"We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." President George W. Bush September 20, 2001 Address to Joint Session of Congress "… MEK hold fundraising events, where like-minded individuals are invited to contribute funds ultimately meant for terrorist activities." Assistant Secretary Juan C. Zarate, Terrorist Financing, Department of the Treasury February 1, 2005 Harper’s Bazaar/International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition Summit ——————————————————————————– Who are the Mojahedin and what are they up to? Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the President of the United States issued Executive Order 13224. This order ostensibly blocked the assets of terrorist organizations and individuals associated with terrorism. The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organziation (aka MKO, MEK, National Council of Resistance of Iran, NCRI, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, PMOI, et al.) is one such listed terrorist organization. Several years before, however, Congress passed the 1996 Antiterrorism Act which directed the State Department to draw up a list of foreign terrorist organizations. Such a list was produced by then Secretary Albright in 1997 and has been updated each two years or as required (1999 info). Additional information on the terrorist list is found in The "FTO" List and Congress. It is a common assertion of the MKO that they were listed during the Clinton administration as a "gesture" to Iran. As evidence of this, an article in the 09 October 1997 issue of the L.A. Times is cited which paraphrases an un-named Clinton administration official as stating that the listing was intended as a goodwill gesture. Whether or not there were persons in the Clinton Administration who held this view, it was made clear to me in my conversations with the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department that no such political considerations were made in drawing up the list. The fact is that the MKO were included in the very first list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the 1996 Antiterrorism Act and this determination was consistent with prior assessments by the State Department that the MKO was an organization involved in terrorism and this view was expressed even during the first Bush Administration. Indeed, in its decision on docket No. 01-1465 the United States Court of Appeals found: …. Petitioner argues that there is not adequate record support for the Secretary’s determination that it is a foreign terrorist organization under the statute. However, on this element, even the unclassified record taken alone is quite adequate to support the Secretary’s determination. Indeed, as to this element-that is, that the organization engages in terrorist activities-the People’s Mojahedin has effectively admitted not only the adequacy of the unclassified record, but the truth of the allegation. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the MKO has some supporters in Congress and this is evidently the result of a long lobbying effort. The effect of this lobbying effort is primarily seen in the repeated claims that some large number of members of Congress have signed on to some statement endorsing the MKO. The statements never have been published in the Congressional Record and the identities of the alleged co-signers are closely guarded by the handful of sponsors that are apparently well paid for their efforts (as you will see). The investment of the MKO has not always been well-placed, however. Two of their champions and targets of much money were Congressman (and then Senator) Robert Torricelli and Congressman James Traficant, both of whom were driven from office over corruption and influence peddling charges. Traficant was convicted and sent to prison. Gary Ackerman has also been the recipient of substantial contributions but these seem to have dried up since he told the Village Voice, in response to questions about his support of the MKO, "I don’t give a shit if they are undemocratic"… "OK, so the [MKO] is a terrorist organization". For some introductory information on the MKO and their friends in Congress, it is suggested that you read the following articles: "A Very, Very Bad Bunch" Don’t Confuse This Group with Freedom Fighters Iran "terrorist" group finds support on Hill Rep. Ros-Lehtinen defends Iranian group labeled terrorist front for Saddam Hussein U.S. bombs Mujahedin; backers hide Terrorists plan D.C. fundraiser Richard Perle Supports Terrorism. He spoke at a terrorist fundraiser In The Money: Congressman James Traficant And His Campaign Contributors Opponents Hit Torricelli On National Security ——————————————————————————– Data on political contributions In an effort to discover some of the MKO lobbying activity in the U.S. I have compiled some data from public sources and posted it here. The Federal Election Commission keeps records of donations made to political candidates and to political committees. There are a number of sites that provide search tools and resources to research this information on line. Two suggested sources are: FEC Campaign Finance Reports and Data Campaign Contribution Search at Newsmeat An Excel File of Political Contributions can be viewed (if you have Excel) by clicking on the highlighted link. This file contains data arranged in tabs according to year in which the contributions were made. Readers are cautioned that the list is almost certainly incomplete and inclusion of a contribution does not necessarily imply a link to the MKO. The file includes data that was collected according to one or more of the following criteria: 1) the contribution was made to a candidate who has promoted the MKO/NCRI or attended their conferences or other events. 2) the contribution appeared to be part of a concerted contribution to a candidate or committee, i.e. one of several contributions made on the same day or same time period, often of the same magnitude and to the same target. 3) the contribution was made by someone known to be associated with the MKO. Where there is an asterisk placed after the name of a contributor in the Excel file, this indicates a known association with the MKO/NCRI and specific information of such affiliations can be reviewed in the list of reference data. ——————————————————————————– OK, so what does this mean? Well, let’s look at one example and see how the facts tie together. On one day this year (May 11, 2004) the Ros-Lehtinen for Congress committee (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen is a Representive from the 18th Congressional District in Florida) reported contributions totalling $8,500 from 9 residents of California: Mr. Ali Kashani 1367 Camino Robles Way San Jose, California 95120 Shahid-Chamran University $500 Mr.[sic] Shahnaz Kiani 1077 Gray Fox Circle Pleasanton, California 94566 Valley Care Med. $1,000 Mr. Behnam Mirabdal * 1920 Francisco Street 301 Berkeley, California 94709 Copy Express $500 Mr. Ahmad Moeinimanesh * 3327 Parkgate Court Richmond, California 94806 Fujitsu $2,000 Ms Marzieh Nikouei 1012 Cornhill Way Folson, California 95630 Capitol Bowl $500 Mr. Farideh Sedighi * 721 San Luis Road Berkeley, California 94707 Cisco Systems $2,000 Mr. Ensieh Yazdanpanah * 4831 Meadowbrook Drive El Sobrante, California 94803 Albany School District $500 Ms Moigan Fahima * 1935 Marin Avenue Berkeley, California 94707 Self-Employed $1,000 Mr. Parvis Ghaffaripour 13765 Heritage Creek Court Saratoga, California 95070 Maxim Integrated $500 OK, well enough. It is possible that Ileana Ros-Lehtinen came to California to raise money for her campaign. It is possible that all these people just happened to want to donate to her campaign in a different state, all on the same day. There may be other explanations. It just seems odd. So let’s look at things more closely. According to the FEC records, Mr. Mirabdal is affiliated with Copy Express. There is a Copy Express at 1164 Solano Avenue in Albany, CA. This business not only sells copying services and greeting cards but also rents post boxes. In this store was found a stack of business cards printed: Copy Express Mojgan Fahima 1164 Solano Ave. Albany, CA 94706 T:510-524-0235 / F:510-524-2590 So now we have established a business relationship between two of the contributors in the list. What else? Well, with the help of some additional information we realize that two of the post boxes rented at that store are being used as registration addresses for web sites used by the MKO: WWW.IRANNTV.COM Registrant: Linear Communications Nasrin Saifi 1164 Solano Ave. #120 Albanay, CA 94706 US Phone: 510-528-0605 Fax..: 510-528-0605 Email: nasrins@earthlink.net www.iran-solidarity.org Registrant: Azimi, Hamid 1164 Solano Ave, No. 117 Albany, CA 94706 US Administrative Contact: Azimi, Hamid hamid@azimi.net 1164 Solano Ave, No. 117 Albany, CA 94706 US 510-528-0605 fax: 510-751-5332 WWW.IRANNTV.COM is the web site of MKO television, Sima-yeh Azadi, and the registrant of that site, Nasrin Saifi, is found to have been a contributor in coordinated donations in past years to pro-MKO candidates Robert Torricelli and Gary Ackerman. WWW.IRAN-SOLIDARITY.ORG is the web site that was used by the MKO to announce their fundraiser in Washington DC earlier this year (see introductory articles). Hamid Azimi was registrant for other MKO web sites including www.iran-e-azad.org and used his contact information in one of the registrations of the site www.mojahedin.org. Now we have established a business relationship between four persons, two in the above list, two with clear MKO links and one a prior contributor. But there is more. The names of two more persons in the above contributor list, Farideh Sedighi and Ensieh Yazdanpanah, appeared on a MKO letter to Jacques Chirac in response to the arrest of the MKO leader, Maryam Rajavi, in France. And one must truly wonder what a person listing their affiliation as "Shahid-Chamran University" (Ali Kashani) is doing making political contributions in the U.S. Recent Events On October 14 2004 a web site was registered with the domain CFDIRAN.COM. A check of the registration shows an address which matches that reported on the receipt for Mr. Ensieh Yazdanpanah’s donation to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen as noted above: Registrant: cfdiran.com 4831 meadowbrook Richmond CA 94803 US The purpose of this web site seems to have been to announce the protest event which took place in Washington DC on 19 November 2004. The Washington Post reports that the event was organized by "the Council for Freedom and Democracy in Iran and the Global Coalition Against Fundamentalism". This "group", the Council for Freedom and Democracy in Iran, had hitherto been unknown and seems to have been created solely for the purpose of obfuscation and to give the appearance of broad support for the MKO. Its creation just prior to an important MKO event is similar to the sudden appearance of the site WWW.IRAN-SOLIDARITY.ORG weeks before the MKO fundraiser in January of this year. Looking into the other reported organizer, Global Coalition Against Fundamentalism, shows that it has a web site, too: WWW.GCAF-USA.ORG Registrant: Shirin Nariman 1409 Beulah Rd Vienna, VA 22182 Phone:+1.7038562565 FAX:+1.7038562565 shirin-nariman@yahoo.com The registrant, Shirin Nariman, is reported to have been an organizer also of the fundraiser. But she denies any link to the MKO , said that there were no MKO members at the event but admitted that there might have been "supporters" there. Interestingly, in other circumstances, defending the MKO, she proudly proclaimed that she had been an MKO supporter for over 24 years. Some of those who witnessed the 19 November event had interesting comments not reported in the media and it was observed that the protest was unusually orchestrated and appeared to have participants flown in from overseas. This may well be, the Washington Times reported 30 November 2004 that a delegation of Iraqis came to Washington for the event and to press for the removal of the MKO from the terrorist list. But we should not forget that in making its case for going to war in Iraq the White House put the MKO at the head of its list of terrorist groups receiving support from Saddam Hussein in violation of UNSCR 687, viz.: Iraq shelters terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization (MKO), which has used terrorist violence against Iran and in the 1970s was responsible for killing several U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilians. [NOTE (20 Jan 2005): According to a Homeland Security report obtained by Cryptome the Secret Service reported an Iranian from Germany suspiciously videotaping near the White House on 18 November 2004. The man claimed to be in Washington DC for the demonstration. Also, it was