Articles

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

What makes a terrorist?

The U.S. State Department supplied over 30 reasons for classifying the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) as a terrorist organization. Among those reasons, "[S]tresing the ability and the will of MKO members and leadership to conduct terrorist operations across the world." Yet, U.S. Army Military Police guard the organization’s bases in Iraq and maintain control over the traffic and supplies heading in and out.

This parallel cooperation/condemnation has long been criticized by news agencies such as Al Jazeera, and rose to prominence in 2003. That year, many allege the CIA promoted MEK-sponsored attacks along the Iraq/Iran border.

The Pentagon and White House seem happy to use this group to their own end. In 2002, The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the public arm of the MEK, was cited as the prime source for revealing Iran’s nuclear program. At the time, Bush and other officials denied their praise of NCRI and MEK signaled a shift in the United States’ official position toward the organization, but it didn’t stop the praise.

Of course this is nothing new. Supporting groups like the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan or the Kurds in Northern Iraq has long been considered a foolproof formula for maintaining a strict foreign policy without getting our hands dirty. However, it seems foolhardy to pick our terrorist organizations. Just because an organization is using terrorist tactics to unseat power in Iran doesn’t make it any less terrorist.

Who separates a terrorist from a freedom fighter? Depends on the context, I suppose.

The White House is peopled by students of Kissinger, so it comes as no surprise the White House and Pentagon are using Kissinger’s doctrine to make lemonade out of their Iraq-war lemons. Just as the U.S. normalized relations with China (effectively ending the cold war in the east), relations with Iran will eventually become more friendly (particularly if the U.S. can count on cooperation from the likes of Turkey and Saudi Arabia). If our foreign policy follows history, the first people who will suffer for those normalized relations will be the MEK in southern Iran and (perhaps) the Kurds in Northern Iraq.

It’s happened before:

When Kissinger arrived in China, one of the first demands met was that all covert military actions against China cease immediately. Perhaps that came as solace to the family of Stephen "Gip" Kasarda Jr., who had given his life supporting CIA missions into Tibet, where many Tibetans, who had been trained at Fort McHale, Colorado, were waging a guerilla war against China. It probably came as no small consolation to the Tibetans, however, as the U.S. immediately withdrew official support and the Chinese army moved in to many locations that had been taken and held by the Tibetan freedom fighters.

How many more U.S. soldiers and operatives will be sacrificed "fighting freedom"? How many more groups who have counted on U.S. support over the years will be stranded and forgotten as the U.S. makes compromises across the world? Foreign policy is a complex issue, and no doubt many who gave their lives understood it was a distinct possibility—maybe even a guarantee. However, shouldn’t the United States’ war on terror extend to all terrorist organizations? If not, why not? And who will provide us the classification system that enables us to tell the good guys from the bad?

Independentreport.org – June 05, 2007

June 25, 2007 0 comment

The cult of Rajavi

Mojahedin Khalq (Rajavi cult) Back against the wall

A publication by Aawa Association, June 2007

http://www.iran-aawa.com/selbsmorde.pdf

The report has been produced in 4 languages. parts of it reads:

…

Recently the public learnt about members of sects committing suicide or putting themselves on fire. Scientists, psychiatrists and sociologists have pursued studies into this. One of the elementary features of sects is that you cannot distinguish it from the outside. You will have to look behind the facade and recognize similarities between sects and terrorist groups.

In public, sects and their members do behave quite normal and maintain a low profile. Throughout the democratic Europe they would camouflage as peaceful groups, publicize democracy and peace and pretend to fight for human rights, but in the back part of their heads they would be pursuing quite a different philosophy. At the command of their leader they are prepared to kill innocent individuals…

June 23, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

The Leadership Hegemony after the Ideological Revolution (1)

The article is compiled in two parts. It aims at reviewing the development of leadership in MKO from the beginning up to 1985. Next , the term ‘leadership’ in the context of ideological revolution would be defined and compared to the statements made by MKO’s ex-members concerning anti-democratic nature of Rajavi’s personal leadership and its role in the strategic failures of organization. As such, three relative topics will be discussed: leadership in MKO, leadership in ideological revolution, and the reasons of the ex-members’ opposition to hegemonic and ideological leadership of Rajavi.

Leadership constitutes one of the major issues of ideological revolution in MKO. In fact, the ideological revolution set up the meeting-point wherein the council leadership, referred to as the democratic centralism, was delegated to Massoud Rajavi. Although in the organization’s manifest the council leadership is considered to be a taken for granted and unalterable issue, many critics as well as MKO’s ex-members believe that the organization has been led under Rajavi’s hegemony.

