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The Ideology of the MEK

The Islamic Republic Referendum, an Issue of Challenge

The presence of Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) in the run of Islamic Republic Referendum in 1979 and its support of the move is an underlying matter of dispute between the Iranian opposition groups, and in some respects the US State Department, and MKO. The group has constantly reiterated that from the very beginning of the Islamic revolution in 1978 has taken an opponent position against the move and its leadership. To justify its congenial attitude in some phases based on existing and unquestioned evidences, MKO claim it was a force of circumstance to follow a conciliatory attitude towards the revolution and the leadership. Mojahedin say they could well have been liquidated unless they moved on a front of accommodation.

No doubt, both in the issue of referendum and the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, Mojahedin were very critical, mostly not of the moves but of the contents. In fact, their dismay was the result of the group’s political and ideological teachings that did not evaluate the two moves coinciding with their strategic ends, that is to say, to escalate a gross military tension with the US. In general, their main objective was aimed at heating up the created tension between the US and Iran to a point that lead to a military face-off according to Mojahedin’s antagonistic ideology. In other words, more than any thing else Mojahedin were focusing on the counter-imperialistic aspect of the Islamic Republic, as they said:

The main issue is not what the form and the name of the regime should be, the most important goal and the attempt of the imperialism is directed at keeping our society fundamentally unchanged and non-reformed so the move could be totally shifted towards the imperialism and bolstering up the bastion of non-revolutionary elements and links. [1]

Somewhere else, in an attempt to intensify the challenging attitude, they said:

From now on, Shah is no more a protector of the imperialism’s interests but, in respect to your [Khomeini] decisive leadership, more known as a nemesis and a cause for a greater, violent anti-imperialism revolution. [2]

 

Addressing Ayatollah Khomeini, they also said:

The imperialism well understood that further confrontation with people and you would lead to a deliberately aggravated public rage. [3]

Indeed, Mojahedin position at the time, in contrast to their present claims of willing to establish freedom and democracy, persisted in political standstill and anarchism, which they called revolution, and establishing a form of conductible democracy or, according to Mojahedin’s ideological trend, a revolutionary democracy modeled in Stalinism. It was the absolute form of the democracy they deemed for the Islamic Republic. In a statement they said:

Our congratulation carries the hope that in future the flaws and errors of this prime democracy in its revolutionary concept are corrected, so there would be no dispute in the form in the coming elections. [4]

Based on their ideological trends, Mojahedin had the same Marxist-based interpretations of other issues in Iran including the human rights. They believed that the issue of human rights in Iran was an instrument for the Shah’s regime to prevent any revolution. In a statement congratulating the initiation of the Islamic Republic they said:

No doubt, the traitor Shah was the most servile puppet of imperialism. So it was impossible for the colonialists to anticipate totally ignoring so anti-national a puppet. Thus, by scheming a totally imperialistic plot called the human rights, imperialism tried to lessen the burden pressing on the proxy regimes to prevent possible burst of revolutions in those societies. [5]

Such views work as a good yardstick to have an analysis of Mojahedin’s antagonistic positions against the Islamic Republic and its principles with the exception that today, because of the grave political situation they are entwined with, their views are tainted with a liberal and American culture. No body is in the doubt that Mojahedin from the very beginning were challenging the Iranian revolution. However, as mentioned, their today’s position is completely different with their past in respect to the issues of imperialism, liberalism and bourgeoisie which indicate that Mojahedin, following an ideologically opportunistic policy, seize the opportunity in any position taking.

Mojahedin’s earlier confession of their perforce coincidence with the Islamic Republic at its early days and their present adaptation with the West in general and the US in particular carries the message that zigzagging position taking [6] is an innate feature of hypocrite Mojahedin. Moreover, Mojahedin, besides zigzagging tactics, never retreat from their ideological and cult-funded teachings. Now the question is that how much are the Americans convinced, being aware of Mojahedin’s opportunistic nature, [7] to manipulate Mojahedin as an instrument against Iran? Although not exposed before the eyes of the world, the evidences tell a possibility of the US maintaining contacts with Mojahedin.

 

Notes

 

[1]. A collection of MKO’s statements and announcements, vol. 1, MKO Publications, Bahman 1358.

[2]. ibid.

[3]. ibid.

[4]. ibid.

[5]. ibid.

[6]. Radio Farda interview with Saeed Shahsavandi.

[7]. In a part of the US State Department Announcement about Mojahedin we read “It is difficult to accept at face value promises of future conduct when an organization fails to acknowledge its past”. 1994.

 

Bahar Irani – April 7, 2007 – Mojahedin.ws

 

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The Ideology of the MEK

Why Mojahedin Shun Manifesting Contents of the Ideological revolution? (3)

As mentioned before and according to a traditional tendency within Mojahedin, they deliberately conceal the events and happenings. An example to mention is the ideological schism within the group in 1975. In this phase, they ducked to impart the news of schism before the declaration of the ideological schism by Taqi Shahram. On the other hand, they strived to convince the converted Marxist members in the prison not to reveal their conversion and keep behaving as a religious member. It was only after the declaration of the Marxist wing that Mojahedin announced the so-called twelve-clause statement. Many separated members of Mojahedin, including Saeed Shahsavandi, Lotfollah Meisami who were in prison at the time, have talked about the issue in detail.

Mojahedin insisted on holding in the schism at a time when such events and splits were common and inevitable in any revolutionary organization. But Mojahedin, believed to be a political group, chose to impart no piece of information. It could be that the group was worried to lose the support of the religious forces at the time. That is to say, Mojahedin utilized the concealment as a tactic in continuation of taking advantage of the financial aids and recruiting the religious, political forces. Following such a double-faced policy, it was the same case with Mojahedin’s position towards the Islamic revolution in 1979 and its cleric leader. In fact, the adopted tactic granted Mojahedin an opportunity to reorganize as well as to recruit and train new forces.

