The ruling of the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC) to remove the ban on MKO’s activities remains a serious challenge failing to convince the UK government that the organisation has really foresworn the terrorist tactics which continue to be a potential threat to civilians. Far beyond being an internal threat, terrorism stages a global threat that has to be fought by all the means. A globally proscribed terrorist organization, MKO may appeal to a variety of lawful judiciary bodies and take advantage of proficient lawyers and proponent parliamentarians to divert governments and international bodies from the potential terrorist threat of the organization. The advocates of MKO should be notified that to win a judicial decision in appeals process to de-proscribe a terrorist organization never implies that its terrorist threats have ever been curbed. It has to be noted that it is a tactic commonly exploited by MKO to alter its serious ideological and cultic challenges from an internal issue to a globally concerned judicial case, a ploy manipulated by majority of cults. A comparative study of some current cults reveals amazing results that never excludes MKO as an exception. The tactics employed by cults and a number of political groups to influence public perception and debate are considerable. I spite of countless suppressive measures to extend their hegemonic domination over the insiders, they escape any scrutiny and controls from the outside world. As Margaret Thaler Singer discusses in her Cults in Our Midst, “Despite a rather grim record of atrocious behavior, time and again cults escape the scrutiny and controls bestowed upon other organizations and activities”. To find out how cults benefit from legal leverages and influential individuals and authorities to circumvent law enforcement is possible only through a careful study of the approaches utilized by certain cults and groups. For instance, involving in lawsuits against respondents are generally costly affairs and time consuming but cults utilize a variety of approaches to overcome the problem. Explained by Thaler Singer, “Legal suits are costly affairs. But some cults have developed large in-house legal staffs, including huge numbers of paralegals to help the resident lawyers. Thus legal actions are not very costly for the cults to pursue, whereas the people who must defend themselves can easily go broke battling against such tactics”. It has also to be pointed out that not all advocates and supporters of a cult and political group are in total agreement with ideological tenets and objectives of the target group. A variety of factors like political and party interests as well as personal interests and financial concerns may involve. Brought to attention by Thaler Singer, “Some people committed to cultic groups become downright illogical in their support. For example, there is a small claque of social scientists who have become procult apologists. Some have been given trips to exotic places by large, wealthy cults; some fear revealing critical findings because certain cults have paid for research and underwritten trips to professional meetings”. As noted, in some cases, the laws not only fail to deter the threat of cults but also work as legal buffers defending them against opponents. The question is, are the learned Westerners who support MKO really unacquainted with the tactics employed by the cults? As many of them assert, they have been well acquainted with MKO activities since long and besides, English intelligence systems have long been monitoring the terrorist activities of the group and have already filled exactly recorded details which can help reaching a logical resolution about MKO. There are suppositions why the English fail to reach a consensus about MKO. A doubtful inference is that the group’s English advocates are initially kept in dark about the real nature and the past history of MKO. As mentioned, British intelligence bureaus as well as news agencies, BBC in particular, have a valuable record of MKO’s terrorist operations and atrocities perpetrated inside Iran against American personnel, British interests, regime’s authorities and innocent civilians since its formation. Then, it is doubtful that they have been uninformed of vital facts concerning the national security as people’s representatives. Looking it from a different angle, the English might be dealing with MKO as a psychotherapy case. That is to say, regarding the organization as a destructive cult that has enforced a variety of cult and mind control techniques on the members, they have to be treated with outmost care and caution. That is much because the English have learned any suppressive measure to repel cults may backfire seriously and cause irreparable social damages; they may be in some way following American’s paradoxical approach in dealing with MKO since they have once paid the price of MKO’s ideological hostility against the imperialism. Finally, the English may have concluded that MKO, as a political organization with a military infrastructure, has reached the end of its political life and must run a peaceful life of retirement. For sure, it takes time to instil the truth into old veterans, a responsibility some British factions have assumed on themselves. However, precautionary measures deem necessary concerning MKO; as a globally proscribed terrorist organization and a destructive cult, it has to be under constant, strict surveillance. Bahar Irani,Mojahedin.ws-February 11, 2008
Bahar Irani
It goes without saying that Rajavi resorted to armed struggle expecting the support of international and foreign powers. Rajavi’s visit to France in early 1981, where he was given a glad hand winning propaganda support and facilities for settlement, was followed with declaration of military phase. It is evident that all such activities on the part of France aimed at exploiting Mojahedin in order to make due political changes in Iran. According to some MKO ex-members (e.g. Lotfollah Meisami), Rajavi was well aware of global transitions and even before initiating the armed phase was willing to make use of leftist parties and USSR-oriented groups whenever necessary. In this regard, Meisami writes:
Rajavi knows that world is divided into the West and the East and for sure is aware of their reciprocal understanding due to his political awareness. When released from prison, he got a formula according to which he had to make the West and the East satisfied to assume power. On the one hand, he makes secret contacts with the Soviets Union to make them convinced to rely on Mojahedin rather than Tudeh party pretending to be the greatest opposition group in Iran, and on the other hand, invited Western-oriented groups and parties for dialogue and negotiation. In fact he had relations with both the U.S. and the USSR. (1)
As such, he tried to recruit some Liberal intelligentsia with capitalism tendency including Hedayatollah Matindaftari, Ali-Asqar Haj Seyyed Javadi, Manuchehr Hezarkhani, Abdolkarim Lahiji, Fereydun Gilani, and later on Jamshid Peyman, some SAVAK members and Moezzi, Shah’s private pilot. An interesting point is that after the annihilation of Socialism camp, Rajavi turned to Western-oriented liberals, some of whom are already in NCR, and Rajavi makes use of their international reputation for attracting the attention and gaining the legitimacy regarding his liberalist mottos. Another instance of such an opportunistic policy is the case of Sa’adatti and delivering the case of General Moqarrabi, former member of Tudeh party, to Russians which had great consequences on armed phase for the organization. In fact, all these actions might be justified under the pretext of the world being divided into two camps of capitalism and socialism with Mojahedin’s pretentious strategic tendency towards the latter at the time. As implicitly stated by Saeed Shahsavandi, MKO made efforts preferably in winning the supports of USSR to assume political power:
In fact the purpose of organization’s contact with the USSR is gaining facilities and being armed as an authorized group. (2)
However, these facts reveal the major policy of MKO regarding the strategic role of the either camps in achieving the political power. But soon after the fall of socialism, the organization made an immediate shift toward the opposite camp.
