Bahar Irani

The Paradigm of a Historic Irrationality

This August, Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) celebrates the forty-one anniversary of its formation. Four decades ago, Mohammad Hanif-Nezhad along with a number of other students, formerly active in National Front, came together to establish an organization that has so far moved in a struggle path totally different from other previously established armed movements like Sazman-e Cherikhai-e Fedaye Khalq (People’s Devoted Militia Organization). Approved by the leaders of many pro-Marxist militias, none of the armed struggle moves in the process of Iran’s political and social fluctuations has proved to be productive and MKO has been no exception. Compared with its parallel armed groups, MKO seem to have suffered a more pitiful and deplorable destiny after selling itself to liberalism and imperialism.

The group’s past history is intermingled with a variety of different and controversial phases. It received two devastating internal and external blows, namely, the ideological split and mass arrests by monarchical regime’s notorious SAVAK. In both circumstances, the organization nearly lost 90 percent of its insiders, but a passing look over its activities, from its inception to the Islamic revolution, evidentially indicate that it had had no influential impact on social milieu and ambiance.

In contrast to the group’s baseless analyses claiming to have played a crucial role in Iran’s contemporary political history, in many cases it acted as a deterrent trying to misconduct the justly guided march of people to achieve their right wants. The armed move that MKO announced against the will of nation to overthrow the Islamic Republic proved to be a total failure; the outcome was a bloodbath targeting many innocent civilians and officials.

The MKO’s first attempt to create a military spectacle the same as Fedayan’s daring operation of Siahkal failed. The group planed to disrupt the 1971 celebrations surrounding the 2500th anniversary of the Persian monarchy. In fact, although it was an attempt to win the control and leadership of the armed struggle, but the armed strategy in itself was in no way justifiable. The historical necessity of the armed struggle at the time was still a big question; yet, the important point was the influence of the rising tide of the guerilla struggles.

Mojahedin were imitators of Fedayan militia who also imitated the guerilla and armed activities of other countries like Algeria, Cuba, and Vietnam. The strategy heavily influenced by the struggling experiences of the guerillas in those countries was in absolute contradiction to Iranian social, cultural, and religious context.

Moreover, Fedayan were under the heavy influence of Marxism and were running on a path to corroborate the theoretical and philosophical aspects of Marxism while Mojahedin believed they were holding an ideological supremacy over other leftist rivals. Mojahedin were basically formed according to the left parties’ structure. Ideologically, the organization was under the heavy influence of the National Front’s scientific theory. Thus, Mojahedin and other active rivals advocating armed strategy against Shah, actually distanced from the main objectives of the armed struggle aimed to prepare a background for the masses to rise and join the struggle. The armed struggle, under the pretext of fighting against Shah’s tyranny, turned into a battle of the ideologies. Well aware of the fact that they were all walking in a wrong path, none of the sides dared to make a rational critique of the strategy; the discouraging factor was being labeled as compromisers. That is to say, if anyone made an appeal to justify that the objective conditions were inappropriate for revolution, he would be labeled a compromiser, reformist, opportunist, and lacking the needed political courage.

Disregarding the role of people in struggle and insistence on armed strategy as well as imposing its ideological dogmatism has raised big questions, after the Islamic revolution, over its formation and the cause for its existence. The motivation and the real objectives of the main founders, among whom faithful, devoted ones existed, have also encountered a big question mark. Mojahedin’s change of guideline aiming to assume power at all costs led it to an absolute ideological drift and, consequently, to the precipice of being dependant on imperialism. The heavily advertised glories of its past military achievements evaporated soon after its collusion with Saddam, an archenemy of Iran, its transmission into a cult, and its direct beg of support from the US to overthrow the Islamic Republic.

In Iran’s contemporary history, Mojahedin Khalq is the paradigm of a defeated armed struggle movement. A review of its function in the course of all these years well depicts the clear and basic controversy between its organizational instructions and that Iran’s social-political conditions. They were moving on a wrong path from the very beginning but kept pretending an avant-garde of a struggle manner that people disapproved. It is always people, however, who have paid the heavy price of the factions’ deviation and dogmatism in the accomplishment of their ambitions.

