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Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

MEK’s tricks to build resistance units

“Resistance unit” is the title used by the propaganda of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO/ MEK/ PMOI/ Cult of Rajavi) to show off about its popular bade inside Iran but under the cover of so-called resistance units they just try to connect with young users of social networks inside Iran to provoke them to commit acts of sabotage and violence.
The most important goal of this project, which has been ordered by the leaders of the group in Europe and has been carried out by the group’s agents in the cyberspace, was to demonstrate the power of the MEK inside Iran for Western supporters.

The secondary goal of the project, which is still important to the leaders of the group, is to induce the potential supporters inside Iran in order to maintain current members inside the group’s camps in Europe – who have been asking to leave the group for the past decades.
However, experience and history have proven that the lack of a social base of Mujahedin Khalq in Iran has always been an obstacle to the success of the group in producing serious protests in Iran. One of the unsuccessful projects is the establishment of the very resistance units.

The fraudulent tactics to establish resistance units received a blow with a wave of revelations on the fraud of MEK, and with the infiltration in resistance units, a significant drop took place in the number of the so-called units.
Henceforth, nowadays, MEK is trying to create an opportunity to rebuild the plan with changes in recruitments, including the areas to recruit targets. MEK commanders have planned to target certain demographic settings that are more likely to succeed. Failed attempts to recruit members for resistance units have led MEK leaders to look for operatives in more specific clusters of the Iranian society.

Schools and work places are among the targeted clusters for MEK to create and launch protest movements. According to the group leaders, these environments create better opportunities to mobilize chaos. For example, in schools, the influence of peers and incomplete awareness about political issues helps MEK agents to deceive their targets with less difficulty. It seems that social activists, teachers and parents must be vigilant about the threat of the destructive cult of Rajavi in the social networks.

June 8, 2021 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq as an Opposition Group

MEK’s efforts for more sanctions against Iranians

The US sanctions against Iran are not new and have continued throughout the history of the Islamic Republic. Following the failure of other US options against the Iranian government such as the coup, war, assassination, and support for opposition, in the past few years, sanctions have become virtually the only tool of the US governments against Iran.

The opposition groups, including the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (the MKO/ MEKL/ PMOI/ Cult of Rajavi) not only support the sanctions but also, they try to push for the military option against Iran. Regarding the inability of the United States and its allies to succeed in the military campaign, the group has to count on sanctions more than ever.

As during the eight years of Iran-Iraq war, the MEK was the spying arm of the Ba’ath Party and Saddam Hussein to gather intelligence on Iranian interests, in the present economic war against Iran, MEK has devoted a considerable part of its power to intensifying economic shocks on Iranian. As Saddam’s private army the MEK launched cross border operations against its country fellow men and provided Iraqi army with intelligence on Iranian fronts and cities, today the group makes efforts to exacerbate the effects of sanctions and pressures on Iranian nation.

The MEK’s well-paid lobbying campaigns work closely with certain American politicians on the issue of sanctions to help boost the effects of sanctions by the Americans. Through espionage in neighboring countries of Iran, and especially those with good relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, they also try to discover and provide the United States with methods the Islamic Republic use to circumvent the sanctions.

Spying on governmental, semi-governmental and private-economic institutions and organizations in Iran, as well as attempts to influence Iran’s economic networks with other countries, are the actions that MEK agents have taken to discover Iranian systems to circumvent sanctions. Also, MEK seeks to find the areas in which the Iranian government has had some progress in domestic production that directly eliminated the effects of sanctions.
Foreign companies under the contract of the Islamic Republic of Iran are other targets of MEK operatives to discover Iran’s business relations with other countries, which seek to explore possible ways to circumvent the sanctions. The agents of the MKO in this area are generally seeking intelligence on Iranian parties by contacting law offices, shipping companies, insurance companies and brokers.

According to some sources, MEK is paid by the intelligence services of the US and Israeli governments to gather intelligence on trade routes between Iran and other countries and to discover possible ways to circumvent the sanctions.
MEK focuses on calculating the results and effects of sanctions on Iranian society. To gain information on such issues, they directly use telephone and superficial information on various sectors of the Iranian society, which is not necessarily economic! Some of this information is accessible in the cyberspace, but for others, they need to spy under the coverage of surveying institutions from ordinary people. The classified information is sold to the enemies of the Iranian nation.