In the historical process of Mojahedin there can be found numerous instances of adhering to the tactic of camouflage for organizational, political, and … interests. But, following the ideological revolution inside Mojahedin, they took a different trend. The only thing sneaked out of the organization was its qualitative echoes on the members and sympathizers. Of course, the left impression differed in respect to the ranks and organizational echelon. Those nearer to the leading cell at the top felt a closer pertinence to the issue and, as a result, showed more emotional and sentimental reaction. Mehdi Abrishamchi quoting Massoud Rajavi talking about the impact of the ideological revolution on Mahmood Ataei, a member of the Central Cadre, said:

Don’t you remember that Rajavi in his speech referred to Mahmood Ataei who had written that ‘let me cut off my hands so you may believe’? What does it mean? It means that Massoud’s self-confidence does not mean self-confidence in himself, Massoud’s self-confidence means trust of Mojahedin in Mojahedin. [109]

In a report prepared following the video-taped display of the ideological revolution in an organizational meeting in the Europe, Mojahedin talk of similar impacts on lower rank sympathizers residing in European countries. In a part of this report annexed to the pamphlet “The ideological revolution within Mojahedin Khalq” Mehdi Abrishamchi states:

England – A lady who had a Ph.D. in political science said while crying ‘so long I have studied in the university but after my few hours of being present in this meeting, I felt I have learned something and came to know what position a woman occupies and what price should one pay to perceive it. I bow my head. Anybody who conceives should bow his head.’ This lady at first refused to watch the video-taped ceremony of the Norooz meeting; she at times got angry and swore at the organization.

Somewhere else, reporting the reaction of a woman while watching the video display, the report reads:

France – An Iranian woman said ‘the move dissolved the inwoven complex in women. I was not a sympathizer but tonight, for the first time, I quivered and cried. I have bought the book “woman on the course of freedom” and a poster of Ashraf to hang it before my eyes. Tonight, I have achieved freedom’.

Here is another remark:

Germany – An Iranian carpet dealer: ‘I underwent a change. I could not believe. For the first time in my life I sat motionless for 5 hours not knowing how it passed. I had improper ideas about Women but now they are corrected. The words changed me. I want to write a letter to the leadership.’

Regardless of these claims whether being true or not, the importance lies in the irrational and sentimental aspects that have impacts on people. They are the factors that are in themselves considered unconventional in relation to conducts within other similar political organization and which turn to be the criterion to gain organizational legitimacy. Talking on the primary importance of this aspect to comprehend the ideological revolution, Niyabati in his book “The Mojahedin ‘s ideological revolution” writes:

It is obvious that the process does not follow a rational approach. The dominant element in the process is not “logic and reason” but “love” and “emotion”. The means are not dispute and contentment but devotion. That is the point wherein Massoud claims the heart of Mojahedin. [113]

And so as to apprehend the evolution:

In this great scene neither is the campaign background of any importance nor the organizational qualification and even the political conscious. [114]

Actually, the benchmark that qualifies a member to be received in the precinct of the ideological revolution is thus defined:

The wayfarer devoid of any will should stand like a log surrendering himself to the axe of the carpenter to be carved in any form he wills.

To have a good understanding of the correlation, it is necessary to have a good recognition of the content which Mojahedin strongly shun to be revealed. However, the Niyabati’s book as well as the detached members’ testimonies there can be found details of some kind.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – April 15, 2007

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The Ideology of the MEK

Why Mojahedin Shun Manifesting Contents of Its Ideological Revolution? (1)

The ideological revolution within MKO seems to be the organization’s greatest theoretical and political approach to the time. Of its great importance, Mojahedin believe that it is hardly possible to grasp all aspects and merits of this internal revolution even years after its nascence. In their opinion,

the change is considered to be the lost-ring of Mojahedin through its four-decade long initiation. Talking of its importance, Mehdi Abrishamchi states:

If you see that we could advance to this standing, before being the outcome of political tactics and vigilance, organizational or military potentialities, or anything else, it refers to the main chapters of the ideological choices all adopted under the leadership of Massoud. [1]

Also, in accentuating the importance of the ideological revolution he adds:

The ideological issue is the issue of existence of a revolutionary organization, that of being or not to be. If in the theological philosophy of the theologians the issue of God is the crux of existence, for a revolutionary organization, too, the issue of ideology is a matter of existence. The existence of an organization and its how-to be is sourced out of its ideology. [2]

It should be added that MKO and its insiders’ emphasis on the importance of the ideological revolution is cantered on internal relations. So far, none of the internal meetings of the organization discussing the revolution’s paragraphs has ever been revealed for the world outside. Also, Mojahedin never publicize reports on the ideological divorces which is the main key into such an internal change. On inevitable occasions, Mojahedin equivocally consent to such an ideological phenomenon but advert it to be the outcome of the insiders’ individual will rather than an organizational command.

Ali Safavi, a political member of MKO who has registered to set himself afire at the order of Massoud Rajavi the leader of the organization, in a documentary made by BBC on MKO claims that the propaganda over the ideological revolution is a product of the Islamic Republic’s propaganda machine. But, in response to the reporter’s question that if the insiders were obliged to divorce says:

– Never, each member of Mojahedin on his own will decided to relinquish the marriage life, of course, the married ones.

In response to the question that if all decided to divorce their wife he says:

– Yes, all of them.