Bahar Irani – mojahedin.ws – August 27, 2006

August 28, 2006 0 comment

Massoud Rajavi

Rajavi, the man who wanted to be a king

The operation Eternal Light (Forugh Javidan), is deemed by its leader a turning point in MKO’s history. The operation, no doubt, remains a black spot in history because of the significant strategic and military factors being considerably disregarded. In spite of the fact that Rajavi has recurrently admitted to have been aware of being no equal to Iran’s military strength, yet he would insist to recognize the operation as an integral part of MKO’s existence. To vindicate the necessity of launching the operation regardless of the outcomes, Rajavi has said:

Namely, at the crucial, serious situation that changes were speeding, the National Liberation Army had to be either checkmated or to sit waiting with the made excuses of not being prepared or the time was not ripe for the action… . [1]

Can it be the mere prove that the operation, with no rational raison d’être, was just a reaction to unpredictable conditions? Of course, the operation’s aftermath and the panorama Rajavi depicted for the forces on the eve of the operation well justify the claim. Talking on the outcomes of the operation before its initiation, Rajavi, commanding rather than asking, stated:

Now to be recorded in the history as you are making a great, prime decision unprovoked by emotions, although no revolution can de dissociated of its emotions, but absolutely based on military-political calculations, I tell you, raise your hands if you agree to go, if you think leaving for the operation, with whatever result, is quantitatively better that sitting idle. Whoever is convinced it behooves us to leave for operation and it makes it much worse if we don’t, raise the hand. I want to see this moment recorded in the history. [2]

Being well aware of the consequent failure of the coming operation, Rajavi cleverly sought to pick up surrogates to accept the responsibility of the inevitable defeat by stirring up the members that operation was the sole way to overthrow the Iranian ruling power. His rhetorical speeches provoked the members to both launch the operation and accept the responsibility for the consequent defeat. In fact, no body was to question Rajavi for the defeat but he was the one to reprimand all.

Really, how did Mojahedin justify the causes for the Operation Eternal Light? Was Rajavi so credulous to talk of “conquering Tehran and overthrowing the Islamic rule”? Did he think that Mojahedin in 1988 were in a better fitted situation than their previous 20 June uprising or the forces had a potentiality above the after-revolution days when they had infiltrated deep into the regime’s political and security institutions? What changes had occurred in Mojahedin’s structure to believe the organization had gained a military potentiality far above the previous guerrilla warfare tactics to form a liberation army able to topple the regime? What ever they were, one thing was evident for Rajavi and other rank cadres; the operation could not possibly succeed. To justify the force inequality, Rajvi gave promises that on the road to Tehran Mojahedin would be warmly received and welcomed by the townsmen and villagers who then would join them.

Before the acceptance of the Resolution 598 by Iran, Mojahedin had been convinced that an imposed peace on Iran would inevitably edge the regime to the brink of collapse. They were, however, overtaken by the acceptance the Resolution 598 that frustrated the prepared third solution of liberating Iran with reliance on the liberation army as they no more could receive the overall protection of the Iraqi army. Talking on the importance of this latter factor, Bijan Nyabati has stated:

The new liberation war was Mojahedin’s proper response to the huge deployment of forces with the aim of invoking a shelling priority powered by Iraqi army potentialities; it had nothing to do with Mojahedin’s previous strategy of the classic guerilla warfare. [3]

In spite of his chanting superficial counter-war slogans, Rajavi preferred the state of war as a good coverage to test war potentialities of the liberation army. In fact, the end of war meant a complete blockade of Rajavi’s tactic:

Overtaken by such unexpected decision (the acceptance of the Resolution 598), Rajavi decided to counteract. Noteworthy, in the strategic order of the liberation army, actually there existed no place for peace and cease-fire. [4]

Mojahedin took advantage of the unstable truce to test their military potentialities once more to topple the regime. Rajavi hoped unexpected outcomes when he let the forces be perished to guarantee his own power hegemony. He was under the illusion that the operation, although a complete failure, from a politically point of view had struck the most crushing blow over the body of the regime. His explanatory comments before and after the operation are in total contradiction.