These spywares are intended to determine how much sanctions are being imposed on the Iranian people and how much tolerance the people can bear on this process.
Besides, the propaganda machine of MEK in the cyberspace and social networks works hard to persuade the audience inside the country to protest against the economic pressure caused by sanctions. Elements of MEK in social networks try to introduce sanctions as a result of the behaviors of the Iranian system, and thus make people’s protests as a result of economic pressures. They fabricate fake news and fake analysis on economic issues and the impact of political issues on the economic field. They produce a variety of contents including clips, photographs and articles to stimulate social networking users.

In total, the performance of MEK is aimed to exacerbate the effects of sanctions on the Iranian people. This is in fact a source of income for the group. As noted at the beginning of this article, the American economic wars against the Iranian nation have created a space, for the MEK traitors, similar to Saddam Hussein’s invasion on Iran.

June 8, 2021 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq as an Opposition Group

The alternative of IR, the illusion of the Cult of MEK

For years, the term “alternative” has been the most widely used term in the literature and propaganda of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (the MKO/ MEK/ PMOI/ Cult of Rajavi) and its paid American sponsors. The claim of Being the alternative of the Islamic Republic, actually demonstrates Massoud Rajavi’s desire to replace the Iranian government with his cult of personality.

However, it is interesting to examine the term alternative in political literature and its consistency with the situation of MEK on political horizon of Iran. The issue can be examined from three aspects: first of all, the components necessary for an alternative to a political system. what capacities, potentials, abilities and practices should an alternative essentially have? Secondly, what capabilities the alternative to the Islamic Republic should have? Indeed, such an alternative has to hold certain components in order to answer the needs of people. Thirdly, Can the Cult of Rajavi basically be considered as an alternative?

The history of MEK
The history of MEK began in Iran in the 1960s. There are certain major phases in the half-a-century history of the Mujahedin Khalq, which affects almost all analyses and historiography about its background. The assassination of seven US military personnel and civilians working in Iran, during the 1970s mark the anti-American substance of the group since its establishment.

Iran Terror Victims

After the 1979 revolution in Iran and the breakout of Massoud Rajavi with the newly established government in Tehran, the most violent period of MEK history came out. 12 thousand assassinations were committed by MEK operatives all over the Iranian cities. Only a few of these terror attacks targeted political or military officials. The rest of the victims were innocent civilians including women and children.

Photo: President of the National Resistance Council of Iran Massoud Rajavi, left, meets with and the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in Iraq in June 1986.

The eighth-year war between Iran and Iraq, according to the vast majority of Iranian people signs the greatest honor of the nation for their defense against Saddam Hussein, known as one of the most hated enemy of the nation. Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein sheltered MEK in his territory from which MEK entered into a war against its own country fellow men. This was the like a suicide for MEK because it lost its last bases among the Iranian public.
The fourth weakening phase for the MEK was started by the leadership of Massoud Rajavi who turned the group into a cult of personality around himself. The cult-like system that he founded became a very proper system to violate the human rights of members.

The revelations made by defectors of MEK on forced divorce, sexual abuse, torture and murder inside the Cult of Rajavi, despite the leaders’ slogans of human rights, freedom, women’s rights and democracy, exposed the true nature of the group.

MEK’s popularity is unheard of
The group that claims to be the alternative to the Islamic Republic, does not enjoy any support among the Iranian population. Nor inside Iran neither in the Iranian diaspora. It has lost even the support of the few thousand members inside its camp in Albania – the majority of them do not dare to leave the group due to the suppressive cult-like system of the leadership. The MEK has no genuine support by the side of the enemies of the Iranian government. It is regularly considered as a bargaining chip or a proxy force in the ups and downs of the relations between Iran and the West.
Moreover, the other groups that oppose the Islamic Republic, despite all the fundamental and radical differences share one viewpoint: staying away from MEK. All opposition groups against Iran, believe that essentially any trace of the name of MEK, with its hefty criminal record, will bring any opposition and protest to complete failure.