reported that on 19 November 2004, 25 Mujahedin e-Khalq linked persons were denied entry at the Alexandria Bay Port of Entry from Canada. The 25 were planning to attend the rally.] The group isn’t quite so benign in its operations in the U.S. since the 1970s, though. While the focus of the organization is no longer generally against American targets since their falling out with Khomeini, the fanaticism of the MKO remains and this from time to time comes through in extreme acts such as the self-immolations in Europe in 2003 (example reference articles 1 and 2 ). The last major act of violence committed by the MKO in the U.S. known to this author was the seizure and hostage taking at the Iranian mission to the United Nations in New York in April 1992 (reported in the New York Times, 06 April 1992). This was part of a concerted terrorist operation on a global scale. In its report on the threat of terrorism to Canada, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service writes: On 5 April, 1992, the Iranian Air Force conducted a bombing raid on an MEK base in Iraq. Hours later, forty MEK supporters wielding sticks, crowbars and mallets attacked the Iranian embassy in Ottawa, wounding several people. Near-simultaneous attacks were carried out on Iranian Embassies in thirteen other countries around the world More Coincidences The web site of the Council for Freedom and Democracy in Iran, which one reporter stated was "Virginia based", lists a mailing address at: Council for Freedom and Democracy in Iran (CFDI) 5765-F Burk Center Pkwy #360 Burk, VA 22015 which is evidently a typo, as there is, rather, a Burke, VA and a 5765-F Burke Center Pkwy. The address is that of a mailbox facility and not a business office. Several names in the FEC database immediately come to attention in reviewing those from the 22015 Zip code. One is Shirin Nariman, the organizer of the January 2004 fundraiser. Another is that of Hossein Panah. In 1996 Hossein Panah made a contribution to Ed Towns, listing his address as "6338 Draco St., Burke, VA 22015". Interestingly, Shirin Nariman also used this address once in an on-line posting. And last but not least, it appears that Bob Filner, who spoke at the 19 November event, was the recipient of an infusion of donations just weeks before, from an interesting group of Californians all residing outside his district: 10/25/2004 Alavi, Parvinalsadat 12468 Whispering Tree Ln Poway, CA 92064 American Int. University/Accountant $400 FILNER, BOB (D) 10/25/2004 Kohani, Kambiz D.D.S. 7920 Grado Al Tupelo Carlsbad, CA 92009 Costa Verde Dentistry & Ortho $300 FILNER, BOB (D) 10/25/2004 Mokhtari, Parvaneh 15 Malibu Laguna Niguel, CA 92677 Home Couture Design Group/Interior $600 FILNER, BOB (D) 10/25/2004 Parsay, Farhad * P.O. Box 92603 Long Beach, CA 90809 Solar Turbines/Engineer $300 FILNER, BOB (D) 10/25/2004 Taheri, Massood 13488 Turlock Court San Diego, CA 92129 Banyan Associates/Business Owner $1,000 FILNER, BOB (D) 10/25/2004 Tasooji, Matthew 851 Cocos Drive San Marcos, CA 92078 Nokia Inc./Senior System Engineer $500 FILNER, BOB (D) Several of these names (Farhad Parsay, Massood Taheri and Matthew Tasooji) repeat throughout the FEC records. Farhad Parsay’s name was on the 2003 MKO letter to Jacques Chirac. Bob Filner received another infusion of cash (at least $4,750 according to FEC records) from additional persons outside his district a month prior to his appearance at a 14 April 2005 rally of the MEK in Washington DC. The first in the following list of contributors, Somayeh Yazdanpanah, used an address identical to that of the CFDIRAN.COM registrant: 3/4/2005 Somayeh Yazdanpanah * 4831 Meadowbrook Drive El Sobrante, California 94803-2051 Albany Unified School Distri $1,000 FILNER, BOB (D) 3/4/2005 Yousef J. Shenasi 3328 E Clay Avenue Fresno, California 93702-1017 Department of Transportation $1,000 FILNER, BOB (D) 3/4/2005 Shahin Toutounchi 1077 Gray Fox Circle Pleasanton, California 94566-6969 Xilinx $1,000 FILNER, BOB (D) 3/4/2005 Nader Moavenian 3949 Acapulco Drive Campbell, California 95008-3821 E2 Open $750 FILNER, BOB (D) 3/4/2005 Fatohllah Dastmalchi 1098 Bevinger Drive El Dorado Hills, California 95762-7669 Department of Transportation $1,000 FILNER, BOB (D) Please note that the address of Shahin Toutounchi is the same used by Shahnaz Kiani in her May 2004 contribution to Ros-Lehtinen documented above. Likewise, James Talent was the recipient of $8,500 before his billing as a celeb at the MEK convention: 12/1/04 SADEGHPOUR, MAJID 500 Kendall Street CAMBRIDGE, MA 02142 GENZYME $1,000 TALENT, JAMES MATTHES (R) Senate – MO 12/5/04 SAJADI, SAEID * P.O. Box 3668 KANSAS CITY, KS 66103 PHYSICIAN $2,000 TALENT, JAMES MATTHES (R) Senate – MO 12/5/04 TALEBIZADEH, ZOHREH 2401 Gilham Road KANSAS CITY, MO 64108 CHILDRENS MERCY $1,000 TALENT, JAMES MATTHES (R) Senate – MO 12/5/04 SHAHRIARY, AZAM 1535 Hummingbird Hill ELLISVILLE, MO 63011 BIOTECH BIOLOGICAL $1,000 TALENT, JAMES MATTHES (R) Senate – MO 12/5/04 ARDAVANI, RAHIM 700 NW 5th St BLUE SPRINGS, MO 64014 RAIL AUTOMATION $1,000 TALENT, JAMES MATTHES (R) Senate – MO 12/5/04 ATTARAN, ALIREZA 1535 Hummingbird Hill Lane ELLISVILLE, MO 63011 UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI $500 TALENT, JAMES MATTHES (R) Senate – MO 12/5/04 KHATAMI, SHAHAB 705 Falls Landing Ct ALPHARETTA, GA 30022 STRUCTURAL DESIGN INC$500 TALENT, JAMES MATTHES (R) Senate – MO 12/5/04 NEJAT, KASRA * 903 Cleta Drive MANCHESTER, MO 63021 ST JOHNS MERCY $1,000 TALENT, JAMES MATTHES (R) Senate – MO 12/5/04 NEJAT, KASRA * 903 Cleta Drive MANCHESTER, MO 63021 ST JOHNS MERCY $500 TALENT, JAMES MATTHES (R) Senate – MO According to the Washington Post, "about 300" staged the MEK convention at DAR Constitution Hall on 14 April 2005, while one of the MEK’s news outlets, Iran Focus, inflated the attendance to "thousands". Although coming on the heels of a rally last November, the press release announcing this event described it as a "first-ever convention". Not to lose out on a winning slogan, the MEK held another "first-ever convention" in Brussels less than 2 weeks later according to the MEK’s Iran Focus. ——————————————————————————– The Foreign Agents The U.S. Department of Justice list four persons under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as registered foreign agents of the National Council of Resistance of Iran: Filabi, Mahin Jafarzadeh, Alireza Mostowfi, Hedayatollah Samsami, Soona Of this group, Mahin Filabi and Hedayatollah (aka "Hedayat") Mostowfi have recorded political contributions with the FEC. Recently, Mr. Mostowfi is shown to have made donations to the FED Political Action Committee on 8/20/2004 and on the same day (7/20/2004) with Mr. Mehdi Ghaemi, donations were made to the Republican Party of Virginia. He lists his address and affiliation as: 2721 South Adams St. #203 Arlington, Virginia 22206 CSRI/Executive Director The CSRI is the "Committee in Support of Referendum in Iran" ( www.referendum-iran.org ) whose board lists Hedayat Mostowfi as Executive Director. All the other names on the list will be recognizable from the FEC files cited above (Mr. Sharifi’s name appears under a number of permutations, most often as "Nassersharifi"): Board of Directors: Masoud Dolati, PE CSRI President and Director of Media Relations dolati@referendum-iran.org Mansour Panah, MD CSRI Vice President panah@referendum-iran.org Ali Parsa, Ph.D CSRI Secretary and Director of Research and Policy Analysis parsa@referendum-iran.org Homayoun Sharifi CSRI Treasurer and Director of Public Relations sharifi@referendum-iran.org Hedayat Mostowfi Executive Director mostowfi@referendum-iran.org The domain registry for the website of this group shows that it was created 26-Nov-2003. At about this same time several other persons who have served as officials or spokespersons of the MKO/NCRI set up web sites and/or corporations with an assortment of names. For example, the "National Coalition of Pro-Democracy Advocates" (http://ncpda.com/) was domain registered 06-oct-2003 by Haydar Akbari. Nasser Rashidi is identified as the group’s Executive Director. Nasser Rashidi has registered an additional web site on Aug 18 2003, http://www.prusa.us/, for a corporation offering lobbying services and giving an address in Virginia. However, no such corporation appears in searching the Virginia State Corporation Commission records: PR-USA Inc. 850 N. Randolph St. Suite 103-A150 Arlington, VA 22203 Tel: 202 487-6989 Fax: 202 318-8331 The web site domain registry, however, lists a different address and it is exactly the same address as used by Hedayat Mostowfi in the FEC records of his donations this year: 2721 S. Adams St Apt 203 Arlington, VA 22206 1.2024876989 nasser_rashidi2003@yahoo.com And then there is the case of Ali Safavi, who was known to have been outside the country in the middle of last year. He is cited as the NCRI London spokesman in a CNN interview aired June 17, 2003. Prior to that he had served in various other locations including Paris, Dubai and Baghdad according to news reports in which he is quoted. Although U.S. law bars entry of non-citizen members of terrorist organizations, barring the possibility of a failure by Homeland Security, Mr. Safavi must have entered the U.S. some time toward the end of 2003 with a U.S. passport. We know this because the Virginia State Corporation Commission records that he established on 11/05/03 a corporation: Near East Policy Research Inc. (NEPR Inc.) 4625 SOUTHLAND AVE APT 302 ALEXANDRIA, VA 22312 [Note: one report states that Ali Safavi has political assylum in the United States. He also travelled to London again in Dec. 2004 to speak on behalf of the Mojahedin.] Similarly, Alireza Jafarzadeh, who we will remember from the list of NCRI foreign agents above, set up a corporation with web site (http://www.spconsulting.us/) giving an address: Strategic Policy Consulting, Inc. 1101 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20004 Tel: 202-756-2288 Fax: 202-318-8382 The Virginia state records list the corporation as being effective 10/07/2003 and with the following address information: 2101 CRYSTAL OLAZA ARCADE #164 ARLINGTON, VA 22202 4600 This is probably a typo, however, as there IS a 2101 CRYSTAL PLAZA ARCADE in Arlington, VA. Actually, it is the address of a mailbox rental firm; Plaza Mailboxes ( phone: 703-415-0400 ). Searching the address "2101 Crystal Plaza Arcade, Arlington, VA" turns up dozens of different organizations. Similarly for "1101 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Suite 600". Presumably that also is a mailbox rental facility. Mr. Mohamad Alafchi is a prominent contributor in the FEC records. On 6/28/2004 it is recorded that he made a $1000 contribution to the Committee to Re-elect Ed Towns. Mr. Alafchi is cited on the ncpda.com web site as the President of American Iranian Association- New York. This organization, along with others which you will recognize, cosponsored a Conference at UN Plaza, December 17, 2003. The list of sponsors included: sponsors: Honorable Congressman Ed Towns (D-New York) Association of Iranian-American in New York (AIA-NY) The National Coalition of Pro-Democracy Advocates (NCPDA) The Public Relations USA, Inc. (PRUSA) Near East Policy Research, Inc, (NEPR) If one did not know better, it might appear that this had been a broadly organized event! Soona Samsami, who has long served as a spokeswoman of the Mojahedin’s NCRI and was appointed in 1998 as their U.S. Representative, is now identified as "President" of the Women’s Freedom Forum (http://www.womenfreedomforum.org/) and makes appearances as their "Spokeswoman". Another spokeswoman of the Women’s Freedom Forum, Zolal Habibi, participated in the 19 November 2004 rally (link is to CFDI site that includes Washington Times coverage) in Washington DC. The National Coalition of Pro-Democracy Advocates, Women’s Freedom Forum and Women’s Forum Against Fundamentalism in Iran all share common U.S. hosts and Australian Registrars for their web sites: National Coalition of Pro-Democracy Advocates Domain Name: NCPDA.COM Creation Date: 06-oct-2003 IP Address: 66.218.79.170 (Yahoo!) IP Location: US(UNITED STATES)-CALIFORNIA-SUNNYVALE Current Registrar: MELBOURNE IT, LTD. D/B/A INTERNET NAMES WORLDWIDE Women’s Freedom Forum Domain Name: WOMENFREEDOMFORUM.ORG Created On:23-Mar-2004 IP Address: 66.218.79.157 (Yahoo!) IP Location: US(UNITED STATES)-CALIFORNIA-SUNNYVALE Sponsoring Registrar: Melbourne IT, Ltd. dba Internet Names Worldwide Women’s Forum Against Fundamentalism in Iran (Radio Voice of Women) Domain Name:WFAFI.ORG Created On:26-May-2004 IP Address: 66.218.79.164 (Yahoo!) IP Location: US(UNITED STATES)-CALIFORNIA-SUNNYVALE Sponsoring Registrar:Melbourne IT, Ltd. dba Internet Names Worldwide There are certainly more manifestations that I have failed to list.