The ideological revolution was the product of a solution to conduct the organization out of its political stalemate. He impudently declared the individual weakness in forces was the cause of failure and that the leader’s potentiality was far above the understanding and tolerance of the forces. In a later justification in general gathering on the anniversary of the operation in 2001, he talked of the operation’s achievements and that it was a proof of Mojahedin’s being independent of Iraqi’s military, financial, and political aids. Quoting words of a few Iranian authorities, Rajavi concluded that Mojahedin proved to be the sole recognized threatening force against the Islamic Republic.

All these words said, what really peopled Rajavi to commit such an organizational suicide was to shoot his last arrow. Seeing his long-existing dream of succeeding to power coming to nothing, he got ready to sacrifice all his devotees to take his chances. His command calling for the urgency of the operation was a shock to all and Mojahedin were watching restlessly that his decision was parching the remaining chances. He horridly prepared to face with the greatest challenge since the failed 20 June event with the consequent of his expulsion from Iran. His previously stated purpose of “conquering Tehran and overthrowing the Islamic rule” infers he had a hallucination of walking on a red carpet spread from the Iranian border to Tehran. The illusion of grandeur as a result of his authoritarian rule over Mojahedin had left him under the impression that the Iranian people, in no way an equal to Mojahedin combatants, would submit on his pass to Tehran. Alas, the idolized king never reached Tehran.

Notes

[1]. “The tenth anniversary of the Eternal Light”; the first book, Mojahedin’s Publications, 12.

[2]. ibid, refer to back-cover text.

[3]. Nyabaty, Bijan: A look within MKO’s ideological revolution, 70.

[4]. ibid.

mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – July 30, 2006

August 5, 2006 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Objective of Mosaddeq and the Deviationist MKO

The achievements of Iranian’s at least past century’s movements, regardless of the pivotal role of the nationalist and religious leaders, have permanently influenced Iran’s contemporary history. These popular movements, particularly the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-9, the Jangal Rebellion of Gilan in 1917-21, the Oil Nationalization struggle of 1951-3, have been repeatedly exploited by Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) and the group took maximum advantage of these national movements.

In spite of their past three decades ideological deviations, Mojahedin claim to be moving on the same path of the century long Iranian movements campaigning for the cause of democracy and freedom. The claim is made at a time when most of the Iranian opposition look at Mojahedin as an anti-nationalist, anti-democratic, dependant, and authoritarian group; separation of many individuals and political activist from the resistance ceases any further explanation. A comparison between Mosaddeq’s thought and political stances and that of Mojahedin reveals to what extent the group is sincere in its claims.

The Oil Nationalization struggle has been known to be one of the epoch-making events in Iran in 1950s, a struggle that undercut the British absolute control over the Iranian oil industry and nationalized the reservoir. It also began a new phase of struggle against the imperialism with the US replacing the British Empire after the evolution of the US-Iran relations.

The revolution in 1978 opened a new chapter in Iran’s struggle against imperialism. Soon after the revolution, all the incongruous parties that failed to reconcile with the nature and matrix of revolution had to dissociate. MKO, atop of these opposition forces, wore the enthusiastic mask of Mosaddeqists in objection to a clerical leadership to challenge it. Were Mojahedin true Mosaddeqists as they claimed?

Regardless of MKO’s ideological-political analysis of Mosaddeq’s class location, sometimes barrowing Marxist terms to label him as representing petite bourgeoisie, Mojahedin resorted to a tactic of attaching themselves to Mosaddeq in an attempt to gain legitimacy.

The Oil Nationalization was the want of people, clerical leaders, and the nationalists to free Iran of foreign domination on reservoir. Moreover, it was a turning point to distinguish between the betrayers and patriots. Intending to free Iran from foreign exploitation, Mosaddeq, in spite of facing internal and external threats to overthrow him of his legal position as a prime minister, never backed off from his anti-imperialism stances and dissented to foreign and internal leftist supports to survive the infamous coup of August 1953.

