In mid November, the Algeria TV network in one of its political briefings, implicitly referred to the utilization of MKO by the Iraqi government as leverage of pressure against the Islamic Republic. The remark seems to have been mainly made on the Iraqi president’s, Jalal Talibani, earlier distorted comment. Hambastegi site, a MKO-run website, two weeks earlier had quoted Jalal Talibani saying that Iraq could utilize MKO against Iran if it continued its meddling in Iraq’s internal affairs. The next day, in an interview with Iranian correspondents in Iraq, he made it clear that Mojahedin had distorted his statement and once more stressed on the group’s terrorist nature which is a proven sine qua none for its expulsion from Iraq. However, the Algeria TV’s recent position is taken in line with other supporters of MKO and Saddam’s loyal remnants to resurrect Mojahedin’s lost weight and the crucial role they dream it might play in Iraq.
All those who evaluate MKO with an optimistic eye have never developed a good understanding of the group’s faculties, neither in the past nor at the present, when inflating it as a threat against Iran. The function of Mojahedin at least through the past 25 years well indicates that they had availed themselves of given opportunity, Saddam’s overall backing and other reactionary political factions as well as the debilitating, prolonged war and controversies among the countries of the region. Of course, Mojahedin had given a pledge to make up for all protections and backings they had received after assuming power in Iran. In fact, any overt or undeclared investment on MKO proves to be the outcome of a political bargain.
Before Saddam’s fall, MKO were enjoying the best given opportunity; being situated close to Iranian territories with an easy access to cross the borders besides being fully armed and financially protected by Saddam. Besides, at the time it was not yet blacklisted as a terrorist group by the US and other European countries and the light was green to get on with its terrorist deeds. The result? All the group’s achievements were a few failed military operations and ultimately veering from the path of a political campaigner to that of a cult practitioner. As a result, it disappointed all its defenders.
Mojahedin’s new approach to the US and the Westerners’ does not necessarily mean that the group has been endowed with new potentialities to gratify its past protectors; they know the beaten road is the safest. Anybody with an average IQ knows the adverse consequences of working with a terrorist group.
Maryam Rajavi has recurrently offered the capabilities of the disarmed fighters stuck in Camp Ashraf so as to regain the group’s lost legitimacy among its supporters to be reutilized as a potential leverage against Iran for whatever reason. However, for them, MKO is nothing more than a weightless instrument and they prefer not to play the card that is burned. But it remains a good plaything in the margins. MKO is a product whose date has long been expired and do not seem to return any interest if recycled.
Mojahedin.ws – Omid Pouya – November 28, 2006
