unclassified material on which she relies, AEDPA does not allow access to the classified record as it makes clear that classified material “shall not be subject to disclosure for such time as it remains classified, except that such information may be disclosed to a court ex parte and in camera for purposes of judicial review.”
It indicates that the US has a comprehensive understanding of MKO compared to other designated organizations. Naturally, classified information include sensitive compartmented information and special access data and are to be used by government departments and agencies if deemed necessary. Disclosure of these information in the presence of an ineligible terrorist organization increases the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information that puts terrorists in full alert.
However, the court requires that MKO be notified of only unclassified information: “In short, we have held due process requires that the PMOI be notified of the unclassified material on which the Secretary proposes to rely and an opportunity to respond to that material before its redesignation; nothing in the amended statute suggests that this protection is any less necessary in the revocation context.”
MKO is well aware that the only probable, granted chance before it is to refute unclassified information or to ask for further opportunity to provide justifications to prolong the process. “And even though the PMOI was given the opportunity to include in the record its own evidence supporting delisting, it had no opportunity to rebut the unclassified portion of the record the Secretary was compiling—an omission, the PMOI argues, that deprived it of the due process protections detailed in our previous decisions.”
The ruling concludes that because of the foreign policy and national security concerns it leaves the designation in place: “As we noted in NCRI I, “[w]e recognize that a strict and immediate application of the principles of law which we have set forth herein could be taken to require a revocation of the designation[] before us[, but] . . . we also recognize the realities of the foreign policy and national security concerns asserted by the Secretary in support of th[e] designation.” 251 F.3d at 209. We thus leave the designation in place but remand with instructions to the Secretary to provide the PMOI the opportunity to review and rebut the unclassified portions of the record on which she relied.”
Consequently, what MKO is trumpeting as a ruling of being removed from the terrorist list is nothing but an urge by the court requiring the State Department to grant MKO an opportunity to defend itself against unclassified information, an opportunity already granted. The court has judicial responsibilities to fulfill, as it will be also held accountable for the consequences of unleashing a terrorist organization. It is complying with all regulations that struggle to diminish the nightmare of terrorist threats that has jeopardized the national security since 9/11.
The echo of the statements made by Ms. Batool Soltani disclosing facts about the sexual abuse and relations of Massoud Rajavi, the leader of Mojahedin Khalq cult, with the female members had the shocking impact of a bomb explosion among the public. She made the testimony in a meeting held in support of the victims of Rajavi’s castle, Camp Ashraf. Although she did not go into very details, her direct avowal did not take the audience in abroad by surprise since, as the organization is commonly referred to as a cult of personality, the prevalence of the sexual exploitation of women in cults is an undeniable fact that may only take different forms.
Surely, the truth of such claim made by one of the ranking members of the organization and one of the closest layers to Rajavi’s private relations cannot be denied but analyzed. Of course, the question of sexual relations within the armed, underground establishment of the organization was a challenge it was facing from its very days of formation and at time it had to adopt different solution to overcome the problem. Although it is in no way considered a problem among the Marxist-oriented groups, at time it turned into a crisis in Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO,MEK, PMOI) because it acted under the guise of a non-secular and religious organization. The instances of illicit relations and sexual scandals in the organization’s split Marxist branch, headed by Taqi Shahram, are undeniable facts confessed by many ex-members and recorded in the files of those Marxist-biased arrested by SAVAK, Pahlavi regime’s notorious security and information apparatus.
Needless to say that Ms. Soltani’s disclosure does not necessarily mean to question morality of many old members of the organization who were devoted, honest Muslims, but to dig into the roots of deviations that has led to the broad scandal. What did really happen that after the execution of the early founders of the organization by the Pahlavi’s court-martials, Rajavi seized the power in their absence, and through an enforced ideological revolution, glamorized an illicit marriage with Maryam Azodanloo? And it became the beginning of a process of female domination promoting women to the ranking, key positions of the organization. The enforcement of the compulsory divorces granted Rajavi the hegemonic monopoly right of exploiting women as his property while he totally deprived other rank and files of their natural right. Sexual control was, and is, seen as the final step taken by Rajavi’s system to objectify members similar to other members of the cults; it took the form of controls of sexuality and sex lives of members through daily and weekly sessions of confession and repentance.