Who doubts MKO’s alliance with Saddam to betray its own nation? A steadfast political leader steering Iran through the most tortuous days as, Mosaddeq never betrayed his nation and did not sell the independence and the national treasury at the offer of an imperialist supported power reign. Dr. Abul-Hassan Bani-Sadr, Iran’s first president after revolution, in an explanation of his dissociation from the National Council of Resistance stated:

Violation of independence principle by going to Iraq to serve the most felonious and corrupt regime has discredited the group among Iranians as anti-Iranist, anti-human, and anti-national and condemned it to isolation. [1]

In fact, Mojahedin’s alliance with Iraq at the time when parts of Iranian soil was usurped by Iraqi regime never corresponded with the resistance’s adopted principles that recognized Iran’s independence and territorial integrity. Bahman Nirumand, a dissociated member of the resistance, elaborated on the issue saying:

We lost patience with the resistance coming to notice that Mojahedin were negotiating with Saddam Hussein’s bloodthirsty regime for months to move the resistance headquarters to Iraq. We could not accept to see one of the indisputable principles of our ally, namely, belief in independence and negation of any dependence, was being violated. It was no more a tactic. The ignobility, I believed, would blot Mojahedin for ever. They were settled in a country that had made war with Iran for eight years. It had nothing to do with armed struggle; they are the aliens’ mercenaries. [2]

A true nationalist, Mosaddeq relied on support of people to accomplish the politically legal wants. Unlike him, Mojahedin, deprived of a social status, easily assented to the political and military backings of the aggressing enemy. Karim Haghi, a Mojahedin defector, articulated on the issue:

The National Council of Resistance lost its legitimacy when it broke away from the masses of people and sought the support of the foreign elements to assume power and turned into a club in hands of foreign countries privileging them in their dealings with Iran. [3]

Once, Mojahedin rebuked the communist Tudeh Party of relying on the Soviet Union to meet its party interests. Walking on the same road, Mojahedin put their past anti-American stances into the oblivion to form a new phase of siding with the US and Western countries. They have completely forgotten that Dr. Mosaddeq’s legal government was overthrown by a US-British plotted coup in 1953, the same plotters from whom Mojahedin beg for support. Apologizing the US for its past anti-American stances, the NCRI in a response to the U.S. State Department report on Mojahedin quoted Orlando Sentinel criticizing the US as a justification of reconsidering its hostile stance:

Alliances depend on a common enemy, not on shared values. This also speaks to another of the State Department’s specious criticisms of the Mujahideen, that they were anti-American in the 1970s. Yep, they sure were. They were trying to overthrow the shah, whom the United States had forced on the Iranian people in a CIA-engineered coup and whose dictatorship the U.S. government was supporting. It was impossible at that time to be anti-shah and pro-American. But that was then and this is now. Who are our strongest allies today? Our worst enemies 50 years ago, Japan and Germany. [4]

Believing to be descendents of Mosaddeq’s once powerful party, the National Front, Mojahedin proclaim the position of the new generation that Mosaddeq had advocated:

After Mossadeq’s fall from power, the [National] Front was taken over by politicians totally out of step with the society’s needs who advocated a passive "wait and see" attitude. They had no specific political agenda and no real platform. Their only political capital was Mossadeq’s popular appeal. Banished to his native village of Ahmadabad by the shah, Mossadeq distanced himself from them, telling visitors that Iran had to rely on the "energetic, dynamic younger generation" to topple the shah and bring about democracy. [5]

Earlier, in a memorial speech made at the burial chamber of the late Dr. Mosaddeq in 1980, Massoud Rajavi had vowed not to retreat from what he called anti-imperialism stance:

So it be to get advantage of our perfect relic and the precious experiences and achievements of toppling Shah’s dictatorship, costing the blood of many martyrs, to follow the path of the late leader [Mosaddeq] of Iran’s anti-imperialism movement so as to safeguard the relic by the continuation of our revolution and absolute effacement of imperialist domination. [6]

What are the proven evidences to endorse Mojahedin to be true Mosaddeqists as they claim? Did Mosaddeq invited, and even incited, the imperialists he objected to deploy their war machine, now already running in Afghanistan and Iraq, in Iran? Iran’s nuclear program now nationalized the same as the oil in Mosaddeq’s era, has perturbed the exploiting powers at Iran’s nuclear development. Unlike Mosaddeq to promote the national will, Iran’s nuclear file has turned to be an apparatus in hands of Mojahedin to widen the already existing breach between the US and Iran. This current issue resembles the anti-nationalist moves by some dissident currents hindering Mosaddeq’s oil nationalization move that eventually brought about his downfall. The pseudo successors of Mosaddeq have taken a completely different course in their political activities:

The course of Mosaddeq was that of a nationalist. He attempted to cut off the foreign domination in Iran to establish an independent state. It is shameful to pose a nationalist but sell itself to a country in war with Iran and to collude as a fifth column all through the war. [7]

Another nationalist party warned against Mojahedin’s abuse of Mosaddeq saying:

The Iranian Nation Party forewarns all Iranian men and women of the advocates of the terror and crime taking refuge under the guise of nationalism and Mosaddeqism to smear Mosaddeq’s name with their black past. [8]

There are many of these quotes sounding the alarm for Mojahedin’s abuse of Mosaddeq’s name and repute. Mojahedin’s struggle manner, at least at the present, in no way places them in the framework of Mosaddeqists. Only people with dim political intelligent might be attracted by Mojahedin’s nationalistic slogans to take a sect-like, terrorist group for a pro-Mosaddeq. Iranian people respect Mosaddeq’s anti-imperialism struggle to end the foreign exploitation and well recognizes the traitors wearing a nationalist mask.

Notes

[1]. The NCRI’s rise and fall; interview with a number of the NCRI’s defectors, Iran Payvand Publication, 1381.

[2]. Ibid.

[3]. Ibid.

[4]. Democracy Betrayed; published by the NCRI, 1995, 43.

[5]. Islamic fundamentalism; published by the NCRI, 131.

[6]. A collection of MKO’s statements, vol. I, Mojahedin’s Publications.

[7]. Keyhan London Weekly, No. 495, London.

[8]. Payam Iran, 1994.

mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – July 18, 2006

July 19, 2006 0 comment

Iraq

MKO and Sharing Strategic Interests with Iraqis

In a speech made in a rally organized by NCRI, Mojahedin Khalq Organization’s (MKO) political wing active in France, in Paris on July 1, 2006 Dowlat Nowrouzi, NCRI’s UK representative, referred to the organization’s widely advertised claim of 5200000 Iraqi people’s supporting MKO’s presence in Iraq and stated that “the organization shares common strategic interests with Iraqi people in accomplishment of peace and democracy”. Her words, a clear MKO’s paradoxical stance, are an affront to Iraqi people. She seems to have a weak memory to remember that MKO’s settlement in Iraq was the outcome of a made alliance with Saddam who led a dictatorial, tyrannical rule over Iraq and that, MKO acted as his mercenaries to suppress peoples’ freedom-seeking moves in Iraq.

How she has found “common strategic interests” is a question Nowrouzi should give an answer to, something she never does as it is Mojahedin’s convention. If it means sympathizing with Iraqi people’s struggle to accomplish demands of democracy and freedom pursuant to the country’s religious, cultural, and traditional conventions, no doubt, MKO’s strategy has proved to be in absolute contradiction with that of people. The group’s stance towards Iraqi political bodies and parties after Saddam’s fall and its policy of advocating disorder to survive in no way comply with peoples demands.

Before anything else, Iraqi people in an abundantly clear voice cry out for Saddam’s just trial for his overt and covert crimes done against the nation. MKO have yet shunned taking a clear position meaning they, too, bore the sin of a close collaboration with the fallen dictator whom they regarded, according to evidences, brother beyond a patron. The existing evidences unveil that Nowrouzi’s words are exactly the same as those that once were addressed to Saddam and his generals by Massoud Rajavi. At timely, regular meetings with Iraqi army and intelligence officials, Massoud Rajavi again and again paid homage to Saddam and talked of the necessity of close cooperation to safeguard common interests. In the irrefutable videotaped meetings between Massoud Rajavi and General Saber, the head of Saddam’s Intelligence Services, once Rajavi stated:

As far as we are concerned I have only one thing to say. In my mind and in my heart, I cannot separate the account of our interests from your interests. They are exactly matching each other….The reality is that our interests match each other and are closely mixed together. *

For sure, the interests of MKO in the reign of Saddam matched that of the dictator which was in contrast to the interests of people. In fact, the only thing Saddam did not account and had no concern for were people and their interests. It is not amazing to see MKO undergoing a sudden change overnight; they call it “strategy”.