The reporter amazed by such answers asked:

– Don’t you think that it is illogical that hundreds of members on their own will decide to divorce their wives?

And Ali Safavi says definitely:

– No, not at all. [3]

He meant to say it was logical altogether. The double-edged answers indicate that Mojahedin dodge to mirror information on their claimed historical and ruling change. The question is why Mojahedin shun delineating the principles and contents of such a great revolution that they believe to be the securer of the organization’s existence.

The media generally function for any establishment to implant its thought and political approaches. In other words, they are potential means at the service of the political organizations to recruit new members. There is a question here that why Mojahedin, in spite of getting advantage of this potentiality, withhold its application to transmit their greatest political and ideological approach? No doubt, political organizations for some security measures stop communicating some of their internal information to the world. Can it be also the same with MKO that considers its ideological revolution as the no-pass red line? If so, then it can no longer be considered an internal and ideological evolution because it can never turn into the red lines.

From its very initiation, any reference to the ideological revolution outside of the organization is limited to the title with no further explanation. Really, why the organization refuses to unveil it for the world? Regardless of any viewpoint considering the contents of the ideological revolution, its very cover up is the them for the discussion, an occurrence that concerns the destiny of Mojahedin and , in some respects, that of the coming generation.

Notes

[1]. Mehdi Abrishamchi’s speech on the ideological revolution within the organization made for a community of sympathizers in France. Published in 1995, Taleqani Publications, pp. 24-25.

[2]. Ibid, 18.

[3]. BBC interview with Ali Safavi on MKO.

Mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – March 23, 2007

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The Ideology of the MEK

February 8, A New Phase to Encounter People

A notable date in Mojahedin Khalq’s history is 20 June 1981 which marks a turning point in developing a good understanding of the group’s ideological, political and strategic nature that build the fundamental premise of its challenge with the Islamic Republic. The importance of the chapter lies in the fact that in spite of Rajavi’s insistence to justify his decision, declaring armed struggle, as a strategic and well calculated move, Mojahedin not only suffered an overall loss of organizational competency, but also generated a temporal hurdle in Iran’s prime leap towards democracy.

It cost Mojahedin a big price to come to believe that it was actually impossible to overthrow the created Islamic system in a short-run process as the group had anticipated. Successive blows over the body of the organization both was leading it to the precipice of a complete termination and challenging the adopted strategy of establishing a phase of armed struggle. Hardly could Mojahedin give an explicit explanation of the factors evolving so challenging a decision, a fact that has remained unanswered to the time. However, now nearly three decades after the initiation of the phase, Mojahedin admit that it was not a sound decision and consider it as a barren move. Bijan Nyabati, a left member of NCRI, talking on the move as unproductive states:

The strategy of developing a national-wide armed move came to be nothing but undermining the position of a great social movement to that of a limited militia struggle with no perspective.*

It has also come to be the cause of a widespread disagreement among the insiders and the detachments of many as well as fostering dispute with other active oppositions.

The crushing blows the organization received during the early months following the armed move phase made irreparable cracks in its structure. Among all the blows struck, the 8 February blow was one of the most crushing ones. Talking on the strategic importance of the event, Bijan Nyabati says:

Martyrdom of the commander [Musa Khyabani] was the first strategic blow over the armed resistance. From that point on, the regime took an offensive posture while Mojahedin maintained a defensive shelter.

The killing of nearly 20 team-commanders of Mojahedin including Musa Khyabani and Ashraf Rabiee after Rajavi’s escape to France brought Mojahedin’s blind assassinations into a sudden halt. Regardless of the force loss, the operation teams inside Iran suffered a great trauma and lost a big portion of their operational potentialities. On the other hand, the tactic of urban guerilla warfare as the leading axis of the armed struggle move was facing a challenge:

And finally, the blow that bereaved Mojahedin, and not only them, for ever was that strategic one struck on 8 February 1982 that put an end to the accuracy of urban guerilla warfare!

Nyabaty refers to the event as a dead-end to the armed strategy that proves to have initially been a foul and which was followed by other received strikes. He explains:

The last blow struck on Mojahedin on the first August 1982 was merely military. Martyrdom of the commander Syavash Seifi characterizes the blow to be a military strike. Thus, the urban guerilla warfare that had faced a dead-end on 8 February 1982, reaches its climax.

The 8 February incident makes Mojahedin desperately withdraw its ranking commanders from Iran to plan a new tactic:

To break the dead-end, Mojahedin, for the moment stressing on the armed struggle policy, adopt a fundamentally tactical change. By withdrawing the remnants of its commanders and ranks out of the soil dominated by the enemy, the tactic of conduct from the outside is adopted.

The aim was to reorganize the commanders to retaliate the 8 February strike. There is an exception; the armed operation mainly aimed at the regime’s authorities shifts to target civil elements alleged to be the regime’s agents.

Massoud Rajavi, besides reviewing various strategic lines, insists on a widespread armed struggle with the difference that, from a tactical point, the aim shifts from the authoritative elements to the believed agents among the people. That is to say, to cut off the finger-points of the suppression in the society in a new turn of tactic. It was a hallmark in the sense of being an easy target for the operation teams.

The result of this turn of tactic was tragic and it is estimated that more than ten thousand civilians were the victims of Mojahedin’s atrocious blind terrorist operations and bombings.