We are to emphasize the fact that Rajavi’s opportunistic orientation in winning the political power and support of influential figures in international relations as well as world powers has been one of his goals in which his success depended upon the political status of NCR, MKO and also Rajavi’s talent in convincing them of the possibility of overthrowing the Iranian regime with regard to the potentiality of Mojahedin. In fact, the organization recruited members from both leftist parties and liberals as a means for achieving its objectives in due time. The fact that West in general and Europeans in particular, in spite of being aware of the terrorist actions of Mojahedin, supported the organization implies their fostered hope in fulfillment of the promise by Mojahedin to overthrow the Iranian government.
The countries attitude, however, ceased once they realized that the second revolution was not at hand. For instance, the France government, as the main supporter of Mojahedin, changed its stance concerning Mojahedin. It has to be pointed out that Mojahedin’s freedom for political and propaganda activities in France exceeded the supposed rights of refugees in international conventions which resulted in quantitative and qualitative growth of the National Council of Resistance to posture as a liable main opposition. However, the NCR soon proved to be incapable of winning the slightest significant victory and its advocates resolved to look at it with a more realistic and cautious eye and began to withdraw their support. Referring to Mojahedin’s strategies and tactics in the Europe for winning propaganda support Antoine Gessler observes:
The People’s Mojahedin of Iran, as we have seen, are past masters in the manipulative arts. Like many far Left organisations, they know the gears that run the media. And they are very gifted at”smoke screening”reporters. (3)
Additionally, he refers to opportunistic, dualistic and pragmatist features of Mojahedin seeking legitimacy and attention of outsiders and writes:
In addition, the Mojahedin are superb lobbyists,”tracking”down political officials, deputies, senators, etc., to get a signature which is supposed to support the PMOI’s fight and provide recognition to it as the only legitimate opposition. (4)
Bijan Niyabati, a leftist member of NCR, illustrates such a condition affected by the illusionary promise of overthrow and says explicitly:
The strength of military strokes of Mojahedin against top Iranian officials spread the false picture of short-term overthrow of Iranian regime not only among Iranian political activists but also foreign parties. (5)
Therefore, the political supports given to Mojahedin and their militancy were replaced by a logical withdrawal and all those governments that had neglected illegal plots of Mojahedin in their countries, and in France in particular, in the hope of establishing relationship with the so-called alternative of the Iranian government had to limit the group’s freedom. Rajavi’s hopes dashed, he had to seek new approaches to strengthen inter-organizational constancy and adopt a defensive mechanism before reaching unavoidably consequent crises.
Niyabati acknowledges the fact that the pressure of foreign forces exerted on Mojahedin made them make some new decisions, change their external relations and internal structure. According to him, the main changes occurred in the geometrical form of internal structure of both MKO and NCR. Before the change, Mojahedin claimed to be the hegemonic lead of a united front of oppositions through a council leadership, but after being in disgrace with western supporters, they were forced to demonstrate their real anti-democratic nature which Rajavi and his sympathizers tried to conceal under a variety of theoretical justifications:
The sum of internal and international pressures and their political impacts on the National Council of Resistance, the strategic failure of armed struggle and its organizational impacts on MKO, the lack of public support in its real concept, and most important of all, an urging need to take advantage of the Iraqi soil followed by a shift from the strategy of micro to macro, which despite the Mojahedin’s claim to be promoting their previous strategy was an acknowledgement of the failure of their old strategy, necessitated MKO to turn into a full pyramidal organization that had to be absolutely ideological. (6)
As Niyabati justifies, the ideological revolution was, in some respect, an inevitable consequent of dwindled foreign supports and its impacts on MKO and NCR. France ventured to assist Mojahedin at a time when it had taken a hostile stance toward Iran and broadly contributed military and logistic aids to Saddam in his war against Iranian aiming at overthrowing the Iranian government. After a while and due to new circumstances, France had to make a revision in its policy toward Iran. Although Mojahedin had earlier made the grounds for moving to Iraq by inviting Tareq Aziz, then Vice Prime Minister to Saddam, but their destabilized conditions in France and the internal conflicts in NCR were the best justification for such a transfer. In a nutshell, their policy in moving to Iraq may be considered as a result of the loss of support of western governments and France in particular. Moreover, the initiation of the ideological revolution was a precautionary defensive measure aiming at controlling the forthcoming challenges.
References:
1. Meisami, L.; The moral decline of a Mojahed. Raah-e Mojahed journal, (32), 1985.
2. Saeed Shahsavandi interview with the voice of Iran. Part 50.
3. Antoine Gessler; Autopsy of an Ideological Drift, 163.
4. ibid.
5. Niyabati, B. A different look at the internal ideological revolution of Mojahedin. p.12.
6. ibid, p.20.
The paradoxical stance adopted by the US towards Mojahedin-e Khalq cultist organization has turned into a rather serious challenge mounting the already existing tension between the US and Iran. According to a number of political analysts, the dual stance might be the result of internal political disparities among the parties. But it has to be noted that regardless of all disparities, the parties reach a consensus when it comes to confront any alien element that imperils the country’s general interests. However, the prevalent political contradictions emerged mostly after the State Department first designated MKO as a terrorist organization in 1997, a status that the group continues to occupy ever since.
Despite MKO’s claim that its classification as a terrorist organization was at the behest of the Iranian government, the State Department’s latest report describing the group a cult of personality as well as a terrorist group indicates that the Americans have well realized the group’s threats. The internal disputes to deproscribe MKO in no way mean that some have come to be duped by group’s pro-democratic propagandas but rather it is regarded as an easy tool against Iranian regime. The speculation was even further underpinned when the group came to receive protection of the coalition forces in Iraq following Saddam’s fall. However, there are many undeniable factors, especially disclosed by the State Department’s report, that convince Americans never put any trust on the group. The features can be classified as:
– MKO’s Marxist ideology
– Group’s innate antagonism with capitalism and adoption of armed struggle to start a mass movement against capitalism
– Perpetration of terrorist operations against American military personnel and civilians inside Iran
– Playing a pivotal role to escalate the emerged US-Iran tension following the Islamic revolution
– supporting the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979
– MKO’s secrete ties with the USSR and the communist camp in general
– A zealous attachment to Machiavellianism
– Masterminding terrorist plots against American interests inside Iran
– Unannounced but implicit acknowledgment of al-Qaeda’s 9/11 terrorist operation
– Wearing a mask of pro-democracy as a tactic to assume political power
– maintaining the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts across the world
– close military and intelligence collaboration with Saddam’s regime Regardless of all lobbying attempts to get the group off the hook, MKO remained on the list. But the raised question is that how a designated organization happened to be the first terrorist organization to be granted ‘protected status’ by the US in its move to combat terrorism?