Who can deny Saddam’s horrible, gruesome cells in Abu-Ghurib prison where MKO enjoyed possession of a few granted cells to utilize as suppressive means against its dissidents? Dissidents were a challenge both for Iraqi regime and MKO and as Rajavi once stated:

Whatever is against you, it is obviously against us, and vice versa. Our security is one. When we receive a blow, it is to both of us.*

The notorious opportunist MKO fish in troubled waters not caring the least for the interests of Iraqi peoples. At the time when the presence of foreign troops has negatively affected Iraq and has escalated turmoil and disorder, MKO is under the protection of the US army. Known as uninvited gusts, MKO intrude in Iraq’s internal affairs and even meddled in the process of elections the same as the remnants of the ousted regime did. Once General Saber appreciated MKO’s standing by Saddam’s regime saying:

We have an Arabic proverb that says: Brothers show themselves in hardship. You supported us with the bodies of your fighters.*

Thus, they had proved to be pro-Saddam fighters. Can they now provide any proof of sharing common interests with Iraqi people? Neither Nowrouzi nor any other MKO insiders can possibly give a distinct answer to the question. Somebody should tell MKO that when the broad day reveals the facts, it is unproductive to bury your head in the sand.

*. The quotes are all from the English transcript of videotaped meetings between Massoud Rajavi and General Saber delineated by Iran-Interlink.com.

mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – July 8, 2006

July 13, 2006 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq as an Opposition Group

NCRI/MEK Response to the West’s Package of Incentives

Following the package of incentives offered to Iran by five permanent members of the UN Security Council as a democratic solution to Iran’s nuclear issue, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the political arm of the terrorist MKO, characterized it an appeasement policy. The group implicitly voiced it to incite crisis in the region. Although the UN Security Council’s stance to solve the issue follows a policy of circumspection so as not to escalate the tension between Iran and the world community, the MKO’s baneful role that guarantees its survival through crises can never be ignored.

The Mojahedin shows great interest in Iran’s nuclear issue so that it constitutes a big bulk of its propagandistic activities. Its news headlines exclusively reflect the opinions of the extremist American parties while it censures Condoleezza Rice’s offer indicating the U.S. willingness to sit at the negotiation table with Iran in an effort to give rise to tension and widen the gap. As a terrorist group, the Mojahedin is more concerned about its own interests rather than what it regards to be a threat against global peace and the interests of the international community. Iran’s nuclear issue works as a precious opportunity to provoke a united hostile front against Iran to intensify the already existing disorder in the region, that is to say, once Saddam gone, the U N Security Council may work as a beneficial alternative. Not the least concerned about global peace and security, the Mojahedin are anxious to succeed to Iran’s political power. Bijan Nyabati, a left member of NCRI, in a recent interview stated:

If it is impossible to fulfill this option (change within Iran), which is absolutely impossible for the reasons I have already theorized, then, the sole left option is from the outside which, as I have told, is on the table of the US foreign policy. [1]

In a statement issued by the NCRI taking position against what it calls a retreat by five permanent members of the U N Security Council we read:

The Iranian Resistance considers the incentives offered to the clerical regime by five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany as a clear retreat from February 4, 2006 resolution by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency. [2]

Although Nyabati implicitly refers the US and the Security Council as leverage to overthrow Iran’s ruling power, however, his fellow Mojahedin very explicitly relate the nuclear issue and the Security Council’s resolution to the proposed third option:

The only effective policy vis-à-vis the mullahs’ nuclear threat is a firm policy including comprehensive sanctions and the recognition of the Iranian people’s demands for a democratic change. [3]

For the time being, Mojahedin does its best to get advantage of the existing gap between Iran and the US, with all the international levers of pressure atop, to incite a military option. Mohammad Mohaddessin, chairman of the NCRI’s Foreign Affairs Committee, following Ms. Condoleezza Rice’s offer stated:

Only a firm and decisive policy can prevent the regime from acquiring nuclear weapons. Such a policy must include comprehensive sanctions being imposed by the UN Security Council continuing negotiations and offering further incentives give the mullahs the only thing they need to develop nuclear weapons to bring the region and the world closer to the prospect of a catastrophic war. [4]