Based on the resources of the organization itself, the significance of council leadership has been elaborated. Since the definition is derived out of Marxist doctrines and explicitly that of Mao’s viewpoints concerning collective leadership, of course it has its roots in dialectic Materialism which Mojahedin strongly believe to be instrumental for further comprehension of the council leadership. Elucidated on the structure and the best standards needed for conducting a revolutionary organization we read:

Centralism, as the highest decision-making organ, consists of the most qualified elements that in whole build up the most appropriately composed structure within an establishment. That is to say, the leading cadre is appointed based on the cadres’ prime qualifications that were manifested through a variety of revolutionary assignments. [1]

Also, in drawing a clear demarcation between democratic centralism and non-revolutionary, reactionary apparatus exploited by dictatorial and hegemonic controllers Mao is quoted:

In non-revolutionary (reactionary) systems (dictatorial administrations and military commanding echelon in reactionary armies) leadership is either hegemonic or simply a formality that have no logical conformity with the leader’s position and qualifications. Differently, in a revolutionary organization the most qualified elements in whole take the sensitive role of leadership upon themselves. [2]

In contrast to these statements, a brief look at the history of MKO from the beginning up to the ideological revolution, and also in two other critical phases of mass arrests in 1971 and the ideological schism in 1975, reveals the traces of hegemonic leadership. In an analysis of the chief reasons leading to tragic events of 1971, the charismatic leadership of Hanifnejad was concluded to be of significant impact which led to a decision on his intra-organizational execution. According to Lotfollah Meisami:

…Also indicated in the message was that because of his remiss, the leader had to be executed within the organization. They came to the conclusion that Hanifnejad, known to be the ideological symbol, had to commit suicide. [3]

However, Pahlavi’s regime executed Hanifnejad and the issue was totally forgotten. In the next phase, the schism, Mojahedin believe Shahram’s hegemony as well as the impact of Marxism and non-revolutionary traits led to the schism within the organization. Since then, Rajavi, inside the prison, gained a central status in the leadership to the point that in (30 Khordad) June 1981, he individually decided and declared the armed struggle phase. Rajavi has repeatedly acknowledged his full responsibility for the decision:

… he (Rajavi) individually made the serious ideological decision to get engaged in armed warfare, despite the probability of physical annihilation of organization. [4]

The interval between started from 1975 to 1985, when the first clause of ideological revolution of the organization was declared, may be considered as the process of theorizing personal leadership in the organization. Niyabati refers to this phase as follows:

For the first time in the history of contemporary revolutions an organization disclaimed its adopted principle of democratic centralism, a several hundred year-long achievement of the organized revolutionary struggle, and (correctly or incorrectly) hands over the leadership to a leader who is accountable only to God. [5]

Mojahedin substituted hegemonic leadership for their former and typical model of leadership, is referred to by Niabati as the Achilles’ heel. They denied democratic centralism openly, in their view of the matter imitating the model of Shiite leadership. The typical feature of this leadership mode is that the leader is in no way held responsible for whatever flaw. Above that, nobody is permitted to violate the sanctuary of leadership and he is immune of any challenge, and liable to be the cause for the insiders’ absolute self-devotion and blind obedience. As Niyabati describes

The sole solution to the issue which has long been the Achilles’ heel of all the contemporary movements and revolutions lies in the development and the maintenance of the theory of imamate in the organization. [6]

Taking such an approach, regardless of the historical background and ideological infrastructure of Mojahedin, was due to their encountered crises as a result of successive failures. It is a main reason the ex-members point to for their separation. Abrahamian expounding on Rajavi’s hegemony states:

In mid 1987, MKO possessed all the features of a cult. It had its own elevated leadership status formally known as leader but he was informally labeled as the existing imam. Mojahedin have established a rigid hierarchy with all the orders issued from the top and the prime duty of any common force is unquestionable and blind obedience. The organization has developed its own distinct ideology. [7]

The dissidents and critics interpret such adopted approach as explicit transformation into a cult that since long was the cause for the detachment of many members and fails to be limited to the declaration of the ideological revolution in 1985. For instance, a number of affiliated student associations in Europe issued a letter declaring their separation from MKO because their ideological and political viewpoints opposed the hegemony of Rajavi which, they believed, was steering the group toward cultist relations in the near future, a prediction that came true a few years later.