Hardly any of the designated terrorists groups on Americans’ list strive for getting close to the US to gain political legitimacy and most of them are recognized to be jeopardizing American interests here and there. In contrast, MKO hankers after convincing Americans that throughout its campaign, it has tried to accomplish a goal of establishing democracy on the US model. Interestingly, the group in an attempt to justify its claim distorted its past records of activities and adopted ideology. The best evidence is its published Democracy Betrayed wherein the group tries to prove absolute devotion to American favoured capitalism and liberalism.
But Americans are well aware of the fact that exactly in the same way that they manipulate the group, Machiavellian mannerism is theorized within MKO. That is why Americans, in spite of the heavy cost they sometimes have to pay, keep in touch with the group while is keen to it at a distance; that is exactly what America is doing in Iraq.
Soon after Americans settled in Iraq, more than a year after the invasion, they actually frustrated MKO’s liberation army by disarming it. In July 2004 all members of MKO in Iraq, including the leadership of the organisation based there, signed agreements which permitted them release from the control and protection of the Coalition forces in Iraq. In order to obtain that benefit, each individual had to sign a statement containing the following words:
…I agree to the following:
a. I reject participation in, or support for terrorism.
b. I have delivered all military equipment and weapons under my control or responsibility.
c. I reject violence and I will not unlawfully take up arms or engage in any hostile act. I will obey the laws of Iraq and relevant United Nations mandates while residing in this country.
Thus, renunciation of militarism was enforced on MKO against its will and its terrorist potentialities were curbed in Iraq. Furthermore, by setting up Temporary International Presence Facility (TIPF) in the vicinity of Camp Ashraf, dissatisfied members were granted opportunity to leave the group which debilitate the organization to a large extent. Beyond that, the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in its last report released on April 30 for the first time brought up establishment of a cult of personality by its leader:
In addition to its terrorist credentials, the MEK has also displayed cult-like characteristics. Upon entry into the group, new members are indoctrinated in MEK ideology and revisionist Iranian history. Members are also required to undertake a vow of "eternal divorce" and participate in weekly "ideological cleansings." Additionally, children are reportedly separated from parents at a young age. MEK leader Maryam Rajavi has established a "cult of personality." She claims to emulate the Prophet Muhammad and is viewed by members as the "Iranian President in exile."
To sum up the Americans views, they indirectly argue:
– That MKO is a terrorist group that maintains unusually aberrant manners compared with other blacklisted organizations
– That its mannerism is rooted in its cult-like structure
– That MKO is a greater potential cult threat beyond its terrorist threat
– That the group is not only a global threat but also a closed cult enslaving its own members physically and mentally
– That the granted ‘protected status’ in Iraq is a measure to have it under control and to find an appropriate way of restoring the members’ mental health
– That instilled by the hope that it can win the US support, MKO can be prevented to commit mass-murder suicide like that of Jim Jones cult of the Peoples Temple
– That it is possible to have MKO under strict control through international conventions
– That the US’s paradoxical deal with MKO is the result of recognizing group’s dual terrorist-cult nature
– That MKO respect no political ethics in its campaign to assume the power
– That the gained experiences over destructive cults like Jim Jones and David Koresh is a warning to be more cautious and conservative to cope with MKO
– That ….
It can be continued with more reasons to see why the US has adopted a paradoxical but rational approach concerning MKO. Mojahedin.ws-February 2, 2008
The ever-increasing political and military crises within Mojahedin due to the wrongly adopted policy in the period subsequent to the failed rallies of June 20, 1981 had devastating internal as well as external impacts on MKO relations with other opposition groups in general and the National Council of Resistance (NCR) in particular. The formation of NCR in 1981 at the peak of terrorist perpetrations of MKO, referred to as strategic strokes by Rajavi, expanded the illusion of an abrupt overthrow of the regime among Mojahedin allies. The quantitative growth of such allies implied the fact that the opposition groups, regardless of political, ideological and strategic disparities, were unanimous to wed all their potentials under the leadership of MKO to bring down the regime. The promises made by Rajavi as well as the encouraging supports by some Westerners made the majority of NCR members yield to the hegemony of Mojahedin. As such, all joined parties and factions had to endorse the essentiality of armed warfare as the cornerstone of the struggle to accomplish the cause despite they were critical of the plans and the drafted charter of NCR. In fact, by submitting to the political hegemony of Mojahedin, all members of NCR entrusted the leadership of armed struggle to Mojahedin.
Many believed that repetitive conduction of bloody, terrorist feats was a grand opportunity for MKO to swagger of big achievements since a number of political and religious figures of the Islamic Republic were the victims of these operations. Rejoiced at committing atrocities for which the group hardly faced condemnation, some Westerners began to cultivate hope in MKO as an appropriate alternative for Iranian clerical government. However, soon MKO’s terrorist activities inside Iran were controlled but Mojahedin and their supporters were the sole losers and MKO could not escape the negative consequence of being stigmatizes as a terrorist organization.
Interestingly, even in such critical conditions Mojahedin’s leadership made an attempt not only to keep integrity of his hegemony on the council but also to expand its dimension. Simultaneous with increasing tensions within NCR, the Iranian regime was overcoming the internal crises. Desperate to find a solution, Rajavi met with Tariq Aziz in 1981; it disappointed all NCR allies who had trusted his leadership. Within one year after Rajavi’s meeting with Iraqi officials, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, one of the largest and weighty allies of Mojahedin, left the council. Soon after, the leftist party, led by Mehdi Khanbaba Tehrani, and also Bani-sadr, the ousted Iranian president, detached from NCR. Subsequently, a number of NCR members got separated due to a variety of organizational as well as personal reasons. The heavy avalanche of defectors challenged the legitimacy of NCR to lead the opposition, and above all, Rajavi failed in recruiting new allies. Niyabati, although a left member of the council, well illustrates the critical phase. He elaborates on the internal crises of Mojahedin and the failure of armed warfare and their grave influence on NCR:
It was even worse in political stage.The failure of Mojahedin in the short-time overthrowing of the regime as well as the failure of NCRI, considered as the sole democratic alternative, in recruiting all the anti-Shah and anti-sheikh political forces made Mojahedin subject to intolerable pressure both from inside and outside of NCRI. Evidently, the main target of all pressures in the first place was Massoud Rajavi. (1)
He also analyses the effects of the big claim of the overthrow on Mojahedin’s allies in the council and the process in which the council turned from an ally to a critical opponent that challenged Mojahedin:
Out of the council, an increasing process of antagonism against Mojahedin that had emerged through 1982 and had reached its peak in 1983, formed into an overwhelming confrontation with Mojahedin in 1984. This remarkable skirmish with an organization fully involved in a bloody war against a regime which logically was the basic enemy of all opposition groups has been, if not rare, a unique occurrence in the contemporary history of Iran. (2)
Opposed to such statements aiming at legitimizing the reactions of Mojahedin to their critics, Mehdi KhanbabaTehrani, a former member of NCR, draws a different picture of the relations of Mojahedin leadership with NCR members. He says:
At the end of the year 1983, when [MKO’s] political failure was proved, impatience, lack of self-control, hegemony, and excluding all non-Mojahedin political groups, under the pretext of keeping ideological principles of the organization, replaced the previous policies. From now on, any criticism on the part of anybody is considered as a ‘satanic’ plot and has to be counterplotted completely (3).