Although a shattering blow, the 8 February strike opened Mojahedin’s eyes on the truth that the people, caught in Mojahedin’s propelled atmosphere of disorder and terror, not only despised them but also confronted them. Mojahedin attempted to trouble the society and inject terror to paralyze the security system of the regime so as to continue the line of assassinating the key authorities with the assistance of their infiltrated agents. But, seeing people in the front of the regime, Mojahedin shifted to target the “finger-points”, a Mojahedin idiomatic expression meaning ordinary people. Besides being easy targets, people could at least lose the trust in the regime and react in the way Mojahedin could take advantage of. These are the reasons that before approval of the ruling system’s legitimacy, advocates Mojahedin’s deprivation of a sound theoretic and political insight to develop a realistic analysis of social context.

The adopted tactic of conducting urban guerilla warfare in exile means that Mojahedin are convinced that people have to be disregarded in their campaign calculations. People were replaced by other supporting apparatus like Iraq that provided them with all forms of geographical, political, military, and financial backings. Consequently, a new transformation was evolved and a new definition of friends and enemies developed.

 

*All quotes are extracts from Bijan Nyabati’s “A distinct look at Mojahedin’s internal revolution”

 

Bahar Irani – February 13, 2007

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The Ideology of the MEK

Mojahedin Laid Criterion for Patriotism and Democracy

Following Saddam’s execution, the MKO-run media have mainly focused on tendentious reports that reprove the dictator’s hanging. The group’s move on such a suspicious line implies that Mojahedin attempt to exculpate Saddam of his myriad crimes to compel a mentality to identify him as a national hero. They have resolved to walk on the line of the opponents to Saddam’s execution, each impelled by different motives, in an attempt to win their support to accomplish their own ends, as they did when the master was in power. No doubt, Mojahedin’s present approach has its own strategic importance but it should be noted that the reach of their siding with Saddam’s supporters lies beyond the scope of the conventional dealings which require much deeper study.

Mojahedin’s silence over Saddam and the Baath Party through the past three years for itself speaks an unspoken truth. Notably, before Saddam’s fall, the two, Saddam and Rajavi, were each other’s sole recognized supporter. Mojahedin, enjoying a strategic position in the region and hardly turning to their Western lobbies, anticipated a promising future settled on Iraq-Iran borders to play their decisive role to overthrow the Islamic regime. Although they were aware that their dream was not to be fulfilled so soon and easily as they portended, at least they could continue to survive in Iraq and keep the members waiting mesmerizing them with murmurs of an imminent victory.

Once in his meeting with Saber al-Duri, who was in charge of the Iraqi security system, Massoud Rajavi stressed that the group’s settlement in Iraq was not a temporary but a long-lasting stay:

Tell him [Saddam] on my behalf; we were and are and will remain at your home as long as possibly we can. [1]

Regardless of their sharing of strategic interests, Rajavi and Saddam’s tie was rooted in a mutual historical and ideological understanding. A passing look over Rajavi and Saber al-Duri’s interlocution reveals the kernel points that ties one to the other. In many parts, Rajavi’s references are an analyzed synthesis of Mojahedin’s ideology with that of Baath Party:

 – We share the same destiny.

– Our bloods are intermingled.

– The tie between we and you, be it either the government or the Baath Party whose leader and symbol is Mr. President, is not merely a political tie. It is an absolute brotherhood.

– Anything that is against you is against us as well and vise aersa.

– Our security and the strikes we receive are the same.

– Our progresses are also the same.

– Neither in my mind nor in my heart can I distinguish between our collective interests and losses.

– Our interests are closely associated.

– Our principles have got us together to be side by side in a front. [2]

The Iraq now turned into a country vulnerable to fluctuations with Mojahedin’s facing stalemate indicates that Rajavi was well aware of the grave consequences of Saddam’s fall and its aftermath effects on MKO. Thus, sensing his unquestioning liquidation, Mojahedin took a different turn to tie a destiny with Iraqi people at least to secure their stay in Iraq. In a sudden shift, they tried to establish the same conduct paradigm with Iraqi people, this time chanting slogans of democracy rather than brotherhood. Interestingly, knowingly or unknowingly, Mojahedin somehow consider Saddam and the Baath Party, compared with the present government in power, more democrat and patriot. Sediqeh Husseini, a ranking member of MKO, in a speech made at Camp Ashraf stated that:

Talking of democracy and a democratic Iraq, a key parameter is this same conduct with Mojahedin. [3]

She further stressed her claim in a message sent to Dayali Province Sheikhs but with a different tone:

Thus, we appraise the degree of patriotism and popularity of any movement according to the scale of opposition to interferences and, consequently, friendship with and respect for Mojahedin. [4]

It is easy to have a sound judgment on Iraq’s past situation and Saddam himself. Mojahedin’s contradictory position after the dictator’s execution and indirect expression of sympathy on his death with pro-Saddam factions that appreciate him as a hero helps a good deal to have a just analysis of Mojahedin on condition the fog of doubt has not completely evaporated. If the establishment of democracy in Iraq, as Mojahedin define, reconciles with their stay in Iraq, then, on account of Saddam’s granting them the bliss of settlement in Iraq, Saddam can be identified as the most democratic person. Consequently, not only the Baath Party represented democracy but also, compared with the current government, occupied a much higher platform of democracy. Mojahedin’s proximity to Saddam in behalf of the mentioned factors on the one hand, and their proposed criterion of democracy on the other hand are actually two sides of a coin that Mojahedin, under the vicissitude of fortune, avail themselves of it only with a little change of tone and literature.

Notes

[1]. To be judged by the history.

[2]. Ibid.

[3]. Sediqeh Husseini’s speech made at Camp Ashraf on the anniversary of Iran’s century long Constitutional Revolution.

[4]. MKO’s message to Dayali Province Sheikhs

Bahar Irani – January 10, 2007

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The cult of Rajavi

Humiliation of Women in MKO

Women’s activists have marked 25 November as a day to contradict all forms of violence against women and the campaigners seek to eliminate violence done against women.