True Facts
Translated version of the document
No. 408/2/2/2/140
Date. 3/27/1997
Republic of Iraq
President of Republic
Intelligent Service (Mukhabirat)
Presidential Office
Subject: Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organization
On 1997/3/2 a meeting was held with Masud Rajavi the chief of National Council of Resistance of Iran, on his own request. He described the situation of the organization and National Liberation Army on the scene. Below, the protocol and important items presented in the meeting are provided:
1- political aspect
A) Mr. Masud Rajavi requested to meet president.
B) Explaining political condition of Iran and asking about the dimension of progress of relations with Iranian regime.
2- Military progress
A) Request to meet Defense Minister in order to negotiate on the issue of NLA and acceleration of providing the equipments on which the two sides have agreed, especially training equipments and repair of telecommunication systems, the return of weapons that Defense Ministry have seized in 1990. In case of any problem NLA could be given rebuilded and repaired tanks which are useful to get armed.
B) Request for training the air force of the organization, allocation of a piece of land to them and providing basic equipments for the money they owned in order to extend their buildings reinforcing the protection of their headquarter.
3- Publicity Aspect
Request for a meeting with Culture and Publicity Minister in order to discuss the issue of special satellite and antenna to broadcast radio programs and increasing the time for T.V program from half an hour to one hour, providing two reporters in order to manage the program.
4- Financial Situation
Describing the problems facing the organization financially, they suggest the allocation of 50,000 its 100,000 tones crude oil gratuitously in order to export through merchants and the import of Iranian carpet through their supporters in Iran.
5- Special Operation
The organization declares its preparation to arrange any especial operation against security and military aims in frontier provinces of Iran.
6- Headquarters of the Organization
Considering the phone contact by the manager of presidential office about the location of their current headquarter, through which he suggested a new headquarter since the current one is placed in Andelis region of Baqdad, a business area, which is difficult to be protected perfectly, They express that their transfer from this headquarter to another one is considered as military attitude, which is a heavy and great stroke for the organization. The issue endangers their credit and honor .they express that they are ready to pay any expense except leaving this headquarter.
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)
a.k.a. The National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), the People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI), National Council of Resistance (NCR), the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Muslim Iranian Student’s Society (front organization used to garner financial support)
Description
The MEK philosophy mixes Marxism and Islam. Formed in the 1960s, the organization was expelled from Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and its primary support came from the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein since the late 1980s. The MEK’s history is filled with anti-Western attacks as well as terrorist attacks on the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad. The MEK now advocates the overthrow of the Iranian regime and its replacement with the group’s own leadership. First designated in October 1997.
Activities
The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorism. During the 1970s, the MEK killed US military personnel and US civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier’s office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the war with Iran during 1980-88, Baghdad armed the MEK with military equipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces. In 1991, it assisted the Government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in southern Iraq and the Kurdish uprisings in the north. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian Embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters—Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The normal pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during the “Operation Great Bahman” in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved regularly in mortar attacks and hit-and run raids on Iranian military and law-enforcement units and government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border, although MEK terrorism in Iran declined throughout the remainder of 2001. In February 2000, for example, the MEK launched a mortar attack against the leadership complex in Tehran that houses the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and the Coalition forced the MEK forces to surrender in May 2003. The future of the MEK forces remains undetermined with Coalition forces.
Strength
Some 3,800 members are confined to Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s main compound near Baghdad, where they remain under Coalition control. As a condition of the cease-fire agreement, the group relinquished its weapons, including tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery.
Location/Area of Operation
In the 1980s, the MEK’s leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. On resettling in Iraq in 1987, almost all of its armed units were stationed in fortified bases near the border with Iran. Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, the bulk of the group is limited to Camp Ashraf though an overseas support structure remains with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America.
External Aid
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the group received all of its military assistance, and most of its financial support, from the former Iraqi regime. The MEK also has used front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.
In May 2005, Human Rights Watch issued a report on alleged human rights abuses committed by an Iranian opposition group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO/MEK),1 inside its military camps in Iraq from 1991 to February 2003, prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government. The report, No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the MKO Camps, detailed allegations by twelve former members of the MKO who told Human Rights Watch of a range of physical and psychological abuses they had suffered and witnessed.2 In addition, the report made use of the published memoir of the MKO’s former chief diplomatic representative in Europe and North America, Masoud Banisadr.3
Following publication of this Human Rights Watch report, individuals associated with the MKO and others, in communications to Human Rights Watch as well as publicly on Web sites connected with the MKO, raised objections to the findings of the report. We have investigated with care the criticisms we received concerning the substance and methodology of the report, and find those criticisms to be unwarranted.
A number of critics of the report claimed that Human Rights Watch was calling on the United States, Canada, and the European Union not to remove the MKO from their respective lists of groups identified as perpetrating or advocating acts of terrorism, in the face of a campaign by the MKO to have itself removed from such lists. Human Rights Watch in fact at no point, either in the report or in responses to media and other queries, took any position whatsoever on whether the MKO should be on such lists or removed from them. Rather, we did no more than report what we believed to be credible testimonies alleging serious abuses perpetrated by MKO officials against dissident members of the group, including prolonged deprivation of liberty and torture.
A group known as Friends of a Free Iran (FOFI), comprising four Members of the European Parliament – Alejo Vidal Quadras, Paulo Casaca, Andre Brie, and Struan Stevenson – presented the most extensive of the critiques of the No Exit report on September 21, 2005.4 The FOFI document disputed the testimonies and challenged the credibility of the witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, saying, among other things, that their allegations were “widely believed to be orchestrated by Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence.”5 The MKO has similarly alleged that Human Rights Watch’s witnesses, and dissident former members generally, are in fact agents of Iranian intelligence. Neither FOFI nor any of the other critics of the Human Rights Watch report have provided any credible evidence to support this charge.
The FOFI document followed a five-day visit by a delegation of FOFI members to the MKO’s main base in Iraq, Camp Ashraf, in July 2005. The FOFI delegation reportedly interviewed 19 MKO members inside Camp Ashraf. According to the FOFI document, these present MKO members disputed testimonies given by the former MKO members to Human Rights Watch. The FOFI delegation did
not interview any of the individuals who gave testimonies to Human Rights
Watch.
Because Human Rights Watch places a high premium on the accuracy of our reporting and public statements, the organization took these allegations seriously. We went back to our sources to review and reevaluate the credibility of their allegations.In October 2005 Human Rights Watch researchers met in person with all twelve witnesses quoted in the No Exit report. The researchers conducted interviews lasting several hours with each witness, individually and privately. All interviews were conducted in Germany and the Netherlands, where the witnesses now live.
All of the witnesses recounted in extensive detail their experiences inside the MKO camps from the 1991-2003 period, and how MKO officials subjected them to various forms of physical and psychological abuses once they made known their wishes to leave the organization. Human Rights Watch researchers questioned the witnesses at great length about the circumstances under which these abuses allegedly took place. The researchers also asked the witnesses to respond to the specific issues raised in the FOFI document with regard to their testimonies. The witnesses provided detailed and credible responses to these challenges that were consistent with their earlier testimony as recounted in No Exit and are detailed in the appendix to this statement.