The statements made by another ex-member imply that Rajavi, despite his claims negating the influence of Mojahedin on NCR, resorted to the factor of ideology in his relations with dissident members of NCR. In this regard he writes:
MKO addressed all the NCR members and said ‘First, you should not take any position against our ideology. First you confirm our ideology and then we will answer your strategic questions. We will give no answer to those denying our ideology’. And finally due to the lack of democracy and totalitarian nature of relations within Mojahedin, NCR members left it one after another. Consequently, since 1984 NCR was undervalued and became another wing of MKO active in political and diplomatic affairs of Mojahedin. (4)
The critical circumstances necessitated controlling of the escalated internal crises within NCR as well as justifying MKO’s political and military failures. Niyabati in his review of the ideological revolution refers to the double effects of the challenges met by Mojahedin due to the internal crises of MKO as well as that of NCR and justifies the necessity of an ideological revolution to curb them:
To confront such complicated conditions as a prerequisite for the next phases, while the lack of an internal and international equilibrium in favor of armed warfare was apparent, Mojahedin’s leader had to take for a decisive and crucial decision. (5)
And finally, Niyabati focusing on the necessity of the organization’s turn from a pseudo-democratic organization to an ideological one, considers the pyramidal ideological revolution as the sole solution for responding to the challenges of the critics. He acknowledges that the change could strongly influence the relations of Mojahedin and also guarantee the integrity of NCR:
The sum of internal and international pressures and their political impacts on the National Council of Resistance, the strategic failure of armed struggle and its organizational impacts on MKO, the lack of public support in its real concept, and most important of all, an urging need to take advantage of the Iraqi soil followed by a shift from the strategy of micro to macro, which despite the Mojahedin’s claim to be promoting their previous strategy was an acknowledgement of the failure of their old strategy, necessitated MKO to turn into a full pyramidal organization that had to be absolutely ideological. (6)
In a nutshell, beside the factors mentioned as the reasons for the start of the ideological revolution, the internal tensions within NCR played a key role, too. For Rajavi, the situation of NCR due to its external consequences was as important as controlling the internal relations of MKO. Rajavi’s appeal to the quantitative growth of NCR by means of a foolish order, resignation of MKO members and their registration in NCR, implies the awareness of Mojahedin leader and his western sympathizers of the importance of the collapse within NCR. The next significant issue for Rajavi was the fact that he had to initiate the same ideological revolution within NCR in order to control any kind of opposition or dissidence.
References
1. Niyabati, B. A different look at the internal ideological revolution within MKO, Khavaran publication, p.14
2. ibid, p.18
3. An inside look at the leftist movements in Iran: a collection of some interviews with Mehdi KhanbabaTehrani. (1987). 17th interview.
4. Rezvani, N. Neo-scholastics in Rajavi’s cult. (1966).
5. Niyabati, B. A different look at the internal ideological revolution within MKO, Khavaran publication, p.18
6. ibid, p.19
Bahar Irani,Mojahedin.ws,January 21, 2008
The existing facts signify that MKO cannot possibly maintain its present organizational structure and its insistence to preserve Camp Ashraf as a whole is a strategic attempt to avert whatever destructive and repulsive effects that might affect the totality of the organization. Rajavi in his messages has repetitively focused on the preservation of Camp Ashraf as one of the strategic guideline and a duty on the opposition forces throughout the world. Regardless of its strategic significance, Camp Ashraf has to be regarded as Mojahedin’s ideological receptacle and the symbol of organizational resistance. Consequently, Mojahedin oppose to any decision of relocation of the Ashraf to other camps inside Iraq which no doubt leads to destabilization of the organization. No need to say that MKO’s expulsion and the consequent shutting down of the Camp Ashraf crucially questions the organizational survival. However, under no circumstance the leading leadership agrees to undergo any change. But, is it the same with the subordinate ranks and members?
The intensified challenges among American parties following the released report by American intelligence agencies that Iran has halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 necessitates a logical and peaceful solution to an issue which have totally disappointed MKO. Through disclosing Iran’s nuclear threat, MKO anticipated instigation of a militarist conflict between Iran and the US; it was the supposition behind Rajavi’s fixing January 2009 as the deadline for the collapse of Iranian regime and Rajavi promised that if nothing happen at the end of the deadline, all the Ashraf residents were free to stay or leave. The countdown has already started and many, including the Rajavis, are closely watching the days passing while nothing of great significance comes in sight. The least consequence will be avalanche-like break of Ashraf veterans that will split the body of the organization.
There is also a possibility that if any threat is sensed from the part of MKO, the world will come to the conclusion to exile the group to a certain location where the group will face strict limits on its levels of activities. In this case, the sole victims will be those members whom the leadership uses as scapegoats to triumph over the crises and guarantee preservation of the organization under the same hegemony. It is a proven fact that, as in many cases of the failed military and suicidal operations, the leadership decides the fate of members who are destined to pay for the terrible mistakes of inept and imposed leaders. No doubt, these members will never taste the sweetness of freedom and will be destined to pass an absolutely stagnated and disheartened life.
But a willful and logical decision will lead members onto a different path of individual and political identity that may also guarantee continuation of the course of the struggle to accomplish the intended objectives for which they had joined. It can only happen through a revolutionary move by the members that separates the body from the head since the present hegemonic domination of the head disappoints the possibility of any deliberately collective change within the organization.