Reza Ra’isi Toosi, Hamid Noohi, and Hussein Rafi’i analyzed the process of hegemonism and violation of democratic centralism that transformed the organization into a cult:

If the leader (Rajavi) continues to disavow self-criticism and returns not to respect adopted principles, he will increasingly be mired. Depending on whether the organization will achieve political power or undergo complete isolation, the degree of deviations varies. [8]

Then, they predict the future of organization as follows:

In case the liberal move fails to assume political power, and specifically be contradicted roughly and face stalemate, it will inevitably transform into a cult due to its isolation and separation from the masses, many instances of which the history can recall. [9]

References

1. A Survey of the Possibility of Deviation of Democratic Centralism or the Difference between Scientific and Non-Scientific Suspicion in Organizational Affairs, MKO publications, Tehran, 1979, p. 6.

2. Ibid.

3. Meisami, L. (2003). Those Who Passed: The Memoirs of Lotfollah Meisami. Tehran. vol.2, 112.

4. Niyabati, Bijan; A Different Look at Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution, Khavaran Publication, 22.

5. ibid, 35.

6. ibid, 90.

7. Abrahamian, Yervand; Radical Islam.

8. The Process of Separation, Mo’ud publication, 1980, 164.

9. ibid, 164.

Mojahedin.ws – June 14, 2007

June 21, 2007 0 comment

France

Anniversary of Raid on a Sect

In Paris on Sunday 15 June, a judge ordered detention of the leader of MKO and a number of her followers to face trial for possible links with terrorism. The following is what the Observer reported of the French police raid to arrest the suspects and the aftermath.

The leafy rue des Gords in this little market town north of Paris hardly lives up to its reputation as a new world capital of terrorism.

It was here that hundreds of police smashed open the doors of suburban houses in a dawn raid which the French claimed had pre-empted worldwide strikes by the militant Iranian opposition group, the People’s Mujahideen.

About 20 members of the organisation were on hunger strike on the pavement this weekend, watched by riot police and comforted by neighbours who had lived alongside the exiled Mujahideen for 22 years. The operation, involving 1,300 police, concentrated on 21 rue des Gords, home of Maryam Radjavi, the most visible leader of what has been dismissed as a violent Marxist-Islamic sect.

Around the building a permanent encampment for followers had been set up. But police blocked attempts by residents – all political refugees – to return and collect their belongings as they continued to search cellars and attics.

The suicide attempts by fire in Paris, London, Rome and Berne focused attention on the movement without clarifying why France chose last week to turn on the Mujahideen, given refuge here after falling out with Tehran’s Islamic leadership.

Labelled as Maoist when it was founded in 1965, the Mujahideen worked alongside Ayotallah Khomeini when he planned the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. But the allies soon fell out and thousands of Mujahideen refugees sought sanctuary in France in 1981. They campaigned against oppression in Tehran, where their members were tortured and hanged in public.

Radjavi was still being held by police this weekend, among more than 160 people taken into custody. The DST, the French equivalent of MI5, claimed that she and her husband, Massoud, were ready to turn Auvers into their terrorist headquarters.

Referring to allegations by Iran that the Mujahideen were responsible for at least 500 murderous attacks inside the country, Pierre de Bousquet, the DST’s director, said the organisation could no longer claim that its aim was to defend human rights and bring about democracy.

‘The attempts at self-immolation to protest against the arrest of Madame Radjavi are proof of a new fanaticism,’ he said. ‘Auvers was to become the Mujahideen’s world headquarters after the loss of bases in Iraq.’

The Observer – 18/06/2007

June 21, 2007 0 comment

The Ideology of the MEK

Mojahedin’s Failed Operation and the Ideological Revolution

Although not yet translated into English, Bijan Niyabati’s “A Different Look on Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution” contains countless evidences that challenge MKO’s adopted circumstantial decision-takings. Being an ardent advocate of MKO and the Rajavis, Niyabati has never intended to criticize the group’s strategies and the leadership flaws; rather his book maintains an absolute appreciation of the organization. The book, however, infers a source of unquestionable facts that challenge MKO in a variety of crucial phases.

Based on Niyabati’s book, the intention is to go through the organization’s ideological revolution that consequently resulted in the group’s transformation into a cult. Of the great importance is that the analyses by Niyabati and other ex-members are in some way identical; the difference lies in the fact that the former is still a ranking member of MKO while the latter are labeled as the agents of the Islamic Republic.