The only piece of information that emerged during these detailed face-to-face interviews that differed from the account in No Exit concerned the period of Mohammad Hussein Sobhani’s detention by the MKO. In No Exit, Human Rights Watch reported that MKO officials had held Sobhani in solitary confinement for eight-and-a-half years, from September 1992 to January 2001. The FOFI document stated that “upon his own request, he [Sobhani] lived in an apartment furnished with all living commodities of a comfortable life. Despite PMOI’s insistence that he must leave the organization, he was not willing to do so…”6
In his testimony in October 2005, Sobhani told Human Rights Watch that MKO officials held him continuously in solitary confinement from September 1992 until February 1998 inside Camp Ashraf, a period of five-and-a-half years. He said that in February 1998 the MKO leadership offered to transfer him to a better location and then to facilitate his transfer to Europe, where his daughter was living. Subsequently, the MKO moved Sobhani to another MKO camp near Baghdad, called Camp Parsian. He said he stayed there until June 1999, under circumstances that he described as “house arrest.” He said he was free to leave his apartment in Camp Parsian but could not leave the camp unless accompanied by MKO guards, and could not leave for Europe. In June 1999, during a visit to Baghdad, he escaped and attempted to reach the United Nations office there. He was captured by the Iraqi police and turned over to MKO officials. From June 1999 until January 2001, Sobhani said, the MKO again held him in a prison inside Camp Ashraf, once again in solitary confinement. In January 2001, the MKO transferred Sobhani to Iraqi custody. The Iraqi authorities imprisoned him in Abu Ghraib until January 21, 2002.7
As reported by the witnesses interviewed for No Exit, the MKO transferred scores of dissident members from MKO detention into Iraqi custody. Iraqi authorities then incarcerated the men in Abu Ghraib prison. Five of the twelve individuals interviewed by Human Rights Watch for No Exit said theyended up in Abu Ghraib as a result of such transfers, and they told Human Rights Watch that former MKO members were being held there when they arrived. The FOFI document fails to address the MKO’s transfer of the
dissidents to Iraqi custody or their subsequent detention in Abu Ghraib.
The FOFI document also raised two other objections to the Human Rights Watch report. Firstly, the FOFI document questioned Human Rights Watch’s methodology of conducting interviews with witnesses by phone. Human Rights Watch, like other organizations that conduct research and report on current affairs, sometimes relies on telephone interviews to gather information. Telephone interviews are a recognized and appropriate method of information gathering. Human Rights Watch has no reason to believe that any of the witnesses misidentified or (misrepresented) themselves in any way whatsoever. They reaffirmed their credibility in face to face interviews in October 2005.
Secondly, the FOFI document challenged Human Rights Watch’s report by stating that, during their visit to Camp Ashraf, the FOFI delegation did not find any indications of abuse or ill-treatment of MKO members. The Human Rights Watch report, as was made clear in that text, covered allegations of abuse inside the MKO camps prior to the overthrow of the government of Saddam Hussein in April 2003. The testimonies by witnesses who recounted allegations of detention and physical abuse cover the period from 1991 to February 2003. After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, U.S. forces interviewed MKO members inside the MKO camps. The U.S. military set up a separate camp for those members who indicated that they wished to leave the organization. At least 300 members (out of a total of nearly 4000) chose to leave the organization. The Human Rights Watch report did not include any testimonies or allegations of witnesses as to whether there were ongoing abuses inside Camp Ashraf after the invasion of Iraq. Thus, the findings of FOFI with respect to current conditions in the MKO camp have no relevance to the Human Rights Watch report of testimonies about conditions in the camp from 1991 to February 2003.
Appendix
MKO members inside Camp Ashraf who the FOFI delegation interviewed disputed certain statements by the witnesses whose accounts appeared in the Human Rights Watch report. Human Rights Watch researchers questioned the witnesses at length concerning the allegations contained in the FOFI document.
Their responses, in the view of Human Rights Watch, confirm the credibility and reliability of their original testimonies in No Exit. The Human Rights Watch report contained allegations by witnesses that two MKO members, Ghorbanali Torabi and Parviz Ahmadi, died as a result of abuse suffered in MKO detention. The FOFI document challenged these testimonies.
With regard to Ghorbanali Torabi’s death, the FOFI delegation interviewed two MKO members in Camp Ashraf who disputed these testimonies. These two MKO members, Zahra Seraj, Torabi’s wife, and Masoume Torabi, Torabi’s sister, told the FOFI delegation that he had died of a heart attack, and not as a result of beatings at the hands of MKO officials. Neither of them claimed to have been present when he died. According to a communication to Human Rights Watch from Lord Avebury, who said he had interviewed Masouma Torabi by telephone on June 13, 2005, “Masouma saw Ghorbanali a week before he died.”8
Human Rights Watch again questioned Abbas Sedeghinejad, one of Human Right Watch’s original sources on these events, about Torabi’s death. Abbas Sadeghinejad confirmed his earlier testimony, based on his experience of sharing a prison cell with Torabi.9 He again told Human Rights Watch that late one night, after Torabi had been taken out of the cell for two days, two men carried Torabi back to the cell, threw him inside, and locked the cell again. Torabi, Sadeghinejad said, was not breathing and his face showed signs of severe beating. He said that other cellmates examined Torabi more closely and believed that he had suffered broken bones. Sadeghinejad acknowledged that Torabi may have died of a heart attack, but maintained that the MKO had severely beaten Torabi, apparently during interrogation.
Alireza Mir Asgari corroborated the fact of Torabi’s detention and ill-treatment at the hands of the MKO, based on his own direct experience. Mir Asgari told Human Rights Watch that the MKO also detained him at the time Torabi was detained. He said that he knew Torabi well as a child in Iran, and that Torabi had recruited him in Tehran at the age of seventeen to join the MKO ranks in Iraq. Mir Asgari told Human Rights Watch that during his detention in 1995, he encountered Torabi face-to-face during an interrogation session. He said that the interrogators questioned them both about Torabi’s motivation for recruiting Mir Asgari to the MKO camps in Iraq and accused them of working for the Iranian government. Mir Asgari said that when he met Torabi during this interrogation, Torabi’s body showed signs of beatings and physical abuse.10
Mir Asgari told Human Rights Watch that when he raised the subject of Torabi’s
death with MKO leader Massoud Rajavi, Rajavi alternately responded that Torabi had committed suicide and that Mir Asgari and other prisoners had themselves killed Torabi because they suspected him of being an informant. He said Rajavi at no point claimed that Torabi had died from a heart attack.
Concerning the death of Parviz Ahmadi, the FOFI delegation reported that Hossein Roboubi, an MKO member, told them that Ahmadi died during a military operation inside Iran.11 In its report, Human Rights Watch cited the MKO’s claim that Ahmadi was killed by Iranian agents.12 Human Rights Watch also presented the testimony of three witnesses, Abbas Sadeghinejad, Ali Ghashghavi, and Alireza Mir Asgari, who said that they had shared a prison cell with Ahmadi and saw him die inside the prison after prison guards returned him from an interrogation session. During Human Rights Watch’s face-to-face interviews in October 2005, each of these witnesses gave separate, detailed, and consistent accounts of their recollection regarding Ahmadi’s death. These testimonies were consistent with their earlier statements as published in the No Exit report.13
The FOFI document contains an interview with Hassan Ezati in Camp Ashraf. Hassan Ezati is the father of Yasser Ezati one of the witnesses quoted in the Human Rights Watch report. Hassan Ezati reportedly told the FOFI delegation that “Yasser having left Camp Ashraf went directly to the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad.”14 When asked about this statement, Yasser Ezati strongly denied it. He said that he first went to the German Embassy in Baghdad because he had lived in Germany before moving to Iraq. He told Human Rights Watch that because the German Embassy was closed at the time, his only options were either to return to Camp Ashraf or to go to Iran. He said he was desperate not to return to Camp Ashraf because he had waited for so many years to find the opportunity to leave. He decided to risk returning to Iran for lack of any alternative. He told Human Rights
Watch that he went to the Iranian border on his own. Yasser Ezati said that during his stay in Iran, the Iranian local police arrested him three times for “moral offenses.” Yasser decided that because he had never lived in Iran previously he could not stay there and left for Germany.15
The FOFI document contains an interview with Leila Ghanbari, an MKO member in Camp Ashraf who disputed the testimonies of Habib Khorrami, Tahereh Eskandari, and Mohammad Reza Eskandari in Human Rights Watch’s report. Tahereh Eskandari and Habib Khorrami are sister and brother. Tahereh and Mohammad Reza Eskandari are married. Leila Ghanbari is the former wife of Habib Khorrami and had left Iran for Iraq with Khorrami and Tahereh Eskandari in 1988. The Human Rights Watch report quoted the Eskandaris as saying: “The organization had taken our passports and identification documents upon our arrival in the [MKO] camp [in Iraq]. When we expressed our intention to leave, they never returned our documents. We were held in detention centers in Iskan as well as other locations.” Leila Ghanbari disputed this statement, telling the FOFI delegation: “In one place they say my passport was taken from me. Let me tell you that I laughed at this claim… What passport? They were escapees!”16 The FOFI authors state that MKO officials “said both Mohammad Reza Eskandari and Tahereh Eskandari crossed the border from Iran to Iraq and they never had passports to begin with.”17
Human Rights Watch questioned Mohammad Reza Eskandari, Tahereh Eskandari, and Habib Khorrami separately regarding these allegations by Leila Ghanbari and the unnamed MKO officials. The Eskandaris and Khorrami separately told Human Rights Watch that Tahereh Eskandari, Habib Khorrami, and Leila Ghanbari left Iran together in March 1988 to go to Iraq, crossing the Turkish border and using their passports to do so. They said the MKO confiscated their passports and never returned them. Mohammad Reza Eskandari was the only member of this family who escaped Iran without a passport across the Iraqi border. All three also noted in separate individual interviews that Leila Ghanbari was pregnant when she left Iran for Turkey, and that her and Habib Khorrami’s son was born in Turkey. Habib Khorrami,
Ghanbari’s former husband and the boy’s father, showed Human Rights Watch a copy of their son’s birth certificate issued in Istanbul in April 1994 and stating the date of birth as June 13, 1988.
Leila Ghanbari also disputed the statements by these witnesses that the MKO had confined them in various MKO detention centers. Mohammad Reza Eskandari, Tahereh Eskandari, and Habib Khorrami, in separate face-to-face interviews again provided Human Rights Watch with detailed and consistent accounts of their confinement in various MKO detention centers.18
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[1] Alsoknown as People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI).
[2] http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/index.htm
[3] MasoudBanisadr, Memoirs of an Iranian Rebel (London: Saqi Books, 2004).
[4] Thereport was presented on September 21 at a meeting in Brussels sponsored by theFOFI, according to a September 23 press release on the website of the NationalCouncil of Resistance of Iran, an MKO-related group The text of the FOFIdocument later became available on the same website: http://ncr-iran.org/images/stories/advertising/ep%20report-with%20cover.pdf Many of the points raised in the FOFI document also were raised separately incorrespondence addressed to Human Rights Watch by Lars Rise, a member of theNorwegian Parliament, and two members of the U.K. House of Lords, Lord EricAvebury and Lord Gordon Slynn.