The body without the head may seize the opportunity of getting help from humanitarian and international organizations to decide their own destiny. It grants the members an opportunity, after many years of indecisiveness, to make a rational decision to ask for asylum in any country they think might be appropriate to live a peaceful, normal life as free men. In contrast to the organizational instillations that whoever leaves the organization will be destined to run a passive and isolated life while carrying the stigma of being an agent of the Islamic republic for the rest of his life, the unbound members will actually regain not only their individual identity but also find the chance of reorganizing a new body lead by a capable and qualified head to instigate an idealistic and political struggle if they will. No doubt, these members will give rise to more fundamentally democratic and idealistic political activities since they carry the long experience of being witnesses to much undemocratic, nasty conducts both in the principles of struggle and inter-organizational relations.
It might be hard for the members encircled in Camp Ashraf to anticipate any better destiny for the organization since they are under non-diminishing pressure of organizational dogmatism and unaware of the political flux of the outside world. However, the truth finds its way through the walls to inform the insiders that MKO is nothing more than a defeated and overwhelmed crew in the face of the world’s political vicissitudes. The sole salvation for the body is to abandon the head that is pressing down the body deep into the mire for its own survival. Any schism in any form is more advantageous than absolute demise.
Bahar Irani, Mojahedin.ws, January 17, 2008
Encampment of MKO, after its expulsion from Iraq, in France and other European countries as well as the United State of America for the reasons discussed is out of the question. The next option, then, might be the region Arab countries, Latin America and the continent Africa.
Jordan, because of its strategically geographical location, seems to be of undeniable priority for MKO; Iraq is the sole country that separates Jordan from Iran. Naturally an opportunist group, MKO made attempts to establish close relations with Jordan prefiguring it as the alternate option after Iraq and Rajavi had repetitive meeting with King Hussein of Jordan. Even before Rajavi’s flight to Iraq, he met with King Hussein when he was on a visit in France. The meeting was said to have been arranged by Saddam. Although King Hussein was a figure of disrepute among the left groups and MKO in particular, it was so important a matter for Rajavi to establish relations with him as a prospective patron since King Hussein and Saddam were close alliances. However, all these expectations and anticipations have proved to be fruitless since Jordan has utterly rejected to grant asylum to members of MKO.
Jordan and Iran restored diplomatic ties in the early 1990s after the two states severed their relations in 1980 following the outbreak of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war and the King Abdullah paid an historic visit to Tehran in September 2003. In September 2007 some news reports broke that Jordan had granted asylum to members of MKO. Immediately, Nasser Judeh, the Jordanian government Spokesperson, acted in response that the Kingdom did not receive any leader or member of Mujahedin-e Khalq, and does not allow the organization to operate on Jordanian soil”. He reiterated that His Majesty King Abdullah was determined to build brotherly relations between the two countries based on mutual respect and understanding and that, Jordan never consented to grant asylum to a terrorist group which was harbored by the former Iraqi regime and was designated as a terrorist organization by the US, Canada and the EU.
Syria, maintaining a long, friendly relationship with Iran even in the course of Iran-Iraq war, is already an impossible option. The case of two MKO members, Ebrahim Khodabandeh and Jamil Bassam, who were arrested and returned to Iran from Syria in 2003, well indicates that the country is in no way a safe haven for members of MKO.
In respect to other Gulf region countries, Bahrain, Qatar, they prefer not to be engaged in the issues that might generate further tension between them and Iran. Besides, Iran’s sovereignty over the Persian Gulf actually paralyzes any move by the group’s so-called liberation army in the embryo.
At the first look, Latin America, because of a variety of scattered active militia and guerrilla groups, might seem an appropriate option. But it should be noted that a number of Latin countries have come to enjoy periods of peace and tranquility after long periods of various revolutions and opposition conflicts. They need peace to reconstruct their countries and avoid whatever might lead to the escalation of any tension. Latin America is politically divided into two groups of countries and territories; ruled under dictatorial militarism and independant revolutionaries. The former countries absolutely disapprove military and terrorist groups since the presence of any alien opposition that might collaborate with the internal opposition builds up a potential threat against the ruling power. Significantly, MKO has long been under the influence of the Latin theoreticians of the urban and rural guerrilla warfare. Besides, MKO’s natural potentiality to enter any illegal and underground trade in union with other active professional smugglers and gangs worsens the problem these countries can hardly overcome at the present.
The second group of countries are stabilized through revolutions and have developed close political and economic ties with Iran. Regardless of their ties with Iran, traumatic effects of revolutions need peace and tranquility to be healed and consequently, any equivocal move is under severe surveillance. For sure, an alien group that is a globally blacklisted terrorist organization can never be trusted to be granted asylum by these countries; a number of these countries are already facing allegations of harboring terrorism and of course, any sign of favor shown for MKO works as evidences against them.
The next only option, then, is Africa. The settlement of the organization in Africa, provided that any country there let it in, is equal to absolute political isolation. Relocation of MKO to any African country means political suicide of an organization that considers itself as the vanguard of a democratic move to liberate not only Iranian people but the mankind in general. The abject misery of being expelled to African countries, after living seemingly glorious days in European countries, is too much for MKO to endure and the group never consents to encamp in African countries.
Considering that there is no option for MKO after Iraq, the question is what is the appropriate solution for Mojahedin to save their organizational structure and entity? No doubt, Mojahedin necessarily have to change their tune and before anything, they need to have another internal revolution in all aspects of organizational structure, ideology, strategy, and leadership. The first rational move will be reconsideration of two alternative options; either dissolve the organization and let the members free or reorganize a logically democratic struggle. The options have to be discussed in detail.
Looking at it from a different angle, the excitement of MKO over the POAC’s ruling is for something beyond its mere removal from the list of the proscribed organizations. That is to say, the judgment plainly decrees that MKO, as a political organization with a military infrastructure, has reached the end of its political life and must run a peaceful life of retirement in an appropriate resort place with no better alternative than England. For two reasons, MKO cannot pass the days of retirement in other European countries. First, its proscription as a terrorist organization has developed a phobia of its threat among the European states. Second, in none of the other European countries there could be found suitable political grounds to evolve the embryo of revolution for other countries whose exiled opposition are inspired through close contact with the intelligentsia communities. Once in France, the early Mojahedin could avail the ostensible political dynamics there; but it was nearly three decades ago and besides, Mojahedin have grown too old for the tast.
Now the West holds no more hope for the claimed capacity of Mojahedin who themselves have come to recognize that they can no more bury their heads in the sand and have to succumb to realism. MKO has lost hope to assume the political power since its struggle might and morale have debilitated and no country intends to entrust a bankrupt group with the legitimacy of a political alternative. Consequently, it is a matter of common sense and prudence for MKO to find an appropriate resting place, while maintaining the look of an active group, to start off an unannounced retirement and to brood over a lost, unproductive life.