Internal stability
The internal atmosphere of the MEK is not so different from the level of popularity of the group in the Iranian community. To this day, the MEK has been able to maintain a few thousands of members as hostages in its headquarters in France and Albania, using physical constraints, control of thought, intimidation and other cult-like practices.

The high rate of defection from the group in recent years show that if the door of the headquarters — the jails of MEK—gets open to the free world members will leave the group, except for the criminal heads and perhaps some old men and women who do not have anywhere to go. No one is willing to stay in a system that oppresses its members day and night.
MEK does not really have the very two to three thousand members in Albania and cannot count on their capacity. It had to resort to street beggars and homeless people, as well as students of foreign countries to show off its gatherings as crowded by the rented crowd.

Qualitative capacity
Forces that are still forcibly kept inside the group do not know anything about the free world, the world of information and technological advances and eventually, the truth of the Iranian political and social situation.
This Ignorance makes MEK uninfluential in the Iranian community. The majority of members of MEK are just as militant forces who do not have the necessary creativity for activity in cyberspace, social networks. They are not even able to produce a poster and slogan compatible to the Iranian society.

In fact, they stumbled and stopped at the very time of the 1980s when they were involved in a bloody clash with Iran and they lost the last chance to live free. Then, they went to Camp Ashraf, Iraq to donate their life to Rajavi.
Finally, it should be noted that the Cult of Rajavi does not have any clues of being able to be considered as an alternative to the Islamic Republic of Iran and generally, any other political system. It is not even categorized as an opposition group. MEK is definitely a destructive cult with a long history of terrorist acts that does not embrace the characteristics of an opposition group. MEK has never behaved like an opposition. Instead of relying on its own nation, it has always tried to bank on the enemies the Iranian nation, such as Iraq, during the Saddam Hussein’s era, the United States and the Zionist regime.

June 7, 2021 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq as an Opposition Group

MEK troll farms in cyberspaces

The troll farm of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO/ MEK/ PMOI/ Cult of Rajavi) in Albania, are charged with some different duties in the cyberspace in order to create street ‎protests and turbulences in Iran.
Workers of the MEK troll farm in camp Ashraf three, are directed to create numerous channels on social networks including Telegram to launch their propaganda. They also are instructed to penetrate other channels, groups and pages related to different social and political group and businesses.

By providing information about that specific matter, they try to show themselves as a member of the very group and then they play the role of a leading protester. In case of any physical protest, there are always some deceived individuals paid or manipulated by the MEK trolls who take part as an enthusiastic protester.

This is not a new tactic for MEK, in the early years after the 1979 revolution in Iran, MEK activists used to work hard to influence students and workers. Each of these people was tasked with missionary roles as the leader of a protest and ultimately led the group to the streets, strikes, and clashes.

It is worth to note that after the onset of MEK’s terror acts in the 1980s, these same individuals were armed with weapons. They killed a large number of students, workers and normal citizens in the streets. In fact, the assassinations were kind of revenge against the lack of public’s company for MEK agents.

June 3, 2021 0 comments

Massoud Rajavi

January 1979 – Rajavi’s tactics for preserving the life of the MEK

After the release of political prisoners on the eve of the victory of the revolution, and the subsequent release of Massoud Rajavi (a central member of the Mojahedin-e- Khalq Organization) in January of that year, members of the organization began to define their alignments with other groups. Rajavi’s main tactic for preserving the life of the organization was to follow the method of the past and the founders of the organization and use their reputation.

Using thoughtful measures and taking the lead in criticizing the past performance of the organization and the slogans and goals of the early founders, he and his comrades resumed their activities. And In this way, they created a positive image for themselves and made the most of the revolutionary atmosphere for recruitment and reorganization. By formation and reorganizing, the organization published several books in the country by members to praise the organization’s casualties. While, the problems caused by the Lack of teaching ideological issues in eliminating its shortcomings and ambiguities were forgotten, and pragmatism and power-seeking grew to the point that prevented the organization from properly analyzing and understanding the existing realities of society. Following this, the organization, from January to February 1979, in order to stabilize its position in the future of the Islamic Revolution, undertook a series of important measures. In fact, in these two months, the centrality of the organization devoted all its efforts to seeking a share in the future of the Islamic Revolution.
One of the most important actions of the organization to achieve this goal was to focus on the forces that the members of the organization and the centrality had worked on in prison.