The failure of the operation Eternal Light (Forough Javidan) initiated challenges against Rajavi’s egocentric decision-making that led many forces of the organization to their death. Most of his critics believe that the operation was in no way correspondent with the organization’s line of strategy and that, Rajavi’s uncertain analysis of the post cease-fire situation compelled him to make a hasty decision.

In spite of claims made by Rajavi and his commanders that the operation was a great success with unbelievable military achievements, the casualties were much greater for Mojahedin to sustain. Niyabati explicitly calls the operation a great loss and defeat:

The operation Eternal Light was definitely a military failure. Through the operation, Mojahedin and Iranian modern revolutionaries lose hundreds of the best commanders of the coming revolution. (P. 82)

However, both Mojahedin and Niyabati insist on the strategic and political achievements of the operation. But it is believed that the achievements in general were nothing more than surfacing and theorizing the narrowest internal relations molded as the ideological revolution that is considered to be the “lost ring” and justification of the strategic crisis within Mojahedin. The post-operation phase was much critical and Mojahedin came to face a remarkable drop out of the members and a predominant sense of passivity among the remnants. But before these disharmonies could surface, rajavi took the control in hand and shifted to another phase of the ideological revolution to confront the non-surfaced crisis. Here are a number of analyses made by the ex-members on the operation.

The operation Eternal Light was the result of the search for an outlet out of an inevitable cul-de-sac rather than to be a strategic necessity. An analysis of the operation from the political and tactical point of view and Rajavi’s rationalization of the operation indicates that the move was the outcome of a desperate situation that had completely immobilized Mojahedin both in political and military fronts. A group that had once concentrated all its campaign marrow in a form of militia warfare and had already suffered great loss, suddenly and unbelievably had shifted to adopt a classic military tack to start a big cross-border operation. In fact, Mojahedin hurried to take advantage of a no-war no-peace situation created after the ceasefire. Niyabati explains the situation as this:

In the created interval following the acceptance of the ceasefire and after the deployment of the UN forces and the closure of the borders, the Iraqi army, in order to gain the upper hand in the upcoming peace negotiations, started slight and scattered over-the-borders military operations and inflicted heavy losses over the body of the regime’s military machine. It was a real chaos in the fronts and many Iranian forces were putting down the arms to flee. The acceptance of the ceasefire had damaged the regime’s dignity. (P. 78)

In spite of Mojahedin’s earlier insistence on peace and ceasefire, the group never anticipated that Iran would consent to ceasefire and was dreaming a long-lasting war that preciously troubled the water for Mojahedin to fish. Based on rajavi’s own analysis of the situation that discarded the possibility of any peace agreement, niyabati says:

The Mojahedin’s leadership utterly shocked by the fait accompli (acceptance of ceasefire by Iran) decided to counteract. It was a truth that in the strategy of the modern liberation war, no room was left at all neither for peace nor for ceasefire. (p. 79)

Regardless of the fact that at the end Rajavi made the claim that the operation was merely a political move propelled by a feeling of self-sacrifice, the move was mainly planned, under the illusion that Iran was vulnerable, to topple the regime. It was not long after sacrificing a great number of the forces that Rajavi, to avoid shouldering the responsibility of the failure, started analyzing the operation as being political and justifying the defeat. He condemned his forces of being a slave of inner and outward inclinations which worked as the alibi for putting the next phase of the ideological revolution into practice. In fact, the failure granted him the best opportunity to sharply reprimand the forces and to announce that he has found the recourse to topple the regime with the same remainder of the forces.

The second phase of the ideological revolution started from the point where Mojahedin came to recognize an urgency to have further control over the forces. It was much because the group could no more rely on the strategic “social element”, namely the masses, to assume power under the pretext of the revolution of the masses. As Niyabati sums up:

From this point on (the operation) Mojahedin develop a quantitative perception concerning revolution, the vanguard role and its association with the masses. From now on, the revolution is no more an issue for the masses. (p. 86)

Explicitly evident in the analyses of the ex-members, Mojahedin are bankrupt in social support. Maryam Rajavi, well aware of such a crucial lack, sees no other choice but to rely on the remainder of the forces when she says “with this same Liberation Army we can and must overthrow the regime of Khomeini”.