Of course, the world community is prudent enough to disregard Mojahedin in dealing with Iran’s nuclear issue through peaceful ways, but those who chorus what Mojahedin voice should know the outcome would intensify the global tension. Compelled to conceal its discrepancies with the Western capitalism, Mojahedin is stealthy creeping into the existing gaps to advance its ambitions. The Machiavellian tenets mingled in all layers of the group’s body, decides for Mojahedin what line to follow:

In this line which has to be discussed within the strategic issues, that is to say, what line we have to follow, and how we have to get advantage of the existing discrepancies among the imperialists, I have already discussed in detail. [5]

The slogans of the global peace, democracy, democratic change and more are all utilized to achieve ideological objectives in the same way Mojahedin once utilized Islam in Iran. They know better than anyone that, in contrast to their claim, they can never represent Iranian people; in fact, they try to foist themselves:

From an internationally point of view, we want to convince the world that we are representing Iranian people. [6]

Never can they face the world with their bare ideology, they need a camouflager:

Of course, in international conduct it is not the issue of ideology and political stances that has to be brought on. It is essential to impose ourselves as representatives of Iranian people. [7]

In fact, Mojahedin have long been urging upon the international bodies, world community, and human rights organizations through unconventional measures. They abstain no lies, groundless claims, distortion, and bullying manners in their international conducts. Mojahedin denounces the five permanent members of the U N Security Council as if it was the authoritative lead to decide what is right or wrong. It is after a new blood-bath but this time through a legalized terrorism. Its harsh reaction against any shown international flexibility to solve Iran’s nuclear issue in a calm, peaceful context well indicates its delirious accentuation of violence and terror. Now it is up to international bodies and organizations to decide how to tackle with this repugnant, cancerous phenomenon of terrorism if they mean business.

Notes

[1]. Bijan Nyabati interview, Taliah-Sepidedaman.com

[2]. ncr-iran.org, 7 June 2006.

[3].ibid.

[4]. ncr-iran.org, 4 June 2006.

[5]. Mehdi Abrishamchi’s speech addressed to Muslim Students Association, Italy, 15.

[6]. Ibid, 12.

[7]. ibid.

http://www.mojahedin.ws/index_en.php

http://www.mojahedin.ws/article/show_en.php?id=1242

Bahar Irani – 11 June 2006

June 15, 2006 0 comment

Germany

Precaution against Mojahedin’s Terrorists Plots in World Cup

Sporting events and international competitions never fail to attract public attention for a variety of reasons. Hundreds of millions of people worldwide attentively follow sports competitions through the public media or as spectators. It is an accepted fact that international competitions have always eclipsed any prevailing political issues and it is also accepted that, because of their focal importance, any number of opportunist political movements, and even terrorist groups, take advantage of this circumstance to accomplish their sectarian or political objectives. The plotted acts, from both the militant and political point of view, bear repercussions long after the event itself and the subsequent propaganda blitz can engross public opinion. The 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, for instance, had an appalling, long-standing effect on people’s minds because of an armed, terrorist group’s hostage-taking. It ended after the hostages and terrorists were killed and history recalls it as the bloody Olympic Games.

Now nearly 34 years after that incident, Germany will again host the World Cup. The ongoing security measures indicate that Germans are alert to the possibility of any threats, and precautions are being made to neutralize even minute suspicious moves to prevent any repetition of the past nightmare; that is to say, learning from the past can come in handy today.

It cannot be altogether ignored that the Mojahedin Khalq Organization, MKO, are historical imitators of other armed, terrorist organizations, and should be listed among the first on Germany’s watch-list. Although the group has recently inaugurated a new policy of denying its past terrorist misdeeds, perpetuation of its ill-will and hostile propaganda minimizes the effects of its claims. At present, the group is doing its best to focus on public opinion to distract attention. The methods it utilizes are in some cases too horrible and violent to forget them easily. For instance, the scattered self-immolations in European countries after Maryam Rajavi’s arrest by French police coerced the French judiciary to release her to cease the practice of these barbaric, sect-like acts.