In a move, the organization’s centrality sent these forces as agents across the country and to different cities to be able to implement the organization’s plans.

These people had the mission to introduce themselves as revolutionary figures, in other words, the owners of the revolution, through extensive and voluminous propaganda. These forces took part in mass demonstrations across the country at this time; and tried to Display placards, posters, pictures related to the organization, the logo of the organization as well as the sentences of its leaders and pictures of the killed people of the organization in order to gain a place for themselves among the people. In order to be able to acquaint the masses with themselves and to introduce themselves as militant, mujahid and revolutionary forces, if possible. Another important action of the organization at this time includes a large-scale effort of the centrality to gain management of the welcoming ceremony of Ayatollah Khomeini or at least take responsibility in that ceremony.
Therefore, in February 1979 and in the days before the arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini in the country, the Central Committee made extensive efforts to introduce the organization as the largest military force that has the authority to manage the reception of Ayatollah Khomeini and protect the life of Ayatollah; Therefore, they insisted that through this, the organization becomes the main circle around the Ayatollah, so that when he enters the country, Massoud Rajavi and Musa Khiabani will be around the Ayatollah. The effort of the centrality was to make history for the organization by placing themselves in the circle of Ayatollah’s entourage so that they could somehow confiscate the revolution and the Ayatollah in their favor. In addition to the efforts of people like martyr Motahari and martyr Beheshti who were in charge, the stance of Ayatollah Khomeini himself, who never even approved of the organization and never recognized them, was very effective in removing the MEK from the circle of Ayatollah Khomeini when he arrived.

Therefore, with the efforts of Martyr Boroujerdi’s group of seven groups in protecting the life of the Ayatollah and establishing the security of the ceremony, a severe blow was dealt to the goals and plans of the organization.

Storing all kinds of weapons and equipping the organization more and more with weapons at this time were other activities of centrality. At the same time as the revolutionary clashes escalated at this time, the members of the organization began to collect weapons and carry out armed maneuvers. In those days when garrisons, police stations, military bases, SAVAK centers were being occupied, one of the orders of the organization to its forces, which was being seriously pursued, was to loot all kinds of weapons in a very large volume.

The next and calculated move of the organization at this stage was to collect documents of SAVAK and the regime’s security organizations. The forces affiliated with the organization were attacking the SAVAK buildings and the regime’s security centers, while destroying these centers, collecting documents and transferring them to team houses. The organization did this for two purposes: first, it tried to hide the betrayals of the organization’s members in prisons and their cooperation with SAVAK. Their next goal was to collect documents to destroy their opponents and tarnish their position.

Finally, the stance taken by the leaders of the organization in the midst of the revolution gives the impression that they, like the Marxists, believed that the struggle in all societies would eventually leads to the establishment of a democratic system of government. In fact, what the organization was seeking to propagate at this time was the realization of a democratic revolution and the implementation of the principles of socialism in Iranian society. Hence, the organization joined the lines of the revolution to get closer to this goal.

June 3, 2021 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System

Media Literacy, the key to stop MEK’s troll farm

Fake accounts can pose a serious threat to users, whether it’s through spam or illicit activities such as scams. In April 2021, Facebook removed hundreds of fake accounts linked to the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MEK/ MKO/ PMOI/ Cult of Rajavi) and their troll farm in Albania. According to the AP, Facebook determined the accounts were being run from a single location in Albania by a group of individuals working on behalf of MEK. Facebook found other telltale clues suggesting a troll farm, in which workers are charged with posting content, including misinformation, to social media.

Facebook said it removed such accounts based on how they behave, not on the material they post. In some cases, the fake accounts used photos of Iranian celebrities or deceased dissidents. A small number of the more recent Instagram accounts appear to have used profile pictures that were computer generated.
Fake accounts run by trolls in the MEK farm –Camp Ashraf 3- in Albania, also proceed to ‎provoke celebrities, famous artists and athletic figures to promote their agenda which is creating chaos and division in Iran.‎ Although Facebook has removed some of their accounts, they keep on working in the social media unintrupptedly. Everyday, they build up new accounts and run new anti-Iran agenda ordered by the leaders.