It has become a cult routine inside MKO that requires members to keep daily records of their thoughts and nighttime dreams, particularly sexual thoughts and desires (which are, of course, forbidden), as well as observations about their fellow members. They must submit their journals to their supervisors. During large meetings, members often are forced to read their reports aloud and to make self-critical statements. It is a process going on while Rajavi is unveiled to have been engaged in a rampant, lustful and scandalous relation with female members observing them both as easily controlled subservience and objects of his harem.
It was commonly believed, or instilled into the insiders, that Massoud and Maryam were not married for the sexual purposes as many would think since Massoud, before the initiation of the ideological revolution, had overcome sexual bonds and had made a revolution within himself to bury all lustful bends for the cause of struggle. However, the disclosures about Rajavi’s indecent relations with the female insiders indicate that sexual acting out of all sorts is frequent among cult leaders and can be primarily regarded as a control and power issue. But how Rajavi came to put his feet on the very same road is a question to be studied with great care and scrutiny.
Massoud Rajavi’s call in mid-May for the instigation of the national uprising in a ten-day period, beginning from June 10 to 20, was his granted opportunity for a joint interaction for many others who were also seeking opportunities from outside of Iran. Rajavi thought himself the center-point of a struggle circle to whom all lesser and minor points around had to attach themselves, a chance set before smaller streams to join Rajavi’s claimed bigger one to form a river. It all started from the point where Rajavi was deluded by the idea that the rebellious uprisings could at least quantitatively, albeit potentially, bring him massive achievements whose big share could go straight into his pocket. Against his expectation, what Rajavi encountered was a negative reaction since the movement, despite being constituted of a young generation majority, had a past experience of blind terror and atrocities perpetrated by the organization.
It seems that the best useful thing Rajavi can do is to at least eliminate the self-made history of the June 20 and destroy it totally. Just like the anti-American campaign resources that it impudently deleted from the history of the organization, this is a stigma that it has to remove from its calendar and resources. Maybe he was under the illusion that the Iranian people, especially the new generation whom he mainly was addressing in the course of his serial messages, had forgotten about and had no notion of the terrorist crimes the organization itself had announced to be responsible for.
But what in fact occurred was in no way different in nature from what they tried to draw out of the past years’ Junes with the exception of some announced prearranged protesting demonstrations that MKO saw as granted opportunities in perspective, that is, to take advantage of circumstances with little regard for principles and putting the interests of the organization before that of the protesters. Withdrawal of the protest organizers, however, apart from a few advertised clumsy photos taken hastily with cell phones and MKO-released reports of some nightly chants whose whereabouts were unclear, resulted in no remarkable achievement for the organization compared with the volume of the invested propaganda.
And the Rajavis are carrying on, now that the June has come to its end, as if nothing has ever been said and promised. There are many subjects currently at hand to divert the attentions; the issue of Camp Ashraf and the families camping before it, the UN Security Council’s resolutions and sanctions against Iran and the like. And none of the people who were arrested in the streets during all these ten days received a message of appreciation and thanks as if nothing had really happened. In fact, nothing was to happen and they were all the victims, as many have so far been, of Rajavis hallucinations and illusions.
And the June wind Rajavi intended to shake the world with rose only to culminate in a colorful fiesta rather than a political gathering in Paris. And that is how they had promised to establish democracy in Iran! And after all these big endeavors made, we see Rajavi again retreating back to overwinter in his hiding cave and to make more decisive and promising decisions, and of course he is the only one who can decide what others should do, that could not only affect the welfare of the Iranian people but the human species in general. Let’s wait for new promises!