The Mojahedin are real experts in the practice of psychological warfare. The world should not dismiss doubts about the ability of its sympathizers to show vigorous agitation over Iranian attendance in international assemblies or wherever the nations come together on certain occasions. Among these, the World Cup games are the Mojahedin’s best opportunity. To refresh our minds, let us go through the details of Mojahedin’s activities during the course of the 1998 World Cup in France; made into a sensitive, full-attention grabbing sporting event by the presence of Iran’s national team.

Utilizing its usual mafia-like methods, the Mojahedin obtained a pile of tickets sold for the play offs of the Iranian team and distributed them freely among its sympathizers so that they would be in position to disturb the peace during the games. There is evidence that several of these pseudo-fans were arrested by French police on the allegations of causing disruption. Mahmoud Malek Afzali, son of an old, Iranian singer serving the Mojahedin, was seriously traumatized by Mojahedin agents during the

Iran-America game because of his objection to his mother’s association with the Mojahedin:

Mahmoud Malek Afzali, a dissident to Mojahedin and son of a famous Iranian singer who cooperates with the Mojahedin, was seriously injured in the face by Mojahedin agents during Iran-America play. [1]

Malek Afzali further disclosed that he and his companions, a number of Iranian singers residing in the US, who had come to watch Iran play, had to recurrently change their accommodation in Paris to escape Mojahedin’s persecution. [2]

A French daily also reported the apprehension of four Mojahedin sympathizers:

Four Mojaheds are in custody on charges of burning a flag and provoking people. According to AFP, four Iranian political refugees arrested on Saturday are still in custody. According to a French judiciary official, one of them, a Dutch citizen, is alleged to have burned the Iranian flag and the other three, coming from Canada and the US, were provoking people into acts of violence. [3]

In another report we read:

French police had banned people from carrying any banners and portraits except for Iranian national flags for the Iran-America game. The question is how they had smuggled the Mojahedin’s arms and portraits of Massoud and Maryam into the stadium.

No doubt they were carrying them under their clothes. An eye witness confirmed that once a French police asked the portrait bearers whose portrait they were carrying and they slyly answered they were Iranian football players! So the police let them carry the portraits. [4]

Also in New York, the Mojahedin caused disruption during the Iran-America wrestling competitions:

The US police arrested a Mojahedin sympathizer on charges of disturbing the Iran-America wrestling competitions last Sunday. The intruder had the competition halted for a few minutes. [5]

These events dispel any doubts that the Mojahedin will stay idle during the days when the Iranian team plays in Germany this year. The group has already orchestrated a vast psychological blitz opposing Iran’s presence in the World Cup, but it was hushed-up before making things worse for proposing so absurd, preposterous a demand. Structurally, the Mojahedin is an extremist, violent organization that ideologically believes in armed struggle. It masterminds violent measures with the provided professional expertise. Such operations are commonly followed by exaggerated maneuvering over the accomplished feat which fuels its propaganda machine for long afterward to be the focus of the public opinion.

Reports indicate that the Mojahedin is kicking off preliminaries to play its role in Germany. It is obtaining and purchasing bundles of tickets to distribute among its sympathizers and whoever consents to cooperate with them. It is a golden opportunity for the organization to bypass the political standstill it is mired in especially for the time being. The absence of Massoud Rajavi, revoking the asylum status of some members in Germany, its uncertain future and increasing number of defectors in Iraq, terrorist charges in France, and a lot more are all the crises the group is facing at the moment.

German authorities should be cautious about the threat of the Mojahedin. A terrorist group that has betrayed its own people, hardly ever respects the interests of other nations. Plotted turbulence and disorder, even on a small scale, may call into question Germany’s security capabilities followed by a backlash from public opinion that it does not trust Germany to host any other International competition. It is a responsibility for Germany, and whoever believes in peace, to maintain security during the World Cup football matches to squelch politically motivated moves that disturb the peaceful atmosphere of the internationally organized games.

Notes:

1- Nimrooz, No. 479, 30 June 1998, 3.

2- ibid.

3- Nimrooz, No. 478, 26 June 1998, 3.

4- ibid.

5- Nimrooz, No. 488, 31 July 1998, 4.

mojahedin.ws – Bahar Irani – April 12, 2006

March 30, 2006 0 comment

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