Leaked photos showing MEK members at work

The MEK trolls, using the freedom of speech in the social media and tolerance of celebrities, write comments below their posts regarding the content the person has posted. They use intimidation bullying other users. In order to launch their clamorous criticism against the Iranian government they resort to fabrications and fake news.
This brings up the issue of “Media literacy” which is essentially originated from critical thinking. Media literacy is the ability to identify different types of media and the messages they are sending. When we speak of media, it encompasses print media, such as newspapers, magazines and posters, and theatrical presentations, tweets, radio broadcasts, etc.

Media literacy is not taught but is voluntary, then it is purely self-selecting and also unlikely to solve the issue. Those interested in learning about and detecting misinformation are probably those who are already least likely to be fooled by it.
Therefore, users in the social media, particularly prominent figures in arts, cinema and sports must be more media literate in order to deal with fake accounts who run fake news. All over the world, concerns over fake news have triggered a renewed interest in various forms of media literacy. Media literacy help audiences to be immunized against any harmful effects of misleading information.

By Mazda Parsi

June 2, 2021 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization

MEK efforts to hide disappointments under the constructions

The headquarters of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO/ MEK/ PMOI/ Cult of Rajavi) is called Camp Ashraf 3. The thought-provoking point about the newly-built camp is that it is very similar to the group’s headquarters in Iraq, Camp Ashraf, which was located in Diyala Province, about 120 kilometers west of the Iranian border and 60 kilometers north of Baghdad. As the group’s new base in the heart of Europe, in north of Tirana, Camp Ashraf 3 is still under construction.

However, the headquarters of the MEK in Albania is much smaller than the notorious Camp Ashraf in Iraq, which covered an area of about 50 km from the Diyala deserts in Iraqi territory. But Camp Ashraf 3 is built precisely by copying the buildings and monuments of Camp Ashraf.

The organization’s instructions to build the new camp parallel to Camp Ashraf must be based on two reasons. Firstly, it connotes the same atmosphere to members of the group and may be able to stop the impressions of failure and frustration from expulsion from Iraq. Secondly, it may create this mental orientation for disappointed and dissident members –whose number is increasingly on the rise—- that nothing has changed and they should remain at service of the group and its cause. Actually, according to the leaders, members should not expect any change!

A member of Mujahedin-e Khalgh walks in a street at the Ashraf-3 camp. Photo:Gent shkullaku/AFP

According to members who managed to escape from the MEK’s camp in Albania, the buildings of the camp are apparently interior and exterior like what it was in Camp Ashraf, Iraq. The names of the streets, the number of the rooms and the way they use the rooms and buildings, exactly the same way they were used in Camp Ashraf, Iraq.
The shut down of Camp Ashraf and the eventual expulsion of the MEK from Iraq is considered to be the most disappointing blow in the history of the Cult of Rajavi, following the long years of promising to overthrow the government in Tehran. The closure of Camp Ashraf marks the failure of the Rajavis to meet their promises and more importantly annihilation of lives of thousands of their members.

June 1, 2021 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

Human smugglers to help MEK recruit members

By the rise of defection from the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO/ MEK/ PMOI/ Cult of Rajavi), the group authorities make efforts to recruit new members. Old age and disability of the majority of members of the group, as well as their failure to recruit new members, leads leaders to ask help from human smugglers.
This has already happened in the MEK during the 1990s when human smugglers, linked with MEK recruiters, in the neighboring countries of Iran including Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, have been tasked to handing over Iranian young immigrants who sought job. They smuggled them to Camp Ashraf in exchange for a significant amount of money for each person.

These people whose number eventually mounted to a hundred, were not informed about where they were supposed to go. With the promise of “working and residing in Europe”, they were tricked by smugglers. While they thought that they were going to Europe from Iraq, they would end up in Ashraf Camp. In Camp Ashraf there was no exit door. The newly-recruited members were forced to stay in the MEK for many years, which lasted over twenty years, and in some cases, they are still kept as hostages in the group.