Mojahedin-e Khalq strategy of armed struggle that constitutes its organizational infrastructure from its very formation has now confronted the organization with a new challenge in spite of its widespread propaganda to convince the West it has made revisions. Although the challenge has failed to break the deadlock over Mojahedin’s proceeding with its revolutionary diplomacy in the outside world, the strategy is the main factor that stabilizes the group’s internal relations especially within Camp Ashraf. That is to say, for the outsiders the organization displays the dual policy of abandoning militarism and armed activities; for the insiders it is a strategically unquestionable principle.
That is a contradiction pervading MKO and, of course, the group has not resolved to convince the Westerners to have adopted a different attitude. It seems that MKO gets much advantage out of an equivocal attitude. In many occasions, MKO has admitted the necessity of armed struggle as an ideological necessity that constitutes the violent ontology of MKO. Definitely stated in the State Department’s report presented to Congress on the People’s Mojahedin of Iran in 1994, MKO developed an eclectic ideological blend of Islam and Marxism that dictated both a war of armed struggle and a war of propaganda to achieve political power.
They [Mojahedin] established an organization dedicated to armed struggle. As they explained in a 1974 newspaper article, "We had to ask ourselves the question, "What is to be done?" Our answer was straightforward: ‘Armed Struggle.,"(1) Commitment to this strategic principle has defined the history of the Mojahedin, from the group’s formal establishment in 1965 until today…. The MKO’s embrace of armed struggle flows from the group’s ideology. Its conceptual framework was painstakingly developed through years of study and discourse and aggressively disseminated throughout Tehran.
Being so fervently devoted to a violent strategy, MKO should undergo a complete ideological cleansing before renunciation of terrorism and militarism. But first it has to be investigated that is it possible by any means to change an ideology that institutes infrastructure of an organization?
During the past two decades, majority of MKO’s propaganda and published documents strongly advocate the strategic importance of the adopted tactic of armed warfare following the organization’s first mass movement on 20 June in 1981; the turning point that was broadly being propagated at the time and which was supposed to speed up the inevitable collapse of the regime. In his first series of speeches delivered on the first anniversary of the phase Khordad 30th (20 June 1981), Massoud Rajavi talked about the influential role of MKO’s ideology on the event:
A one-year review of implacable struggle indicates that it is a widespread, organized struggle and resistance matchless in Iranian history. It is not a merely review of political, military, strategic and tactical issues. All of them together, as different organs of body, constitute a cohesive essence that is Mojahedin’s ideology; they all remarkably signify this truth.*
In Rajavi’s analysis of the year-long armed struggle, you come across issues focusing on the inevitability and necessity of armed struggle and violent acts. Rajavi is in no way sceptical about the adopted strategy of armed struggle and is critical of anybody who may oppose the strategy:
All the nonsense woven against the armed struggle during this one year is loathsome and even ludicrous to listen to for those who are in close contact with reality.
In fact, the telling reality Rajavi points out is that armed struggle is the spirit of the organization without which it cannot survive:
In essence, we owe our existence and survival before anything to the widespread armed combat of the Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization.
There are much more evidences found in MKO’s ideological sources that implicitly and explicitly denounce abandoning the strategy of armed warfare adopted by Mojahedin and consider any made criticism and disapproval as definitely illegitimate. Those who are familiar with the group’s dual nature consider MKO’s claimed renunciation of militarism nothing beyond a tactic of duplicity.
Since MKO’s resort to armed combat and militarism is an internalized ideological principle, its renunciation also needs a similar process of ideological revision. If MKO is standing resolute to abandon terrorism as it claims, at least a review of its previously adopted resolutions will imply the earnestness of its decision. Renunciation of terrorism and militarism, although MKO has refrained to denounce publicly, first needs a through ideological polish, something MKO has dodged to go through at least up to now. MKO should explain how commitment to an ideological necessity can possibly be deserted while the ideology itself remains intact.
*All Rajavi’s quotes are from Mojahedin’s published A one-year review of the armed struggle