Expounding on Maryam Rajavi’s new position concerning the regime change, Niyabati thus depicts the potentialities of the Liberation Army:

With this noted sentence uttered by Maryam Rajavi following her promotion to the second rank in the leadership, the responsibility of overthrowing the regime was officially rendered to the vanguard. That is the point where the function of the army that had the mission to break the spell of repression and to pave the way for the mass uprising comes to an end and the army itself bears the vocation of overthrow. (p. 86)

Niyabati believes that the second reason behind the ideological revolution was to deprive the forces of any sense of psychological and mental confidence and to establish a new system of revolutionary values. The remainders of the operation Eternal Light could neither be reorganized nor could possibly be employed in the new strategic path. Furthermore, they could not be replaced as they were old revolutionary veterans. The solution, as Niyabati points out, was either a shift in the strategy or making the forces pass through an ideolog:

Now the circumstances compelled Mojahedin to adopt a new course. In respect to the existing condition neither the pivotal role of the Liberation Army could be of any significance nor could it continue to be national but ideological. (p. 86)

It was a necessity that could only emerge out of a forcibly tensed relation, in contrast to the previously loose context, within Mojahedin. As Niyabati points out:

Thus, the ambiance of the post-operation of compels Mojahedin to abandon the policy of extension to get tense. Once more Mojahedin establishment enters a new phase of its internal ideological revolution. (p. 87)

The ideological revolution that initiated in 1984 to end the leadership council and to promote Rajavi to an uncontested leader, evolves into an expanded system of heretical values that affects the innermost layers of Mojahedin’s internal as well as political relations.

Obviously, because of this novel system of ideological values in general, the extent of changes includes all the acts and reacts and the ideological regulation of the individuals with the organization in all aspects of political and social contexts. (p. 23)

Majority of detached members represent nearly the same aforementioned causes that advanced the second phase of the ideological revolution following the failure in the operation Eternal Light. In fact, most agree that it was the very start point for transforming Mojahedin into a cult.

All references are from Bijan Niyabati’s “A Different Look on Mojahedin’s Ideological Revolution”

Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – June 2007

June 13, 2007 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

A just ruling misinterpreted

In a recent gathering of a number of MKO’s sympathizers outside the British Parliament, they called for removal of the group’s terrorist tag at a time when the EU intends to keep it on its terrorist list. The rally is reported to have been attended by David Jones, a Conservative Member of Parliament, who assured the protestors of his unflinching support.

Referring to the ruling of the European Court of Justice on December 12, 2006 he said: "I was present in the European Court of Justice last year when in February it deliberated the case of the PMOI. This court in December ruled that the name of the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran should be removed from the list of banned organisations".

Of course, Mr. David Jones may not be willing to explain how a banned organization can have the permission of orchestrating a rally in broad daylight for ten successive weeks, as the group claims, outside the British Parliament. Besides, the European Court of Justice has never ruled that MKO “should be removed from the list of banned organisations", as he states. Here is the verdict of the court in its press release No. 97/06 12 December 2006:

In conclusion, the Court finds that the decision ordering the freezing of the OMPI’s funds does not contain a sufficient statement of reasons and that it was adopted in the course of a procedure during which the right of the party concerned to a fair hearing was not observed, and that it is not in a position to review the lawfulness of that decision. Accordingly that decision must be annulled in so far as it concerns the OMPI.

Mojahedin.ws – 12/06/2007

June 13, 2007 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq 's Function

MKO and the US presidential election

The US forthcoming presidential election has turned to feed MKO’s propaganda machine in its antagonizing position against Iranian regime. The group seems to be walking onto the front of the republican candidate Duncan Hunter because he is showing more hostile attitude toward Iran. Reported by Reuters earlier, republican candidates for U.S. president have agreed that Iran must not develop atomic weapons even if a tactical nuclear strike is needed to stop it and accused Democrats of being soft on the issue.

MKO’s media releases make no hesitation to report that Mr. Hunter has been more direct on the issue of Iran, saying the United States has reserved the right to dissuade Iran militarily.

"I would authorize the use of tactical nuclear weapons if there was no other way to preempt those particular centrifuges," he said, while noting it could probably be done with conventional weapons.

In contrast to MKO’s advertised position that the group disapproves the military solution to stop Iran’s claimed peaceful nuclear program, its recent position well indicates that, as a terrorist group, it can never abandon hostile and military option against Iran and is a strong advocate of whoever supports the idea.