England, because of its strongly conservative policies and as a country that has well merged traditionalism with modernism, seems to be a much appropriate option. There MKO would be granted the opportunity of having offices and publishing papers and bulletins and arranging regular rallies to maintain the prestige of an active opposition as well as enjoying the nice weather and romantic aura of London.
It is sheer truth rather than an ironically stated or humorous remark. For many reasons, MKO cannot announce retirement but at least it can survive for a while by taking refuge in a safe reclose. Unlike other modernized European countries, English people are anxious to keep to traditions and classism and show much reluctance to make innovations even in literature, cinema and the like. They prefer reading long novels of Dickens and poems of Shakespeare. Such a piquant, enchanting classic atmosphere provides a favourite resort for the retired Mojahedin since they are also nostalgic feel a great attachment to the past. In fact, the entity of the organization has its roots in its past and in any granted circumstance, there is an attempt to connect the present to the past.
A look at the veterans and analysts of the organization appearing in a variety of TV programs signifies them as the vestige of a passé political group who sooner or later have to be retired. In respect to the group’s leader, how long the elegant dresses, make ups and beauty products can hide her aging visage. She also needs retirement and a calm, nice place to repose. They have lived enough to the ripe age of retirement, like thousands of English citizens, to walk on the banks of the river Times and chat about the past. The POAC’s ruling deems necessary as a prerequisite to sign Mojahedin’s retirement papers and provide for their pension. It is needed to grant them a status as senior citizens to live peacefully in the company of other retired British citizens.
Mojahedin.ws,
For the reasons discussed, relocation of MKO to France, and also other European countries, after its expulsion from Iraq is out of the question. The next option, then, might be the United State of America. In spite of telltales that the organization benefits from a number of supporters inside the Congress and other lobbying bodies, for many reasons, including ideological and strategic challenges, MKO is barred to inter the US territories, let alone to be accepted as political settlers.
It is a well proven fact that MKO ideologically antagonizes the capitalist camp characterized as deterring man’s evolution. In MKO ‘s early ideological texts, the group’s anti-capitalist ideas and its ambition to implement a radical redistribution of wealth as well as to inaugurate a classless society are fundamentally sanctioned principles. In contrast to their strongly claimed pro-democratic conducts especially in the past few years, there is no close affinity between MKO’s ideology and liberalism. In many critical situations that the organization has considered as turning-points, and particularly in the course of its ideological revolution, MKO has reiterated the significance of its ideology, even compared with those of Marxist groups, as extremely antagonizing capitalism and especially that of the America’s. Unlike terrorist groups like al-Qaeda whose antagonism with America is rooted in their reactionary and historical positions, MKO’s contradiction is generated out of a scientific comprehension and socio-historical dynamism. Giving further clarification about MKO’s ideological revolution, Mehdi Abrishamch has stated:
Mojahedin’s ideological grasp, in contrast to others, has distinctively and quantitatively historical and social inclinations. Nowhere else can you possibly find the world explained as in MKO and chiefly by Rajavi. [1]
That is MKO’s last achievement revealed particularly following the ideological revolution, which is exactly concurrent with the publication of the State Department’s genuine report on MKO. Although some five months after the publication of the State Department’s report, and in a hasty response to the report, the organization published a book entitled The Democracy Betrayed, the report itself and the later registration of MKO as a FTO proved that the US has developed a deep understanding of MKO and its dual nature and that, it would no longer be duped by the group’s fallacious mottos and claims. The latest report of the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism released on April 30 discloses even a deeper appreciation of the organization by stating that the group’s leader has established a”cult of personality”. Thus, the US is well aware of the group’s left ideological drift that in circumstances shifts tactics in pro-democratic disguise.
The support MKO claims is receiving from a number of neocons, by the means of which it might practice the proposed “third option”, proves to be nothing above a political ploy regarding the group as cost-effective instrument against Iran. Even in some instances MKO is looked upon as a worthless implement since Americans have no doubt that advertised publicity of MKO among Iranians ends to the gates of a castle in the air.
It seems that the existing US-Iran tensions can be an alibi to grant MKO a temporal settlement in the US soil. However, MKO’s terrorist tag and the US determination to combat terrorism on the one hand and MKO’s insistence on preserving its militarist structure that indicates its tenacity of resorting to armed struggle strategy on the other hand disillusions Americans to trust and endure presence of the organization on their soil. The capacity of MKO as a terrorist organization to conduct terrorist operation anywhere in the world is a truth Americans fail to come to terms with as stated in the State Department’s latest report:
MEK leadership and members across the world maintain the capacity and will to commit terrorist acts in Europe, the Middle East, the United State, Canada, and beyond. [2]
Americans believe that MKO has the capacity to conduct its terrorist feats under an idealistic cult structure throughout the world. The self-immolation and suicide operations are known to be the most practical stratagem and revolutionary deeds advocated by the leaders:
Many members and sympathizers of Mojahedin, residing in military camps as combatants against the regime or scattered in different countries, are urging to commit self-immolation or other self-sacrifice deeds to advance Iranian modern revolution. [3]
Of course, Americans admit that in spite of MKO’s open manipulation of propaganda and terrorist approaches to achieve its objective in its campaign against the Iranian government, it has never been tried for its crimes:
The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives and has been supported by reprehensible regimes, including that of Saddam Hussein. During the 1970s, the MEK assassinated several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the violent takeover in 1979 of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Despite U.S. efforts, MEK members have never been brought to justice for the group’s role in these illegal acts. [4]
The cause is not malfunctioning of judiciary systems but MKO’s capacity of adaptation strengthened through other complicated ideological and cultist teachings. MKO’s inherent tendency toward Machiavellianism frustrates having any trust in its promises and Americans are well aware of the fact that even the group’s surrendering of weapons following the invasion of the coalition forces to Iraq was a tactic to prevent its complete demise. Stated in the State Department’s report:
Following an initial Coalition bombardment of the MEK’s facilities in Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK leadership negotiated a cease-fire with Coalition Forces and voluntarily surrendered their heavy-arms to Coalition control. [5]
MKO has the potentiality of perpetrating terrorist operations in the US far beyond the menaces of al-Qaeda. Even much above the terrorist threats, MKO’s cultist deeds, like self-immolations in some European countries, are perpetration of unspeakable cultist prejudice and violence which Americans can never tolerate because they have had enough of these deeds by destructive cults that have shaken the country only in the past few years. Thus, MKO’s presence in the US will impose irreparable damages both on the country’s policy making and the nation. The American citizens never consent to live next-door with the terrorists and the cultists.