Now, the MEK is encountered with the crisis of losing members, in Europe. This leads the leaders of the group to seek help from human smugglers and select their targets among Iranians who face severe financial issues and legal residence permits in Europe. The group prefers to recruit young refuge seekers in order to use their abilities for the most needed skills in the MEK, such as working in the cyber space.

These people are attracted to the organization with false promises of work, residence, and the right to live and stay in European countries, but in the first stage, they have to sign a commitment for at least three years of work in the group. Ultimately, they have to undergo the cult-like system of the group that manipulates and radicalizes them under a daily basis. Threats, fears and intimidation of the MEK cult is haunting the refuge seekers in Europe.

May 30, 2021 0 comments

The cult of Rajavi

MEK leaders: Suicide is the perfect fate for members

Since the relocation of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (the MKO/ MEK/ PMOI/ Cult of Rajavi) in Albania, demands for leaving the group have been increasingly on the rise. Although the leaders of the group have always been faced with such a problem, with the more open space in Europe that restricted the mind control system of the MEK in Albania, a large number of members of the group have managed to leave the group. However, many of them refrain from publicly expressing their desire to leave the group because of their fear of the consequences— severe punishments by the group commanders.

The MEK leaders also have techniques to dissuade the forces who want to leave. One of the commonly used methods that is now being run in Camp Ashraf 3 is the quarantine. Quarantine is actually for people who have been openly asking for defection, and after hours and days of interrogations and peer pressure have insisted on their demand. The leaders keep the dissident member in the so-called quarantine for a period of time in which the person is allegedly away from the group’s information and after that period of time his or her previous information would be expired.

Nonetheless, the fact is that the quarantine to burn the person’s information about the group, is a dishonest justification; the quarantine is actually a solitary confinement in which the member is kept under mental and physical torture. This is the leader’s last chance to coerce the person in order to maintain him or her in the Cult of Rajavi. All members, even those who work in the lowest levels of the group’s hierarchy, are forced to undergo a quarantine period, according to defectors of the group. Hilariously, even if the member has no reliable information and has been cooking or grooming all the time, he or she must still go through the quarantine before defection.

Pressure to coerce again
The first and most important intention of the group’s leaders to set up the so-called quarantine is to push the person into an environment similar to that of solitary confinement. There is no specific time for the end of the quarantine days. Mental and psychological pressures during the quarantine period, are the factors that often lead to the withdrawal of many troops. A person in a quarantine environment is questioned and interrogated on various occasions under different pretexts.
The member who, due to psychological stress and disappointment in leaving the group normally, admits to be quarantined. The person must undergo more severe obligations in the quarantine than the past, so he or she no longer desires to leave the group. In fact, when the member gets out of the quarantine accepts that his or her survival or death will be at the disposal of the organization! The person signs a commitment letter at the end of the solitary. Signing of such commitments, of course, implies how horrible the quarantine atmosphere is that the person has been convinced to stay!
In such a situation, another secondary consequence of defection is also eliminated; firstly, the person is not any more at the height of dissatisfaction among other members, which makes it harder for others to follow his path; second, he has not been imprisoned to compromise the organization. After the so-called quarantine, if the applicant for defection returns to the cult with the signed documents, others in the group will be shown “the regret of a wrong decision”.

An opportunity to get rid of a disturbing element
The physical elimination option is still on the table, in the MEK. Regarding the revelations defectors have made about the MEK’s notorious violent system, this option is still left with the group leaders dealing with the individual who want to defect. However, this option is not simply practicable like the time the group was located in Iraq. They are not able to kill dissident members because the UNHCR has enrolled almost all members of the group after its relocation in Albania and it will force the group authorities to respond about the fate of the rank and file.
In the quarantine environment, mental and psychological pressures and lack of knowledge about the ending time of the quarantine, sometimes make it difficult for people who are not willing to return to the group themselves. So, they might commit suicide. This option is an ideal ending for the heads of group when it comes to defection requests. Besides, they are free to set scenes for the death of some of the high-risk members of the group in the quarantine.