[5] FOFI document, pg. 6.
[6] FOFI document, pg. 65.
[7] HumanRights Watch interview with Mohammad Hussein Sobhani, Germany, October 4, 2005.
[8] LordAvebury email to Human Rights Watch, June 15, 2005.
[9] HumanRights Watch interview with Abbas Sedeghinejad, Germany, October 2, 2005.
[10] HumanRights Watch interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, Germany, October 2, 2005.
[11] FOFIdocument, pgs. 60-62.
[12] http://hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iran0505/4.htm#_Toc103593132:: “… the MKO’s publication Mojahed of March 2, 1998, lists Parviz Ahmadias an MKO ‘martyr’ killed by Iranian intelligence agents.”
[13] HumanRights Watch interview with Abbas Sedeghinejad, Germany, October 2, 2005. HumanRights Watch interview with Alireza Mir Asgari, Germany, October 2, 2005. HumanRights Watch interview with Ali Ghashghavi, Germany, October 3, 2005. Theirtestimonies regarding Ahmadi’s death appeared in No Exit, Pgs. 16-17.
[14] FOFIdocument, p. 69.
[15] HumanRights Watch interview with Yasser Ezati, Germany, October 3, 2005.
[16] FOFI document, p. 78.
[17] FOFI document, p. 78.
[18] HumanRights Watch interview with Tahereh Eskandari, The Netherlands, October 6,2005. Human Rights Watch interview with Mohammad Reza eskandari, TheNetherlands, October 6, 2005. Human Rights Watch interview with Habib Khorrami,The Netherlands, October 6, 2005.
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/02/15/iran12678.htm
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notifythe Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the bound volumes go to press.
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued April 2, 2004 Decided July 9, 2004
No. 01-1480
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE OF IRAN,
PETITIONER
v.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND
COLIN L. POWELL, SECRETARY OF STATE,
RESPONDENTS
On Petition for Review of Orders of the
Department of State
Paul F. Enzinna argued the cause and filed the briefs forpetitioner. Martin D. Minsker entered an appearance.
Douglas Letter, Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department ofJustice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on thebrief was Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General.
Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs outof time.
——————————————————————————– Page 2
Before: HENDERSON, GARLAND, and ROBERTS, CircuitJudges.Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBERTS.ROBERTS, Circuit Judge: This is the fourth in a series ofrelated cases concerning the biennial designations by theSecretary of State of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization(MEK)1and its aliases as a foreign terrorist organization(FTO). See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t ofState, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (PMOI I); NationalCouncil of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192(D.C. Cir. 2001) (NCRI); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v.Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (PMOI II); seegenerally 8 U.S.C. § 1189. In 1999, and again in 2001, theNational Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) was deter-mined by the Secretary of State to be an alias of MEK andwas accordingly also designated an FTO. See 1999 Designa-tion, 64 Fed. Reg. at 55,112; 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089. In May 2003, after a remand to cure certaindue process deficiencies, see NCRI, 251 F.3d at 208–09, theSecretary decided to leave in place the 1999 and 2001 desig-1The Mojahedin-e Khalq translates into English as People’sMojahedin. [AR268] The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)is known in English as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran(PMOI). Our prior decisions have variously referred to the Moja-hedin-e Khalq as MEK, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, and PMOI.Compare PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 20 (‘‘the People’s Mojahedin Organi-zation of Iran — the MEK, for short’’), with NCRI, 251 F.3d at 197(‘‘petitioner People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (‘PMOI’)’’).To limit confusion, wherever possible we will use the terms Mojahe-din-e Khalq and MEK, and, except in case names, not the termsPeople’s Mojahedin or PMOI. We adopt this convention because itis the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization that the Secretary hasdesignated as a foreign terrorist organization. See Designation ofForeign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997)(1997 Designation); Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organiza-tions, 64 Fed. Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 1999) (1999 Designation); Redes-ignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,088,51,089 (Oct. 5, 2001) (2001 Redesignation); Redesignation of For-eign Terrorist Organizations, 68 Fed. Reg. 56,860, 56,861 (Oct. 2,2003) (2003 Redesignation). ——————————————————————————– Page 3
nations of NCRI as an FTO. NCRI now again petitions forreview. After reviewing NCRI’s arguments, the entirety ofthe administrative record, and certain classified materialsappended to that record, we conclude that the Secretary’slatest designation complied with the governing statute and allconstitutional requirements. We therefore deny the petitionfor review.I.The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of1996 (AEDPA) empowers the Secretary of State to designatean entity as an FTO whenever the Secretary determines that(1) the entity is foreign; (2) it engages in terrorist activity;and (3) the terrorist activity threatens the security of theUnited States or its nationals. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). Adesignation as an FTO persists for two years, after which theSecretary may redesignate the entity as an FTO for a suc-ceeding two-year period upon finding that the statutory cir-cumstances still exist. Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B).An FTO designation visits serious consequences on theaffected organization: The Secretary of the Treasury mayrequire financial institutions to freeze any assets of the FTO,id. § 1189(a)(2)(C); the members and representatives of theFTO become ineligible to enter the United States, id.§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), (V); and anyone who knowingly pro-vides ‘‘material support or resources’’ to the FTO — includingany donation of money — may be prosecuted and imprisonedfor up to fifteen years, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). The mani-fest purpose of these provisions is to deny terrorist organiza-tions support — financial or otherwise — in and from theUnited States. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 43–45 (1995)(House Report on AEDPA’s primary predecessor bill).Despite these serious consequences of designation, thegoverning statute affords suspect entities only ‘‘truncated’’participation in the administrative process leading to thedesignation and ‘‘quite limited’’ judicial review after the fact.NCRI, 251 F.3d at 196. As we noted in PMOI I, ‘‘unlike therun-of-the-mill administrative proceeding,’’ ‘‘there is [under ——————————————————————————– Page 4
AEDPA] no adversary hearing, no presentation of whatcourts and agencies think of as evidence, [and] no advancenotice to the entity affected by the Secretary’s internaldeliberations.’’ 182 F.3d at 19. Once the Secretary hasdesignated an entity an FTO, the statute directs us to ‘‘holdunlawful and set aside a designation’’ only if we find it to be:(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-erwise not in accordance with law;(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, orimmunity;(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limi-tation, or short of statutory right;(D) lacking substantial support in the administrative rec-ord taken as a whole or in classified information submit-ted to the court [ex parte and in camera], or(E) not in accord with the procedures required by law.8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3). Although the statute permits thiscourt to base its review either ‘‘solely upon the administrativerecord’’ ‘‘taken as a whole,’’ or as supplemented by anyclassified information submitted by the Secretary, the Actmakes no provision for the disclosure of that classified materi-al to the designated entity. See id. § 1189(b)(2), (3)(D); seegenerally 28 C.F.R. pt. 17 (governing access to classifiednational security information).In 1997, and every two years since, the Secretary hasdesignated MEK an FTO. See 1997 Designation, 62 Fed.Reg. at 52,650; 1999 Designation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 55,112;2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed. Reg. at 51,089; 2003 Redesig-nation, 68 Fed. Reg. at 56,861. Starting in 1999, the Secre-tary added NCRI to the list of designated FTOs, havingconcluded that NCRI was an alias of MEK. See 1999 Desig-nation, 64 Fed. Reg. at 55,112 (‘‘I hereby designate TTT thefollowing organization as a foreign terrorist organization: TTTMujahedin-e Khalq Organization TTT also known as NationalCouncil of Resistance, also known as NCR.’’). NCRI now, forthe second time, seeks review of that designation. In NCRI’sprevious challenge — brought jointly with MEK — we con- ——————————————————————————– Page 5
cluded that both the 1999 designation of MEK as an FTO andthe designation of NCRI as an alias of MEK satisfied therequirements of the statute. Specifically concerning NCRI,we held — based on the record then presented to us by theSecretary — that the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI wasan alias of MEK ‘‘does not lack substantial support and TTT isneither arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise not in accordancewith law.’’ NCRI, 251 F.3d at 199.As a constitutional matter, however, we determined thatthe procedures afforded by the statute and employed by theSecretary in arriving at those designations violated bothorganizations’ due process rights. See id. at 208–09. We didnot vacate the Secretary’s designation as to either MEK orNCRI, but remanded to the Secretary with instructions thateach entity be afforded the opportunity to: (1) respond to anypart of the Secretary’s administrative record that is notclassified material; (2) file evidence on its own behalf; and (3)be meaningfully heard by the Secretary. Id. at 210.Both MEK and NCRI availed themselves of these opportu-nities. NCRI submitted voluminous materials that purportedto demonstrate that it was sufficiently independent of MEKthat it could not be considered an alias of that organization.On September 24, 2001, the State Department informed MEKand NCRI that the Secretary had decided to leave the 1999designation of MEK in place but that ‘‘no such determinationregarding the NCRI as an alias of the MEK is possible atthis time.’’ Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordi-nator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 2 (Sept.24, 2001). This was shortly followed, on October 5, 2001, bythe Secretary’s redesignation of both MEK as an FTO andNCRI as an alias of MEK. See 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089. At that time, the State Department assuredNCRI that although ‘‘the present situation TTT requires con-tinued designation of [NCRI] as an alias of MEK for now,’’upon the completion of review of NCRI’s submissions, ‘‘theSecretary will make a de novo determination in light of theentire record, including the material you have submitted.’’ ——————————————————————————– Page 6
Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator forCounterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Oct. 5, 2001).Nearly a year later, the State Department provided forNCRI’s review additional materials obtained by the FBI inthe course of ‘‘its long-running investigation of the MEK andNCRI.’’ Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordina-tor for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Sept. 4,2002). Within two months, NCRI submitted its response.See Letter of Paul F. Enzinna, Esq. (Nov. 1, 2002). In May2003, the State Department completed its review process and,on May 24, the Secretary decided to leave in place the 1999and 2001 ‘‘designations of the National Council of Resistance(NCR) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran(NCRI) as foreign terrorist organization aliases of the Muja-hedin-e Khalq (MEK).’’ Action Mem. from William Pope &William H. Taft, IV to the Secretary of State, at 3 (May 22,2003) (Action Mem.). NCRI now petitions for review of thislatest decision.II.NCRI’s primary argument is that the Secretary’s conclu-sion that NCRI is an alias of MEK lacks substantial supportin the administrative record. NCRI insists that it is anumbrella organization of Iranian dissident persons and groupsof which MEK is only a single member, no more powerfulthan any other. In addressing this contention, we begin withour earlier holding in this action. In NCRI, we concluded —based on the record then presented to us — that the Secre-tary’s designation of NCRI as an alias of MEK ‘‘does not lacksubstantial support and TTT is neither arbitrary, capricious,nor otherwise not in accordance with law.’’ 251 F.3d at 199.Although that decision is obviously not determinative of thequestion before us today — we are now reviewing a recordthat has since been supplemented both by the Governmentand NCRI — its holding must nevertheless inform our deci-sion here. Logically, NCRI’s challenge can succeed only ifthe new record materials establish its independence fromMEK so that we can no longer affirm that ‘‘the Secretary, on ——————————————————————————– Page 7