In the modern world, the evil of inequality, humiliation, sexual harassment, and a domineering masculine violence against women still continues to exist. The most prominent instances of violence against women are sexual slavery and social deprivation and limitations. Not only in the under-developed but also in developed countries women are subject to various physical and psychological practices of violence and pressure. Many of these victims are wives and daughters who are regarded as the possessions of the husbands and fathers. Multitudes are also the victims of the clandestine cults and political groups wherein they are abused as sexual slaves, instruments to advance the cult and group’s objectives, and in general, servitudes of a masculine hegemony.

An example to reveal the hegemonic abuse of women is the condition of female insiders of MKO. The predicament of these insiders, who under the hollow slogans of being the pioneers and heroines of freedom and democracy suffer crushing physical and psychological pressures, is even worse than those living in the outside world. They are under severe physical and psychological cult bounds of the organization and deprived of free will, thought, and even imaginations.

In two phases, at least to mention, women suffered under the extreme exploitation exercised by MKO. In the first phase, on pretext of removing obstacles for the advancement of the struggle, the leaders ordered compulsory inter-organizational marriages. These marriages didn’t take place according to the members’ tastes or ages. This was closely related with rising and degrees of merit. Meanly, it was related with how much the members had adapted to the organization. The couples thus married were forbidden to have children and their conjugal duties and meetings were under strict control.

In fact, the marriage was an ideological practice; the couples were the property of the organization and their marriage had to be channeled for the advancement of organizational ends rather than to secure familial and emotional relations. The target was not love, emotion, sexual pleasure or continuation of the generations but the control of the forces and maintenance of the organization. Women were utilized as the objects of controlling the male insiders and motivating them onward.

The second phase began with the ideological divorces after MKO’s failure in the operation Eternal Light. To justify the failure, Massoud Rajavi in 1991 completed his philosophy of ideological revolution by the decree of ideological divorcing. He gave the command of general divorcing of all married members. Thereafter, women, suffering grave humiliation, had to succumb to the wills of the leaders. In 2003, the world was shocked to see members of MKO setting themselves on fire to protest Maryam Rajavi’s arrest by French police. Two women members, Marzieh Babakhani and Neda Hassani, died of the injuries. They had the order to sacrifice themselves for the leader.

Many of women members are crushed under heavy physical and psychological pressures at the present. They suffer humiliation by regular confessions of the sins they have never committed before other members and have to write and report about their dreams and fancies. Where in the world women are treated as they are? Confined within the walls of a heavily guarded military camp in Iraq, these women are susceptible to any form of assault and harassment.

If international bodies and Women’s activists seek to eliminate violence against women, a proven case of exploitation and violence extends before their eyes. If they are determined, they can easily hear the help cries of these women. They do not wish for much; they want to live like any ordinary woman in the world.

Mojahedin.ws  –  Bahar Irani – December 3, 2006

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Mujahedin Khalq as an Opposition Group

MKO’s Media-based Tension Escalation

Coincidental with the aggravation of Iraq’s internal disorders and religious-based conflicts mainly fomented by the remnants of the Baath Party, the role of MKO in fanning the flame of public disturbance should never be overlooked. Mojahedin are well aware of the fact that with the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Iraq, they would lose their greatest protector in Iraq and that none of their claimed collected signatures of supports from the Iraqi people, factions, and Sheikhs of tribes would work to be productive to secure their stay in Iraq.

Mojahedin main attempt at the present is focused on the escalation of the internal tension which might compel the Iraqi authorities to relay on the presence of the American forces to overcome the social disorder and to secure social stability. Although unspoken, Mojahedin try to have it understood that the existing tension is the outcome of the current Iraqi government’s incapacity to control the situation and the US feels impelled to utilize its lever of power to replace the current government with a new “national salvation government” to ease the tension.

While the Iraqi authorities point to Mojahedin as elements of interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki approves availability of proven evidences, Mojahedin, unable to deny the said truth, indirectly diffuse incapacity of al-Maliki’s government to control the dominant disorder and, through some American officials, threatens his dismissal. For instance, Mojahedin website selectively published excerpts from Senator John Warner’s statement wherein he stated:

I assure you, in two or three months, if this thing hasn’t come to fruition and if this level of violence is not under control and this government able to function, I think it’s a responsibility of our government internally to determine: Is there a change of course that we should take?

was said to have sated that if Iraq’s current situation failed to improve in the next two or three months and violence continued as a result of Iraqi government’s inefficiency to control it, then, the US took it as a responsibility to decide whether take a direct step to make a change or not.

Depicting an inauspicious future for Iraq if the US forces left, Mojahedin quote Warner saying that untimely departure of the US from Iraq would turn the country’s reservoir into a treasure in the hands of the global terrorism.

Once enjoying the granted oil quota by Saddam, Mojahedin are in absolute agreement with the Americans that the Iraq’s rich reservoir might help reconstruct what they all despise as Islamic Fundamentalism and, of course, al-Maliki’s legal government makes a never-tolerable obstacle. Acting as the mouthpiece of al-Maliki’s critics, Mojahedin distort the news reports and add their own comments to help debilitate al-Maliki’s government and advertise its incompetency especially in controlling the armed insurgents. It can be well noted in news reports released by Mojahedin’s site stressing “analyses indicate that Nuri al-Maliki fails to disarm militia”.

Mojahedin, always a collaborating hand to intensify religious disputes to escalate political tension, in Hambastegi site quoted the US Secretary of State saying “religious violence in Iraq is a strategic threat”. Commenting on her speech after her meeting with Iraqi officials, the site states “Rice in her meetings with Iraqi political leaders tacitly mentioned the national salvation government which means a directly made note for the formation of a new such government”. Rice had earlier made an unannounced visit to Iraq to consult with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki about his efforts to achieve national reconciliation between the country’s various ethnic and sectarian groups.