Control the defection rate
One of the coolest mechanisms of the organization to build quarantine is to control the exit rate. In fact, the MEK, by setting the timetable for departure, are trying to show that there is a high degree of cooperation and understanding with the applicants of defection
In sum, the quarantine is the last station of the MEK members, who are not willing to return in any way and under no pressure. They stay strong. They do not commit suicide or they cannot simply be physically killed by the group commanders. Also, this is the last station for the heads of the MEK and Maryam Rajavi, who are endeavoring to coerce hundreds of dissatisfied and dissident members.

May 30, 2021 0 comments

Mujahedin Khalq Organization as a terrorist group

MEK Crime Organisation

The Italian police are investigating an incidence of two Iranians with German passports who were intercepted smuggling 3 vials of Astrazenica COVID-19 vaccine from Italy into Albania. The tiny amount (about 18 doses) indicates this is for personal use by somebody. The mystery of why the men travelled from Germany to Albania via Italy can be easily unlocked with the key knowledge that both men are long-term members of the MEK. With this knowledge it is possible to suggest that the vaccine was destined for the MEK leader Maryam Rajavi who was expelled from the EU to Albania three years ago.

Rajavi leads a cult with around 2,000 members, who live in a closed camp west of Tirana. The members in Camp Ashraf 3 have suffered many deaths due to COVID. From the start of the pandemic, MEK refused entry to the local authorities and medial teams who wanted to help prevent the spread of the virus and offer medical support to the camp residents. Currently it is not certain whether the residents of the camp have had access to vaccines, and if they have, what type.

However, MEK leader Maryam Rajavi and her acolytes do not live in the camp. Rajavi prefers more luxurious surroundings. No doubt she explains the necessity for her separate accommodation as a security issue – a claim simultaneously and equally insulting to Albania’s security services and the credulity of the members. Since she lives separate from the members, it is possible that Rajavi has ordered the vaccine for herself and her acolytes because she believes this is the most effective against the virus. Possibly other smugglers have brought Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna vials too.

Of course, in the big picture, the personal whims of a cult leader in Albania may not seem important. But the incidence of smuggling by MEK members is a reminder of the nature of this group and its activities beyond political posturing. Over the past four decades MEK has morphed from a military terrorist entity to an intelligence propaganda entity. But while MEK has been exposed for click farm activity and expensive propaganda rallies, by far its most important activity is criminal in nature; the MEK is a mafia-type criminal organisation.

The two men used to smuggle the vaccine are 69 and 73 years old. With German passports, they qualify for pensions and state support. Why would they take part in criminal activity? Italian investigators will probably discover that as members of the MEK they do not have proper addresses, but live communally in Germany. They almost certainly do not have bank accounts or any assets to pay any possible fines. These two men should be enjoying a relaxing retirement, not used for criminal activity which they will not personally gain from. Such members of MEK are not paid or rewarded for their services, they are simply two of the tens of slave members owned by Rajavi.

Rajavi long ago gave up any hope of actively bringing about change in Iran. Over time, the MEK has shrunk and shrunk through deaths and abandonment until, now there are fewer than two thousand members trapped in the camp in Albania. Most of these are old and ailing with no ambition to ‘overthrow the Iranian regime in its entirety’, as Rajavi boasts. Instead, the MEK’s speciality is as an organised crime group which survives through criminal activity and sells its expertise to Iran’s enemies.

MEK criminal activity includes: people trafficking; smuggling – money, passports, jewellery, goods and even vaccines; money laundry (Saudi money was channelled via the MEK to fund the right-wing VOX Party in Spain); foreign money paid to warmongers in America to promote Saudi, Israeli and Neocon agendas; corruption of politicians to promote the MEK brand; corruption of media outlets to suppress criticism of MEK; and corruption of various officials to not apply laws and turn a blind eye to MEK activity.

The MEK has been enabled to act with impunity because its anti-Iran messaging suits so many of Iran’s enemies. Italian investigators who trace the smuggled vaccine “vials of the ABW4330 series expiring in July 2021” back from these Iranian men, will no doubt uncover the source of MEK’s criminal involvement in this activity. Whether they will be minded to act on their findings will involve a lot more than straightforward policing.

May 29, 2021 0 comments

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