the face of things, had enough information before [him] tocome to the conclusion’’ that NCRI is an alias of MEK. Id.Having reviewed the supplemented administrative record as awhole and the classified information appended to it, we con-clude that NCRI has not met this burden.To explain our decision, we must first review what itmeans — in the very particular context of AEDPA — for oneorganization to be an alias of another. On its previousappeal, NCRI argued that the Secretary lacked authorityunder AEDPA to designate an entity an FTO based on afinding that it was an alias of another designated FTO. Seeid. at 200. We rejected that contention, finding that thegrant of authority to designate FTOs ‘‘implies the authorityto so designate an entity that commits the necessary terroristacts under some other name.’’ Id. In so doing, we used amathematics metaphor — specifically, the transitive proper-ty — to describe the alias concept: ‘‘Logically, indeed mathe-matically, if A equals B and B equals C, it follows that Aequals C. If the NCRI is the [MEK], and if the [MEK] is aforeign terrorist organization, then the NCRI is a foreignterrorist organization also.’’ Id.; see also id. (‘‘If the Secre-tary has the power to work those dire consequences on anentity calling itself ‘Organization A,’ the Secretary must beable to work the same consequences on the same entity whileit calls itself ‘Organization B.’ ’’). Seizing upon our earlierinvocation of the transitive property, NCRI now argues thatthe administrative record does not demonstrate that ‘‘Aequals B’’ — that is, that NCRI equals MEK — and there-fore NCRI cannot be an alias of MEK. Indeed, NCRIrightly points out that even the State Department acknowl-edges that NCRI and MEK are not ‘‘one and the same.’’ SeePet. Reply Br. 4–6.Implicit in NCRI’s argument, however, is a mistaken as-sumption that the alias concept, under AEDPA, is boundedby the transitive property. This reads too much into ourmathematical metaphor in NCRI. See Berkey v. Third Ave.Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) (‘‘Metaphors inlaw are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices toliberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.’’). While it is ——————————————————————————– Page 8
certainly correct to use the term alias to describe scenarioswhere a single entity is known by more than one name — forinstance, Mojahedin-e Khalq is an alias for People’s Mojahe-din, two names for the same organization, one Farsi, theother English — nothing in AEDPA or any more general ruleof logic or language requires that the application of the aliasconcept be strictly limited to such circumstances.To the contrary, our citation in NCRI to First NationalCity Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462U.S. 611 (1983), indicates that we intended the alias conceptto have a sweep beyond the transitive. In that case, whichconcerned a suit brought by Banco Para El Comercio Exteri-or (BPECE) against First National City Bank for perform-ance under a letter of credit, the Supreme Court held thatFirst National could counterclaim for setoff of the value of itsassets that had been seized and nationalized by the Cubangovernment, notwithstanding the fact that BPECE had beenestablished by the Cuban government as a juridical entityseparate from the government. See id. at 623–34. Acknowl-edging a presumption that ‘‘government instrumentalities es-tablished as juridical entities distinct and independent fromtheir sovereign should normally be treated as such,’’ id. at626–27, the Court nevertheless concluded that the normallyseparate juridical status had to be set aside where the Cubangovernment was the real party in interest behind BPECE’sletter of credit claim, id. at 632. The Court, in reaching itsconclusion, looked to ordinary principles of agency law, notingthat ‘‘where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled byits owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created,we have held that one may be held liable for the actions of theother.’’ Id. at 629 (citing NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361U.S. 398, 402–04 (1960)). We think those same ordinaryprinciples of agency law are fairly encompassed by the aliasconcept under AEDPA. When one entity so dominates andcontrols another that they must be considered principal andagent, it is appropriate, under AEDPA, to look past theirseparate juridical identities and to treat them as aliases.The inclusion of these fundamental precepts of agency lawwithin AEDPA’s alias concept is entirely consistent with — ——————————————————————————– Page 9
indeed, necessary to — the effective pursuit of the statute’sobjective of denying support in and from the United States toterrorist organizations. Just as it is silly to suppose ‘‘thatCongress empowered the Secretary to designate a terroristorganization TTT only for such periods of time as it took suchorganization to give itself a new name, and then let it happilyresume the same status it would have enjoyed had it neverbeen designated,’’ NCRI, 251 F.3d at 200, so too it is implau-sible to think that Congress permitted the Secretary todesignate an FTO to cut off its support in and from theUnited States, but did not authorize the Secretary to preventthat FTO from marshaling all the same support via juridicallyseparate agents subject to its control. For instance, underNCRI’s conception, the Government could designate XYZorganization as an FTO in an effort to block United Statessupport to that organization, but could not, without a separateFTO designation, ban the transfer of material support toXYZ’s fundraising affiliate, FTO Fundraiser, Inc. Thecrabbed view of alias status advanced by NCRI is at war notonly with the antiterrorism objective of AEDPA, but commonsense as well.We need not plumb all the complexities of agency law todetermine when an agent, under AEDPA, is the alias of itsprincipal. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that therequisite relationship for alias status is established at leastwhen one organization so dominates and controls another thatthe latter can no longer be considered meaningfully indepen-dent from the former. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware,Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 403 (1960) (‘‘ ‘Dominion may be so com-plete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules ofagency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary anagent.’ ’’) (quoting Berkey, 244 N.Y. at 95); Casino ReadyMix, Inc. v. NLRB, 321 F.3d 1190, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2003)(‘‘ ‘agent’ is one who agrees to act ‘subject to [a principal’s]control’ ’’) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, cmt.a (1958)); cf. Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica deVenezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (‘‘A sovereign isamenable to suit based upon the actions of an instrumentalityit dominates because the sovereign and the instrumentality ——————————————————————————– Page 10
are in those circumstances not meaningfully distinct entities;they act as one.’’).We thus frame our inquiry here as whether ‘‘the Secretary,on the face of things, had enough information before [him] tocome to the conclusion’’ that NCRI was dominated andcontrolled by MEK. PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 25. Based on ourreview of the entire administrative record and the classifiedmaterials appended thereto, we find that the Secretary didhave an adequate basis for his conclusion. While our deter-mination is buttressed by classified information provided tous on an ex parte and in camera basis — the contents ofwhich we cannot discuss — the voluminous unclassified mate-rials contained in the administrative record by themselvesand by a comfortable margin provide sufficient support forthe Secretary’s conclusion, given the standard of review. Itwould serve little purpose to catalogue all the material in theadministrative record supporting the conclusion that NCRI isdominated and controlled by MEK, but we will set out belowa few of the pieces of information we found to be mostcompelling. As we do so, it bears repeating that AEDPAdoes not permit us, in exercising our limited judicial review,to make any ‘‘judgment whatsoever regarding whether thematerial before the Secretary is or is not true,’’ but allows usto inquire only whether the Secretary ‘‘had enough informa-tion before [him] to come to the conclusion’’ that NCRI isdominated and controlled by MEK. Id.After an extensive investigation of MEK and NCRI, theFBI reported to the State Department that ‘‘[i]t is theunanimous view of the FBI personnel who are involved in andfamiliar with the FBI’s investigation of the [MEK] that theNCRI is not a separate organization, but is instead, and hasbeen, an integral part of the MEK at all relevant times.’’Letter of Charles Frahm, Section Chief, International Terror-ism Operations Section II, at 1 (Aug. 28, 2002). Contrary toNCRI’s portrayal of itself as an umbrella organization, ofwhich the MEK was just one member, the FBI concludedthat it is NCRI that is ‘‘the political branch’’ of the MEK. Id.Attach. at 1. ——————————————————————————– Page 11
This conclusion was based in large part on evidence gath-ered from the search — executed in December 2001 pursuantto a valid warrant — of a house in Falls Church, Virginiaapparently used as office space by both NCRI and MEK.There, the FBI discovered NCRI and MEK materials ‘‘com-mingled together, and not separated,’’ including bank records,signed blank checks, MEK propaganda, NCRI publications,travel documents, and letterhead which listed the sameFrench address for each organization. Id. Attach. at 2–4.Crucially, among the recovered documents was a schematicbreakdown of the ‘‘Iranian Resistance,’’ which describedNCRI as ‘‘The Political Branch’’ of the movement. Id. at Tab6.Additionally, earlier investigations of MEK and NCRI hadrevealed that the two organizations shared an essentiallyunitary leadership structure. The overall head of MEK,Massoud Rajavi, also leads NCRI. And Rajavi’s wife, Mar-yam Rajavi, was selected by NCRI to be Iran’s President-in-Exile. Id. Attach. at 2; see also id. Attach. at 4 (‘‘Theleadership of [MEK] and NCRI is intermixed, and the enti-ties operate in a day-to-day way as a single unit.’’). Thesefacts corroborated the FBI’s earlier conclusion prior to the2001 designation of NCRI as an FTO that ‘‘the NCR/NCRI isin fact controlled by and inseparable from the MEK.’’ Decl.of Agent Michael Rolince (quoted in Action Mem., Tab 2 at11).The State Department acknowledged that ‘‘NCRI has sub-mitted numerous affidavits purporting to show that it is notcontrolled by the MEK and is not an MEK front,’’ and evencredited some of NCRI’s ‘‘subsidiary points.’’ Action Mem.,Tab 2 at 12, 9. The agency, however, concluded that ‘‘theevidence developed by the FBI is convincingly to the con-trary.’’ Id. Tab 2 at 12. It may be true that the StateDepartment relied very heavily on the conclusions of thecounterterrorism experts of the FBI. As noted above,though, under the narrow powers of judicial review Congresshas accorded to us under AEDPA, it is emphatically not ourprovince to second-guess the Secretary’s judgment as towhich affidavits to credit and upon whose conclusions to rely. ——————————————————————————– Page 12
We are to judge only whether the ‘‘support’’ marshaled forthe Secretary’s designation was ‘‘substantial.’’ 8 U.S.C.§ 1189(b)(3)(D). We conclude that the support for the Secre-tary’s conclusion that NCRI was dominated and controlledby, and thus was an alias of, MEK was indeed substantial,and we therefore reject NCRI’s statutory challenge to itsdesignation as an FTO.III.This leaves only NCRI’s constitutional challenges to certainprocedures employed in making that designation. Specifical-ly, NCRI argues that due process requires that (1) it beprovided access to any classified materials that the Secretaryrelied upon in making the designation, and (2) it have anadversary hearing before the agency at which it could con-front witnesses against it. Both these arguments are fore-closed by our earlier decisions in NCRI and PMOI II. See251 F.3d at 208–09; 327 F.3d at 1242–43. ConcerningNCRI’s claim that it is entitled to review classified materials,in NCRI we wrote that the government ‘‘need not disclose theclassified information to be presented in camera and ex parteto the court under the statute.’’ 251 F.3d at 208. In PMOIII, addressing the same claim, this time brought by MEK, wewere even more emphatic: ‘‘We reject this contentionTTTTWe already decided in [NCRI] that due process required thedisclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administra-tive record.’’ 327 F.3d at 1242. PMOI II also disposes ofNCRI’s claim for an adversary hearing. There, we held thatNCRI established the constitutional baseline for fair processand, the Government having complied with those commandson remand, that ‘‘nothing further is due.’’ Id. at 1243. Wereach the same conclusion with regard to NCRI.The petition for review is denied.