Mojahedin-run propaganda machine in the West is already busy taking hostile and threatening positions against the legally-elected Iraqi government through circulating statements made by Mojahedin supporters. Al-Maliki is believed to have a deep understanding of Mojahedin’s threatening tone in their propaganda strategy which indicates their interference in Iraq’s internal affairs.

Earlier last week, Mojahedin quoted Jalal Tlebani, the Iraqi President, claiming he had threatened to utilize MKO to influence Iran’s internal security and affairs. The next day, Talebani in an officially made speech repudiated the claim and emphasized on his recognition of MKO as a terrorist group and its expulsion from Iraq. Although a broadly known opportunist taking advantage of circumstances, Mojahedin have to be dealt with prudence in some respects to frustrate attempts made to accomplish certain political ends.

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – October 21, 2006

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Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

Semiology of another defeat

Mojahedin Khalq-run TV station in its regular “direct contact” program on the first October rotated around Iran’s nuclear program as it has been during the past few years. Unlike the previous programs analyzing the nuclear subject talking from a firm position, this latest show revealed the organization’s desperate position. Yazdan Haj-Hamzeh, a senior member of the National Council of Resistance, tried to unveil a further comprehension of the talks taking place between Javier Solana and Ali Larijani and to warn the West that the current negotiations would solve none of the West and the US’s problems in respect to the threat of Iran’s nuclear weapons that could put the security in the region and the world in jeopardy. But the potential threat he was referring to had nothing to do with Iran’s nuclear activities; the threat was the existence of the Islamic Republic itself and an unconditional overthrow of the regime was the sole solution to thwart the threat.

During the past few years Mojahedin have employed all their political might to magnify Iran’s nuclear threat to lead on their power struggle to be entrusted the legitimacy of an alternative. As political bankrupts, Mojahedin even lost their last residue of political legitimacy among other opposition who believed in them as ultimate hope. Mojahedin’s propaganda blitz to infuse that Iran did not have any peaceful intentions with its nuclear program was regarded to be a hanging halter tightening around Iran choking off the current rule. At the present, Iran’s talk with the West to find a peaceful solution to Iran’s nuclear program is so promising that Mojahedin took a new turn to annex a new dilemma; instability in the rejoin led by Iran. Haj-Hamzeh’s comments concerning this subject can be analyzed as follows.

1. Unlike before that Mojahedin showed aggressive position on the lead of any peaceful solution to Iran’s nuclear program, they show to be more lenient with the emphasis that a diplomatic solution would consequently jeopardize the stability and peace in the rejoin that would, of course, be threatening to the West and the US’s interests exclusively. Haj-Hamzeh suggests that the West has to be decisive if they intend to safeguard their interests and markets in the rejoin. He pays not the least attention to Iran’s nuclear threat and addressing the EU states:

In my opinion, the greatest interest for them [the EU] is that the Middle-East and, above all Iran, has to reach a relatively political stability that the regime [Iran] has troubled; otherwise they can do nothing in the current situation.

2. Haj-Hamzeh maybe for the first time in this TV program ties the issue of the nuclear activities and the West position to the destiny of Mojahedin emphasizing that any resolution can be decisive for Mojahedin:

We are entering serious phase. It is not a mere conflict between the foreigners and the regime. Our issue is also decided in this conflict.

 Such a direct statement indicates Mojahedin’s serious condition, something they had never pointed before.

3. Being in a desperate situation, Mojahedin through Haj-Hamzeh announced their satisfaction over the sanction threats made by the EU and the UN Security Council against Iran. They suggest that the West be decisive at least on what they proposed as deterrent means:

At least, by imposing sanctions, prevent Iran’s procuring means to continue nuclear activities. We do not intend to go beyond our expectations to see them suffer loses in their interests. We hope they are observant of what they have signed.

4. Somewhere else, Haj-Hamzeh suggests Mojahedin’s cooperation with the West if they intended sanctions on Iran. In fact, Mojahedin are offering to take side with the West in their deal with Iran in the same way they acted in disclosing Iran’s secret nuclear activities:

A comprehensive sanction has its own plans to fulfill and we can, if they will, give more details on the issue.

5. Haj-Hamzeh at the closing minutes of the TV program and talking about the possible pressure that Iranian people might sustain following the imposition of sanctions said people had to inevitably pay the price if Mojahedin were possibly assume the power:

Ultimately, we intend to step into a big fight to settle it with the state that is nearing the side and naturally we have to pay for it.

The current process of negotiation between Iran and the European sides is rational and promising and Mojahedin never sit silent to watch it proceed smoothly. Manssour Qadr-Khah’s letter to President George Bush demanding to fulfill his threatening promises against Iran is only one of the many attempts. Out of the three plotted projects against Iran (terrorism, human rights and the nuclear file) to create serious international crises, the nuclear issue, having the top priority, has badly disappointed them. They have to find new solutions to prevent any failure in this project. Besides, all Mojahedin sympathizers, especially those situated in Iraq, are waiting to see the miracle the organization has promised to come out of the crisis of the nuclear file. How Mojahedin are to convince the reminder of the forces to wait longer to see the miracle happen is a trick of their own and the inter-organizational reactions play so serious a role in jeopardizing the group’s survival in future.

Mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani  –  October 8, 2006

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Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

MKO and 9/11

On the anniversary of 11 September terrorist incident, all MKO-run media have purposefully remained silent; that makes it essential to focus on its position on the incident. It is an issue of concern that while the world unanimously condemned the terrorist acts at the time and voted on a universal move to stop any further terrorist plots and still commemorates the victims, MKO has preferred to keep silent. The testimonies of the ex-members who were still in Camp Ashraf when the incident happened well reveal the strategic and ideological positions of the organization. A number of these ex-members have stated that after the incident, Massoud Rajavi’s manner of behavior had arisen in them a suspicion that the organization might have masterminded the incident. So passionate had Rajavi talked about the inhuman incident that the members had come to believe that Al-Qaeda operation team might have received their training at Camp Ashraf. In a part of his speech Rajavi was quoted to have stated:

What happened reveals only a percentage of the potentialities of an Islamic organization which has adopted the most reactionary concepts of Islam. Imagine how potential and capable our revolutionary Islam might be!

These ex-members have further stated that Rajavi had ordered to show the videotaped explosion of the Twine Towers again and again. They say that Maryam Rajavi once referred to Muhammad Ata’s will, one of the agents of the 9/11 incident, wherein he had banned women’s attendance at his tomb and stated his aversion to family and children, and said that Al-Qaeda and the perpetrators of the 9/11 incident have a far better understanding of MKO’s ideological revolution than those inside the Camp Ashraf.

The Mojahedin leadership is also quoted to have said; “We did the ideological revolution but Al-Qaeda is actually practicing it”.

Regardless of all these stated remarks, MKO’s silence and indifferent position is an indirect approbation of the terrorist act of Al-Qaeda. The fact is that an act the same as the 9/11 incident was long a deep yearning for Mojahedin. It is natural for an organization that dreamed to create another Vietnam in Iran not to hide its feeling over a Vietnamized America in spite of appealing to imperialism to muster protection. The incident was an actual test of the organization to determine its degree of sincerity towards the US it attempted to utilize to achieve its political objectives. While in a world wide propaganda MKO maneuvers on beguiling mottos of “peace”, “democracy”, and “human rights”, inside the organization it refers to these mottos as tactics to assume political power. This innate hypocrisy has even made some supporting powers to be skeptical of the group.

Years before the 9/11 incident, in a US State Department report submitted to the Congress in 1994 on "people’s Mojahedin of Iran", Mojahedin’s duality, untruth, and reversal was not a fact for the US to be unaware:

Current Mojahedin publications assert the group’s advocacy of specific guidelines for a future provisional government, including: "democracy," "peace," "love, friendship, and unity," "separation of church and state," and "recognition of private ownership and a market economy," A recent addition has been the Mojahedin claim to support the Middle East peace process. The group also stresses its commitment to the rights of women and has drafted a "NCR plan on Women’s Rights."

These claims present a revolutionary departure from the substantial written record of Mojahedin ideology. Examples of such reversals include the switch from revolutionary Islam to separation of church and state and from nationalization to private ownership. Yet the changes in MKO ideology occurred without any public debate, and there is no public record of discussion or review of Mojahedin principles. It is also unclear when each change in policy occurred, and what internal factors motivated each shift. The absence of dialogue about this critical issue of ideology contrasts markedly with the group’s earlier history of discourse.

Nor are these new claims substantiated by the record of the Mojahedin’s activities throughout the last 29 years.

The report then continues:

The Mojahedin’s credibility is also undermined by the fact that they deny or distort sections of their history, such as the use of violence or opposition to Zionism. It is difficult to accept at face value promises of future conduct when an organization fails to acknowledge its past.

In contrast to its claims of having accepted democratic parameters of the West, MKO’s indifferent position on 9/11 incident indicates its innate duality. So grave was the effect of this terrorist act on global community that it was turned into a criterion to identify other instances of terrorist acts and apparent as well as unapparent instances of advocating terrorism. For the Mojahedin who in the past shed the blood of American citizens and blasted its offices in Iran, the destruction of the Twine Towers was a relief for a long bearing grudge against the imperialism. At the same time when many innocent American citizens were being crushed under the debris of the towers collapse, Mojahedin Khalq, safe in their Camp Ashraf haven, were celebrating the incident as a fulfilled dream of seeing the doomsday of the capitalism camp. Possibly, looking at the towers’ collapse, Rajaviv was thinking of the late Mao when he said “the US is paper tiger”.

No doubt, notwithstanding its attempts to distort its past and to justify its present struggle manner, MKO is a terrorist group which believes Marxist and Machiavelli ethics are the best lead out of any problem. Al-Qaeda, unlike MKO, refuses to camouflage its strategy and ideology to meet its terrorist objectives. MKO, in contrast, because of its eclectic ideology and easily consenting to adopt destructive tenets, has the capacity of theoretical and political reconciliation under any condition. Mojahedin’s dual nature has notoriously labelled them as “the terrorists in shadow”.

Mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – September 26, 2006

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Mujahedin Khalq 's Terrorism

A Revolutionary Diplomacy; the Costs and Achievements

Nobody could imagine that Massoud Rajavi’s meeting with Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, on 9 January 1983 in France would develop into a strategic alliance entwining the destiny of both Mojahedi Khalq and Saddam together. The meeting opened a new chapter in Mojahedin’s history. The meeting was in fact the product of accepting defeat in urban guerrilla warfare favored by Mojahedin as an effective tactic. Although Mojahedin had anticipated that the meeting would bring about inevitable consequences, but the process of the alliance led them to encounter unanticipated situations and conditions.