References:
[1]. Lecture delivered by Mehdi Abrishamchi on the ideological revolution within MKO.
[2]. The State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the report released on April 30.
[3]. Mojahed, No. 253: Massoud Rajavi’s speech made in the first open session of the ideological revolution in Paris.
[4]. The State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the report released on April 30.
[5]. Ibid.
But, MKO never consents to be dispossessed of its organizational identity and individual transfer of the members but the option of the wholesale relocation. Many assume that since some key ranking figures, including the leading cadre and its president-elect, are already situated in France and the organization is engaged in an extensive campaign aimed at winning support from among the politicians there, then, France might be the next appropriate option. However, there are evidences that corroborate unfeasibility of such a formed theory some of which are mentioned below:
1- The organization is not acquitted of its allegations of June 17 and French judicial system is still making inquiry about its file.
2- There are countless indications of alleged civil disturbances and violations against citizens and refugees, like the incident in which agents of MKO assaulted an association of Iranians in Paris and wounded 13, that makes French police and authorities to be seriously concerned about the hostile nature of the organization.
3- Organizationally instigated cult-like operations like the June 17 self-immolations with two deaths have been serious warning for repetition of similar acts; two members recently went on trial before a French court for allegedly helping a third member burn herself to death.
4- There are also corroborated evidences that led to the expulsion of Rajavi and his gang from France in 1985 that led to his alliance with Saddam and its flight to Iraq.
5- There exists a widespread public panic regarding MKO’s cult-like makeup and its potential threats against the French citizen.
From the very first days of the group’s refuge in France, strict measures were taken by French authorities to have it under surveillance. However, on occasions it found opportunities to engage in illegal activities and violation of regulations concerning refugees’ status. Although the leaders had already agreed not to engage in any form of political activities in France, its clandestine activities were juxtaposed to a snake’s progress:
Paris had required that the Iranian refugee leaders sign a written statement, containing the routine text promising to avoid all political activity on French soil. This would be respected for exactly two weeks. [1]
Following the coalition forces attack against Iraq and fall of Saddam, MKO started to move the headquarters to France again. According to the French intelligence services, the Mojahedin’s aim was to move their”world operational centre”- previously based in Baghdad – to the Val d’Oise. The head of France’s Direction for the Surveillance of the Territory (DST), Pierre de Bousquet confirmed the danger posed by the group beyond that of a campaigning political group:
The People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI) has, for a long time, been going over to a terrorist logic. Despite the organisation’s rhetoric, which claims only to be fighting against a regime, it should be noted that their attacks have usually struck many civilian victims. As to the claims of the PMOI that it wants to bring democracy to Iran, this must be understood within the paradigm of the movement’s extraordinary autocracy, where a radical cult of personality is enforced. Its members must be blindly devoted to Massoud Rajavi and his wife. The slightest criticism is severely punished. The PMOI can be considered as having followed a sectarian detour which is obvious in the fanatical behaviour of it militants: the dramatic immolations of recent days show the sad truth about them. [2]
Based on confidential reports that proved the organization was engaged in terrorist and clandestine activities, produced two weeks before 17 June 2003, DST undertook a major operation against the group under the code named”Theo”. Following the operation, the Figaro could obtain and publish what was believed to be the first-hand information on MKO and was enough to spread panic among the nation:
The PMOI has carried out a number of activities on French soil that are clandestine, sectarian, delinquent, and even seriously criminal. In France, tile organisation has two or three hundred militants and sympathisers. Its ‘hard nucleus’ is made up of a few dozen militants. [3]
Even before relocation of its headquarters from Iraq to France, the organization had started expansion of its residence sites in France as a preparation to establish a second base similar to Ashraf. A report by DST asserts that:
The construction company, Algeco, was called in by the Mojahedin to add bungalows in their camp on rue Gordes. Several hundreds of square meters of housing space have been rented by the organisation in the Val d’Oise in its reorganisation on French soil”. [4]
Accordingly, the wholesome transfer of Camp Ashraf to France seems to be out of question. In respect to Germany, MKO’s situation there is not better than in France. Its trespass of law as well as financial scandals in Germany has sounded the alarm for the authorities there to keep a watchful eye on the organization’s activities. Exploitation of members’ children, after separating them from the parents forcefully, for illegal fund-raising activities was among its most noted outrageous and immoral actions there. Referring to uncovered scandals of MKO by German authorities, Anne Singleton has said:
In Germany, the government uncovered the Mojahedin’s financial activities. After a two year investigation, the German High Court on 21st December 2001 closed the Mojahedin ‘shop’ – twenty-five houses and bases – after evidence was found of misuse of Social Security and fraud. Disturbingly, the Mojahedin had used the members’ children who had been evacuated during the Gulf War of 1991. These children, whilst they lived in the Mojahedin’s bases in Germany, were required to undertake work in the base and take part in fund-raising activities, collecting money in the street. At the same time, the Mojahedin were abusing every possible avenue of Social Security in Germany in order to claim benefits for these children. Documents in Germany showed that ten to twelve million Marks had been used by the Mojahedin to buy weapons. Considering that a Social Security claim of 130 – 260 Marks could be made per child per day, this is a conservative figure of the amount that the Mojahedin collected on account of these children. [5]
Of course, MKO’s situation in other European countries is just the same. Its proscription as a terrorist group in England makes it even worse and erects impassable barrier since England, as a member of European Union, has adopted strict rules against terrorist threats under its enacted Terrorism Act. Besides, any asylum granted to MKO by the European countries raises suspicions on their claim of their engage in war against terrorism. Then, will the US welcome the opposition that might be exploited against Iran? Let’s discuss it. References: [1]. Antoine Gessler; Autopsy of an Ideological Drift, Translated by Thomas R. Forstenzer, 2004, p. 103.
[2]. Ibid, 93
[3]. Ibid, 95
[4]. Ibid, 100
[5]. Anne Singleton; Saddam’s Private Army, Iran-Interlink, 2003.
Bahar Irani,December 31, 2007
Preceding articles investigated two major factors leading to the development of internal ideological revolution of Mojahedin and the role they played therein. The encountered crises following declaration of armed struggle as well as the failed strategy of overthrow were grave challenges threatening the organization. Rajavi’s hurried and unreasoning resort to armed phase followed by an illogically drawn timetable of short-term toppling of Iranian regime heavily affected the internal and external relations of Mojahedin. The third factor that forced the organization to cling to the alternate of the ideological revolution was the gradual dwindling of its social prestige and legitimacy. Besides, feelings of distrust began to arise among the cadres as a result of observing ever increasing anti-democratic relations within the organization.