FAS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE Office of the Coordinator for Counter-terrorism [Public Notice 3795] Re-designation of Foreign Terrorist Organization AGENCY: Department of State. ACTION: Re-designation of foreign terrorist organizations. Pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), as added by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, Sec. 302, 110 Stat. 1214, 1248 (1996), and amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), the Secretary of State hereby redesignates, effective October 5, 2001, the following organizations as foreign terrorist organizations: Abu Nidal Organization
Also known as ANO
Also known as Black September
Also known as the Fatah Revolutionary Council
Also known as the Arab Revolutionary Council
Also known as the Arab Revolutionary Brigades
Also known as the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims
Abu Sayyaf Group
Also known as Al Harakat Al Islamiyya
Armed Islamic Group
Also known as GIA
Also known as Groupement Islamique Arme
Also known as Al-Jama’ah al-Islamiyah al-Musallah
[[Page 51089]]
Aum Shinrikyo
Also known as Aleph
Also known as Aum Supreme Truth
Also known as A.I.C. Sogo Kenkyusho
Also known as A.I.C. Comprehensive Research Institute
Basque Fatherland and Liberty
Also known as Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna
Also known as ETA
Gama’a al-Islamiyya
Also known as the Islamic Group
Also known as IG
Also known as al-Gama’at
Also known as Islamic Gama’at
Also known as Egyptian al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya
Also known as GI
Hamas
Also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement
Also known as Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya
Also known as Students of Ayyash
Also known as Students of the Engineer
Also known as Yahya Ayyash Units
Also known as Izz Al-Din Al-Qassim Brigades
Also known as Izz Al-Din Al-Qassim Forces
Also known as Izz Al-Din Al-Qassim Battalions
Also known as Izz al-Din Al Qassam Brigades
Also known as Izz al-Din Al Qassam Forces
Also known as Izz al-Din Al Qassam Battalions
Harakat ul-Mujahideen
Also known as HUM
Also known as Harakat ul-Ansar
Also known as HUA
Hizballah
Also known as the Party of God
Also known as Islamic Jihad
Also known as Islamic Jihad Organization
Also known as Revolutionary Justice Organization
Also known as Organization of the Oppressed on Earth
Also known as Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine
Also known as Organization of Right Against Wrong
Also known as Ansar Allah
Also known as Followers of the Prophet Muhammed
al-Jihad
Also known as Egyptian al-Jihad
Also known as New Jihad
Also known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad
Also known as Jihad Group
Kahane Chai
Also known as Kach
Also known as Kahane Lives
Also known as the Kfar Tapuah Fund
Also known as The Judean Voice
Also known as The Judean Legion
Also known as The Way of the Torah
Also known as The Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea
Also known as the Repression of Traitors
Also known as Dikuy Bogdim
Also known as DOV
Also known as the State of Judea
Also known as the Committee for the Safety of the Roads
Also known as the Sword of David
Also known as Judea Police
Also known as Forefront of the Idea
Also known as The Qomemiyut Movement
and
Also known as KOACH
Kurdistan Workers’ Party
Also known as the PKK
Also known as Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan
Also known as the People’s Defense Force
Also known as Halu Mesru Savunma Kuvveti (HSK)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Also known as LTTE
Also known as Tamil Tigers
Also known as Ellalan Force
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization
Also known as MEK
Also known as MKO
Also known as Mujahedin-e Khalq
Also known as People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran
Also known as PMOI
Also known as Organization of the People’s Holy Warriors of Iran
Also known as Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran
Also known as National Council of Resistance
Also known as NCR
Also known as National Council of Resistance of Iran
Also known as NCRI
Also known as the National Liberation Army of Iran
Also known as NLA
National Liberation Army
Also known as the ELN,
Also known as Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional
Palestine Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction
Also known as PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction
Also known as PIJ-Shallah Faction
Also known as Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Also known as PIJ
Also known as Islamic Jihad of Palestine
Also known as Islamic Jihad in Palestine
Also known as Abu Ghunaym Squad of the Hizballah Bayt Al-Maqdis
Also known as the Al-Quds Squads
Also known as the Al-Quds Brigades
Also known as Saraya Al-Quds
Also known as Al-Awdah Brigades
Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction
Also known as the Palestine Liberation Front
Also known as the PLF
Also known as PLF-Abu Abbas
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Also known as the PFLP
Also known as the Red Eagles
Also known as the Red Eagle Group
Also known as the Red Eagle Gang
Also known as the Halhul Gang
Also known as the Halhul Squad
Also known as Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces
Also known as PPRF
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
Also known as PFLP-GC
al Qa’ida
Also known as al Qaeda
Also known as “the Base”
Also known as the Islamic Army
Also known as the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and
Crusaders
Also known as the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places
Also known as the Usama Bin Laden Network
Also known as the Usama Bin Laden Organization
Also known as Islamic Salvation Foundation
Also known as The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
Also known as FARC
Also known as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
Revolutionary Nuclei
Also known as the Revolutionary People’s Struggle
Also known as Epanastatikos Laikos Agonas
Also known as ELA
Also known as Revolutionary Popular Struggle
Also known as Popular Revolutionary Struggle
Also known as June 78
Also known as Organization of Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity
Also known as Revolutionary Cells
Also known as Liberation Struggle
[[Page 51090]]
Revolutionary Organization 17 November
Also known as 17 November
Also known as Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front
Also known as Devrimci Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi
Also known as the DHKP/C
Also known as Devrimci Sol
Also known as Revolutionary Left
Also known as Dev Sol
Also known as Dev Sol Silahli Devrimci Birlikleri
Also known as Dev Sol SDB
Also known as Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units
Shining Path Also known in Spanish as Sendero Luminoso
Also known as SL
Also known as Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose
Carlos Mariategui
Also known as Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose
Carlos Mariategui
Also known as Partido Comunista del Peru
Also known as Communist Party of Peru
Also known as PCP
Also known as Socorro Popular del Peru
Also known as People’s Aid of Peru
Also known as SPP
Also known as Ejercito Guerrillero Popular
Also known as People’s Guerrilla Army
Also known as EGP
Also known as Ejercito Popular de Liberacion
Also known as People’s Liberation Army
Also known as the EPL.
Dated: September 28, 2001.