At the beginning of their declared armed struggle that resulted in killing of tens of ranking Iranian statesmen, Mojahedin’s claim of toppling the regime in short-term confronted the group with challenges from the side of other opposition and the forces active inside the country. Bijan Nyabati, a left member of NCRI, in respect to this issue states:

The severity and extremity of Mojahedin’s military blows especially struck at the regime’s top put the Iranian political forces as well as many other foreign communities under the illusion of the possible overthrow of Iran’s regime in short-term. Mojahedin were also under the same illusion. [1]

In October 1982, Rajavi in summing up the year-long military phase justified the group’s 20th June uprising as an inevitable event and strategic decision for the group to have been taken. But he alluded to two uncalculated external and internal factors that he claimed to have prevented the regime’s downfall; the Syria’s aid and restraining and disintegrating the terror cells inside Iran.

It was in no way the miscalculations that thwarted “the abrupt downfall”, the initiation of the 20th June uprising in itself was a blind and absurd act:

The strategy of a widespread and national-wide armed struggle was nothing more than declining a massive public uprising into the level of a limited militia struggle with no prospect. [2]

Rajavi claimed that unlooked-for suppression of Mojahedin forces by the regime hampered the downfall but Nyabati, depicting a truer image of the conditions, believes that Mojahedin’s expected response by the “social factor”, people’s general response to Mojahedin’s call for mass uprising, not only disproves to be productive for the organization but also turns to be utilized as a deterring force against Mojahedin. That is to say, the “social factor” turns to be an element of hindering and controlling Mojahedin. Bothe Rajavi and Nyabati say the same words; rajavi says that suppression of Mojahedin by the regime hampered the downfall while Nyabati believes that it was people who thwarted Mojahedin’s supposed threat:

From mid-August 1981 Mojahedin initiated armed rallies to provoke people into the arena. The rallies reaching their climax on 27 September 1981 [Rajavi’s ordered armed march in Tehran to provoke people join Mojahedin to initiate an armed uprising], the “social factor” provides a negative response. [3]

He assumes that even long before, Mojahedin had lost their hope in the utility of the so called “resistance cells”, Mojahedin combatants active inside Iran, and Mojahedin’s strategic tactic had proved to be nothing but a great failure:

The strategic blow on 8 February 1982 [killing of 20 members of Mojahedin including Musa Khyabani, MKO’ commander inside Iran after Rajavi’s escape to France, and Ashraf Rabiee, Rajavi’s first wife] was an end to the accuracy of the urban guerilla warfare. [4]

But it was not the last blow and another crushing blow over the body of Mojahedin in nearly 6 month later absolutely disappointed them coming to believe that they could neither relay on the “resistance cells” nor on the positive response and presence of the masses:

The blow on the first August 1982 [annihilation of another Mojahedin-run team-house, under the command of Syavash Seifi, and a number of other combatants by Iranian security forces] caused urban guerilla warfare that had faced a dead-end on 8 February 1982, reach its climax. [5]

To find a way out of this strategic cul-de-sac, Rajavi eagerly accented to meet Tariq Aziz on 9 January 1983; it was a reaction against people’s retreat from Mojahedin’s violent tactic and gave Mojahedin an opportunity to prepare the background to conduct a struggle from abroad and from a foreign soil and expand it into a global concern. Although Rajavi referred to the meeting as a joint effort to find a solution for a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq to end the devastating war, but it was a de facto recognition of each other’s interests in case of forming a joint alliance:

The Iraqi government was ready to provide Mojahedin with so convenient a facility (Iraqi soil), for the simple cause that Iraq needed to open a new potential front to crush its enemy’s war machine. [6]

However, the meeting had a decisive effect on the National Council of Resistance and its members; a gradual detachment of the old members, each credited as weighty veterans, from the NCRI could speed up depreciating legitimacy of an assumed alternative.

The later consequence of the event was Mojahedin’s ideological transition that aimed at certain ends and could tip the scale in Mojahedin’s favor. The meeting convinced the NCRI’s members that Rajavi was utilizing them as instruments to obtain further legitimacy. Many separated members of MKO and NCRI attributed Rajavi’s ideological revolution to an outcome his negotiation with Tariq Aziz to contrive move into Iraq. Talking of the link between the ideological revolution and move to Iraq, Khan Baba Tehrani, a separated left member of NCRI, states

The ideological revolution was a maneuver masterminded by Rajavi in order to restructure the organization, purge the dissidents, and recruit anew. It was the point where the forces like us had to separate. Because the ideological revolution was a ploy to prepare for the organization and Rajavi’s move to Iraq, to be dependent on Iraq, and play a role in a war that was initiated after Iraq’s aggression against Iran and we saw that the organization fought beside Iraq against Iran. The move to Iraq was the outcome of Mojahedin’s failure in their armed strategy and Rajavi’s jugglery framed as the ideological revolution to arrive a new phase of the revolution worked in no way but transition of the organization into a pseudo-religious closed sect. there are a great number of these religious sect around the world. [7]

Never has Rajavi disclosed the contents of his meeting. To escape further allegations and making excuses, he called it an accidental occurrence. The coming events and incidents proved, however, that what they exchanged in their meeting was much more strategic and fateful than expected. Even the most pessimistic critics could have never anticipated the outcome we broadly witness today. At least we can discern a message that MKO at the present neither relays on people nor on the residue of its potentialities but on a surfing strategy to survive on.

Notes

[1]. Nyabati Bijan; “A distinct look at Mojahedin’s internal revolution, slightly from inside, slightly from outside”, pp.13-14.

[2]. Ibid.

[3]. Ibid.

[4]. Ibid.

[5]. Ibid, 15.

[6]. Ibid, 62.

[7]. An internal look at the left move in Iran; Hamid Shokat’s interview with Khan Baba Tehrani.

 

Mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – September 12, 2006

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