Gradual dwindling of MKO’s social prestige
An optimistic analysis of MKO’s failure in the accomplishment of its short-term promise of overthrowing Iranian regime well indicate that Rajavi had an incorrect and subjective evaluation of the public element, namely, masses. His alliance with Bani-Sadr and confidence in the supposed potentiality of sympathizers and members gave him the illusion that Mojahedin was highly supported. He was under the false impression that the march of a number of members and sympathizers might lead to the elimination of any public fear that prevented masses from entering onto the scene in support of the group. The failed rally on 27 September 1991 made it clear to Mojahedin that masses walked in an opposite track which totally disappointed them of relying on social support as their last winning card from the very beginning months of the armed phase. However, the overall failure of this event was a severe put-down to the false illusion of Rajavi. Niyabati, in his review of this phase of armed struggle, points to the fact that it had no gain for Mojahedin but disappointment. He also believes that the September rally made Rajavi reconsider about having any faith in masses’ support. In fact, it was a test that convinced Mojahedin not only people accounted them no political-ideological legitimacy but also would engage in battle against them if needed:
After the wide-range military offences of Mojahedin in the summer 1981, the organization withdrew to take a defensive position; it was decided to test the social element once more. As such, Mojahedin started masterminding armed rallies in late summer 1981 in order to prompt people onto the scene. At the peak of these rallies, the test of the social element was ascertained to be negative. (1)
The confession well approves the strategic miscalculation on the part of Rajavi and Mojahedin. Although Niyabati tries to hide the lack of social support under the banner of the controlling strategies used by the regime, he acknowledges the fact that Mojahedin came to realize that they could in no way rely on the masses to bring about regime’s downfall:
The fact was that Mojahedin were still facing the problem of mobilizing masses for armed struggle that was known to be a locked strategic bolt and the three-year-long plan to overthrow the regime proved to a an absolute failure.(2)
The test being failed, Mojahedin turned to target the ‘social elements’, besides top official figures, to retaliate the defeats. His hopes totally frustrated, Rajavi this time termed the ‘social element’ as tip-fingers of the regime to intensify challenging ordinary people. He states that against his expectation, the masses had played a different role against Mojahedin. Elaborating on Mojahedin’s shift of attitudes in terrorist actions Niyabati has said:
The failure of Mojahedin in bringing the social element onto the scene, so as to unite them with the vanguard forces, through organizing rallies sheltered by Mojahedin’s military units results in the continuation of resistance by cutting the tip-fingers of the regime. (3)
Hadi Shams-Haeri, an MKO ex-member, analyses the 27 September rally as follows:
The organization’s analysis was that people supported the rally in heart but did not dare to participate since they were not armed. So we had to assure them that we would support them in case of firing from the side of [regime’s] guards to encourage them. Therefore, the 27 September rally was organized but again the masses refused to come and the strategy failed. The organization had predicted that 27 September was the regime’s last day and it would assume the power in the evening, but nothing happened. (4)
It is self-evident that the leadership’s miscalculations not only failed to work up support but also took away the little prestige it had already gained. Besides, the organization had to deal with the consequent challenges faced from within. Although it took some time to get internal tensions externalized, their invisible internal impacts cannot to be ignored. To curb internal reactions of any form, a number of decisive decisions had to be made.
The increase of distrust in the leadership
The first serious and critical consequences were the rapid grow of distrust in Rajavi’s leadership. Rajavi’s egocentric decision makings all resulting in strategic failures put the blame on him and made many doubtful about Rajavi’s ideological and political qualification. In spite of the fact that his inefficiency came to be even more palpable after the ideological revolution, according to Mehdi Abrishamchi, in any circumstance Rajavi was the one who said the last word:
Even prior to the internal ideological revolution, it was evident to all of us that Massoud was the key answer to all the ideological necessities of revolution in this historical phase. (5)
As such, it goes without saying that the leader was the one mostly met by crises and the consequent result would be escalation of distrust. As Niyabati openly points out:
The failure of Mojahedin in the short-term overthrowing of the regime as well as the failure of NCRI, considered as the sole democratic alternative, in recruiting all the anti-Shah and anti-sheikh political forces made Mojahedin subject to intolerable pressure both from inside and outside of NCRI. Evidently, the main target of all pressures in the first place was Massoud Rajavi. (6)
The rapid swelling of distrust within the organization put no other solution before the leadership but to resort to preventive measures to meet internal challenges.
The increase of anti-democratic relations in MKO
The only solution to the internally threatening critical conditions was to put an end to the question of leadership and his criticism forever. Cultivation of anti-democratic relations in MKO and NCRI was Rajavi’s short-term solution. However, a fundamental change in the organization’s internal and ideological structure deemed necessary. Still, before the initiation of the ideological revolution, the encountered serious backlashes were severely repressed in a variety of forms. Going into details about organizational reactions, Norooz-Ali Rezvani has said:
In 1984, MKO imprisoned more than 700 members out of whom 73 members, including me, had criticized the organization’s ideological, strategic flaws like accuracy of armed warfare and lack of any democratic internal relations and violation of the members’ democratic rights. I spent 10 days in gaol and 47 days in solitary confinement in the cities of Kahrizeh and Soleymanieh [in Iraq]. Finally, we cut our ideological connection with the organization and announced we were ideologically detached. (7)
The dispersion of organization’s forces
Rajavi called upon all members of the resistance cells and sympathizers inside Iran to leave the country. It led to the dispersion of members who now completely desolate, had to submit to Rajavi’s hegemony. Therefore, the reformation and revival of organizational relations and exercise of hegemony on members demanded a new mechanism to bring and control all the members under a single leadership:
It seemed something much unattainable at the end of 1984 if the past [organizational] framework had to be maintained. Therefore, to safeguard the new revolution and prevent another failure of Iranian people in struggle against repression and colonialism, the integrity and strategic stability of the leading organization had to be preserved. (8)
References:
1. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, p.14.
2. ibid, p.16
3. ibid, p.54
4. Shams-Haeri, H. (1996). The Swamp, vol 2. Khavaran publication, p.90
5. The lecture delivered by Mehdi Abrishamchi on the ideological revolution.
6. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, p.15.
7. Rezvani, n. (1996). Neo-Scholasticism in Rajavi’s cult, p.8.
8. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, p.18.
Bahar Irani,Mojahedin.ws,December 14, 2007