Mojahedin.ws – 12/6/2007

June 13, 2007 0 comment

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Unleash of Terrorists, the Perilous Disaster

According to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Mojahedin along with EU Parliamentarians arranged a conference in Copenhagen where Lord Slynn of Hadley who is a former Judge of the EU court sharply criticized the decision of EU Council of Ministers.

After September 11th terrorist acts, EU countries coordinated their activities against terrorism and one of their decisions was to block bank accounts of those in the list. Decision on the inclusion in the terrorist list is made in “Clearing House” where representatives of security agencies meet. It then is discussed in the Conference of Ambassadors and eventually is passed in the EU Council of Ministers. Normally they should present documents on the group’s recent acts of terrorism. The decision is reviewed every 6 months. MKO was included in the EU terror list in May 2002 and remained since then.

Although MKO sued and won a case against the seizure of its assets by the EU in an EU court in December 2006, at end of January 2007 the Council of Ministers announced that the verdict applied to December 2005 assessment and the subsequent decisions, starting May 2006 by the Council of Ministers still held. The EU Council of Ministers informed Mojahedin of the decision on why they were remaining “in the list of individuals and organizations participated in acts of terror”. But PMOI attorneys claimed that the stated letter and documents by the EU Council of Ministers did not include any evidence on acts of terrorism by MKO especially after June 2001.

Exposed in a report by the State Department on April 30, MKO has been indulged in terrorist activities even after June 2001. Interestingly, these acts were perpetrated in the European countries rather than in the US but the European advocates of the group insist to close their eyes on what their people witnessed with open eyes in the streets. These advocates believe that ignoring the ruling of EU Court to remove MKO from the terrorist list is a disaster, but the EU Council of Ministers are well aware of the fact that the real disaster might germinate when the terrorists, now transformed into a cult, are unleashed.

June 11, 2007 0 comment

William Scott Ritter

Scott Ritter’s New Book, Target Iran

Scott Ritter’s recently published “Target Iran: The Truth about the White House’s Plans for Regime Change” reveals that the present Iranian crisis was mainly manufactured by Israel. Ritter’s book is based on IAEA reports, media accounts, and his extensive contacts among academics, weapons inspectors, nuclear experts, intelligence officials, and diplomatic sources.

Ritter reveals that in order to advance their agenda against Iran, the Israelis have used intermediaries which include the Kurds loyal to Mustafa Barzani, the Mujahidin-e Khalq, and US neo-conservatives. Quoted in Reader-list Book Review concerning MKO’s intelligence collaboration with Israel we read:

Like the separatist Kurds, the People’s Mujahidin of Iran, known as the Mujahidin-e Khalq or MEK, has also been providing Israel with information regarding Iran’s military capabilities for decades. In order to gather public support for the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, Israeli intelligence started to feed false information to the National Council of Resistance in Iran in Washington DC, often using the Israeli lobby as an intermediary. The NCRI, of course, is merely the official façade of the Mujahidin-e Khalq, which is designated as a terrorist organisation by the US, Canada, the EU, and Iran. The Israelis denounce Iran for its support of Hizbullah and Hamas when the Israelis themselves support terrorist groups such as the MEK.

Mojahedin.ws – 08/06/2007

June 11, 2007 0 comment

European Union

Exaggerated Numbers of Supporters Come up

The EU Council is determined to keep MKO on its terrorist list regardless of Mojahedin-run media advertising exaggerated numbers of European supporters calling its removal from the list. In one instance, Mojahedin claimed that in a petition, 30,000 Canadians demanded from their government to give up the misguided policy of appeasing the Iranian regime and remove the terror label from MKO.

The petition is reported to have been addressed to Mr. Stockwell Day Minister of Public Safety wherein the signatories stress that the only way to prevent another catastrophe such as foreign war, export of fundamentalism, terrorism or competition for nuclear proliferation in the region is an indigenous solution by Iranian people. It also states that Mojahedin-e-Khalq reflect a modern and democratic alternative to the present regime ruling Iran and it is essential to remove their name from terrorist list. How the Canadian citizens have come to such a unanimous agreement and to use Mojahedin’s literature is another question.

In another case, Mojahed, MKO’s official organ, in its issue 855 reported that 20,000 Danish citizens have signed a petition demanding the same as Canadians. No official source has so far approved the authenticity of Mojahedin’s claims. It is not so hard a task for MKO to forge documents as they are masters of counterfeiting as they did in Iraq and released a fraud of Millions Iraqi signatures.

mojahedin.ws – 10/06/2007

June 11, 2007 0 comment

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