Francis X. Taylor,
Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 01-24911 Filed 10-4-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-10-P
immigration.com
Designations of Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations Pursuant to Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001 SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the designation by the Secretary of State of foreign persons whose property and interests in property have been blocked pursuant to Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001. These designations comprise 8 individuals and 29 organizations determined to meet the criteria set forth under subsection 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. DATES: These determinations were made by the Secretary of State on October 12, 2001, October 31, 2001, December 18, 2001, and December 31, 2001, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Frederick W. Axelgard, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State; telephone: (202) 647-9892; fax: (202) 647-0221. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background On September 23, 2001, President Bush issued Executive Order 13224 (the “Order”) imposing economic sanctions on persons (defined as including individuals or entities) who, inter alia, commit, threaten to commit, or support certain acts of terrorism. In an annex to the Order, President Bush identified 12 individuals and 15 entities whose assets are blocked pursuant to the Order (66 FR 49079, September 25, 2001). The property and interests in property of an additional 33 individuals and 6 entities were blocked pursuant to determinations by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury (effective October 12, 2001), referenced in a Federal Register Notice published by the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury (66 FR 54404, October 26, 2001). Further determinations made by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, on November 7, 2001, and December 4, 2001, December 20, 2001, January 9, 2002, February 26, and March 11 are addressed in a separate notice published elsewhere in this issue of the Federal Register. Pursuant to subsection 1(b) of the Order, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, has determined to date that 8 foreign individuals and 29 foreign organizations have been determined to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. The Secretary of State’s etermination that each of these individuals and organizations meets the criteria set forth under subsection 1(b) of the Order subjects each of these individuals and organizations to sanctions. 23 of the organizations determined on October 31, 2001 and December 18, 2001 to meet the criteria set forth under subsection 1(b) of the Order are also subject to sanctions imposed pursuant to their designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1189. Pursuant to the determination made by the Secretary of State under subsection 1(b) of the Order, all property and interests in property of any listed person that are in the United States, that come within the United States, or that come within the possession or control of United States persons, including their overseas branches, are blocked. All transactions or dealings by U.S. persons or within the United States in property or interests in property of any listed person are prohibited unless licensed by the Department of the Treasury’s Office of foreign Assets Control or exempted by statute.The determinations of the Secretary of State were effective on October 12, 2001, October 31, 2001, December 18, 2001, and December 31, 2001. In Section 10 of the Order, the President determined that because of the ability to transfer funds or assets instantaneously, prior notice to persons listed in the Annex to, or determined to be subject to, the Order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, would render ineffectual the blocking and other measures authorized in the Order. The President therefore determined that for these measures to be effective in addressing the national emergency declared in the Order, no prior notification of a listing or determination pursuant to the Order need be provided to any person who might have a constitutional presence in the United States. The property and interests of property of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported,withdrawn or otherwise dealt in except as authorized by regulations,orders, directives, rulings, instructions, licenses or otherwise: Designations by the Secretary of State on October 12, 2001 ADBELKARIM HUSSEIN MOHAMMED AL-NASSER AHMAD IBRAHIM AL-MUGHASSIL ALI SAED BIN ALI EL-HOORIE IBRAHIM SALIH MOHAMMED AL-YACOUB ALI ATWA HASAN IZZ-AL-DIN IMAD FAYEZ MUGNIYAH KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED Designations by the Secretary of State on October 31, 2001 ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION a.k.a. ANO; a.k.a. BLACK SEPTEMBER a.k.a. FATAH REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL a.k.a. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL a.k.a. ARAB REVOLUTIONARY BRIGADES a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION OF SOCIALIST MUSLIMS AUM SHINRIKYO a.k.a. A.I.C. COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH INSTITUTE a.k.a. A.I.C. SOGO KENKYUSHO a.k.a. ALEPH a.k.a. AUM SUPREME TRUTH BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY a.k.a. ETA a.k.a. EUZKADI TA ASKATASUNA GAMA’A AL-ISLAMIYYA a.k.a. GI a.k.a. ISLAMIC GROUP a.k.a. IG a.k.a. AL-GAMA’AT a.k.a. ISLAMIC GAMA’A a.k.a. EGYPTIAN AL-GAMA’AT AL-ISLAMIYYA HAMAS a.k.a. ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT a.k.a. HARAKAT AL-MUQAWAMA AL-ISLAMIYA a.k.a. STUDENTS OF AYYASH a.k.a. STUDENT OF THE ENGINEER a.k.a. YAHYA AYYASH UNITS a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BRIGADES a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM FORCES a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL-QASSIM BATTALIONS a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BRIGADES a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM FORCES a.k.a. IZZ AL-DIN AL QASSAM BATTALIONS HIZBALLAH a.k.a. PARTY OF GOD a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD ORGANIZATION a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY JUSTICE ORGANIZATION a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF THE OPPRESSED ON EARTH a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF RIGHT AGAINST WRONG a.k.a. ANSAR ALLAH a.k.a. FOLLOWERS OF THE PROPHET MUHAMMED KAHANE CHAI a.k.a. COMMITTEE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE ROADS a.k.a. DIKUY BOGDIM a.k.a. DOV a.k.a. FOREFRONT OF THE IDEA a.k.a. JUDEA POLICE a.k.a. KACH a.k.a. KAHANE LIVES a.k.a. KFAR TAPUAH FUND a.k.a. KOACH a.k.a. REPRESSION OF TRAITORS a.k.a. STATE OF JUDEA a.k.a. SWORD OF DAVID a.k.a. THE JUDEAN LEGION a.k.a. THE JUDEAN VOICE a.k.a. THE QOMEMIYUT MOVEMENT a.k.a. THE WAY OF THE TORAH a.k.a. THE YESHIVA OF THE JEWISH IDEA KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY a.k.a. HALU MESRU SAVUNMA KUVVETI (HSK) a.k.a. PARTIYA KARKERAN KURDISTAN a.k.a. PKK a.k.a. THE PEOPLE’S DEFENSE FORCE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM a.k.a. LTTE a.k.a. TAMIL TIGERS a.k.a. ELLALAN FORCE MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ a.k.a. MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION a.k.a. MEK a.k.a. MKO a.k.a. NLA a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF THE PEOPLE’S HOLY WARRIORS OF IRAN a.k.a. PEOPLE’S MUJAHEDIN ORGANIZATION OF IRAN a.k.a. PMOI a.k.a. SAZEMAN-E MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ-E IRAN a.k.a. THE NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY OF IRAN NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY a.k.a. ELN a.k.a. EJERCITO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD–SHAQAQI FACTION a.k.a. ABU GHUNAYM SQUAD OF THE HIZBALLAH BAYT AL-MAQDIS a.k.a. AL-AWDAH BRIGADES a.k.a. AL-QUDS BRIGADES a.k.a. AL-QUDS SQUADS a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD IN PALESTINE a.k.a. ISLAMIC JIHAD OF PALESTINE a.k.a. PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD a.k.a. PIJ a.k.a. PIJ-SHALLAH FACTION a.k.a. PIJ-SHAQAQI FACTION a.k.a. SAYARA AL-QUDS PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT–ABU ABBAS FACTION a.k.a. PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT a.k.a. PLF a.k.a. PLF-ABU ABBAS POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE–GENERAL COMMAND a.k.a. PFLP-GC REAL IRA a.k.a. 32 COUNTY SOVEREIGNTY COMMITTEE a.k.a. 32 COUNTY SOVEREIGNTY MOVEMENT a.k.a. IRISH REPUBLICAN PRISONERS WELFARE ASSOCIATION a.k.a. REAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY a.k.a. REAL OGLAIGH NA HEIREANN a.k.a. RIRA REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA a.k.a. FARC REVOLUTIONARY NUCLEI a.k.a. POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE a.k.a. EPANASTATIKOS LAIKOS AGONAS a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY POPULAR STRUGGLE a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE’S STRUGGLE a.k.a. JUNE 78 a.k.a. ORGANIZATION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERNATIONALIST SOLIDARITY a.k.a. ELA a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY CELLS a.k.a. LIBERATION STRUGGLE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION 17 NOVEMBER a.k.a. 17 NOVEMBER a.k.a. EPANASTATIKI ORGANOSI 17 NOEMVRI REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE’S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT a.k.a. DEVRIMCI HALK KURTULUS PARTISI-CEPHESI a.k.a. DHKP/C; [[Page 12635]] a.k.a. DEVRIMCI SOL a.k.a. REVOLUTIONARY LEFT a.k.a. DEV SOL a.k.a. DEV SOL SILAHLI DEVRIMCI BIRLIKLERI a.k.a. DEV SOL SDB a.k.a. DEV SOL ARMED REVOLUTIONARY UNITS SHINING PATH a.k.a. SENDERO LUMINOSO a.k.a. SL a.k.a. PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU EN EL SENDERO LUMINOSO DE JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU ON THE SHINING PATH OF JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI) a.k.a. PARTIDO COMUNISTA DEL PERU (COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU) a.k.a. PCP a.k.a. SOCORRO POPULAR DEL PERU (PEOPLE’S AID OF PERU) a.k.a. SPP a.k.a. EJERCITO GUERRILLERO POPULAR (PEOPLE’S GUERRILLA ARMY) a.k.a. EGP a.k.a. EJERCITO POPULAR DE LIBERACION (PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY) a.k.a. EPL UNITED SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF COLOMBIA a.k.a. AUC a.k.a. AUTODEFENSAS UNIDAS DE COLOMBIA Designation by the Secretary of State on December 18, 2001 LASHKAR-E-TAIBA a.k.a. LASHKAR E-TAYYIBA a.k.a. LASKAR E-TOIBA a.k.a. ARMY OF THE RIGHTEOUS Designations by the Secretary of State on December 31, 2001 CONTINUITY IRA (CIRA) LOYALIST VOLUNTEER FORCE (LVF) ORANGE VOLUNTEERS (OV) RED HAND DEFENDERS (RHD) ULSTER DEFENCE ASSOCIATION/ULSTER FREEDOM FIGHTERS (UDA/UFF) FIRST OF OCTOBER ANTIFASCIST RESISTANCE GROUP (GRAPO) Dated: March 13, 2002. Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State. [FR Doc. 02-6577 Filed 3-14-02; 3:48 pm] BILLING CODE 4710-10-P immigration.com
UnitedNorthAmerica.org
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) From: Country Reports on Terrorism, 2004. United States Department of State, April 2005. ——————————————————————————– Other Names The National Liberation Army of Iran The People’s Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI) National Council of Resistance (NCR) National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) Muslim Iranian Student’s Society Description The MEK philosophy mixes Marxism and Islam. Formed in the 1960s, the organization was expelled from Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and its primary support came from the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein starting in the late 1980s. The MEK conducted anti-West-ern attacks prior to the Islamic Revolution. Since then, it has conducted terrorist attacks against the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad. The MEK advocates the overthrow of the Iranian regime and its replacement with the group’s own leadership. Activities The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorism. During the 1970s, the MEK killed US military personnel and US civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier’s office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the 19801988 war with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with military equipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces. In 1991, the MEK assisted the Government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in southern Iraq and the Kurdish uprisings in the north. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff. In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The normal pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during "Operation Great Bahman" in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack against the leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved regularly in mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids on Iranian military and law enforcement units and Government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border, although MEK terrorism in Iran declined toward the end of 2001. After Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the MEK leadership ordered its members not to resist Coalition forces, and a formal cease-fire arrangement was reached in May 2003. Strength Over 3,000 MEK members are currently confined to Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s main compound north of Baghdad, where they remain under the Geneva Convention’s "protected person" status and Coalition control. As a condition of the cease-fire agreement, the group relinquished its weapons, including tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery. A significant number of MEK personnel have "defected" from the Ashraf group, and several dozen of them have been voluntarily repatriated to Iran. Location/Area of Operation In the 1980s, the MEK’s leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. On resettling in Iraq in 1987, almost all of its armed units were stationed in fortified bases near the border with Iran. Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, the bulk of the group is limited to Camp Ashraf, although an overseas support structure remains with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America. External Aid Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the group received all of its military assistance, and most of its financial support, from the former Iraqi regime. The MEK also has used front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities. ——————————————————————————– This is an official U.S. Navy web site
Terrorist group profile Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK)
Mothertongue Name: Mujahedin-e-Khalq
Aliases: Mojahedin Khalq Organisation, Mujahideen-e Khalq Organisation (MKO), People’s Mujahideen of Iran (PMOI)
Base of Operation: France; Iraq
Founding Philosophy: The MEK is the primary opposition to the current Iranian government and acts as the focal point of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a coalition of Iranian opposition groups which claims to be the transitional parliament-in-exile with 570 members. The NCRI was headquartered in Iraq, with representative offices in other countries including a presence in Washington where it has previously received support from the US Congress. After the 9/11 attacks however, the US government actively courted cooperation from the government of Iran and further sidelined any unofficial support for the MEK. Worsening their reputation further, intelligence reports suggested that the MEK’s military camps in Iraq might be hiding some of Iraq’s weapons programs. The group surrendered to US forces following the US invasion of Iraq. In May 2003, US Central Command stated that the group was "complying fully with Coalition instructions and directives". The MEK began as a liberal nationalistic party supporting former Prime Minister Mossaddeq against the Shah. When a 1963 uprising against the Shah failed, more radical members split off to form the MEK. In 1971 the new group began its armed struggle against the Shah, whom it saw as a dictator and a puppet of the United States.
The group conducted a number of attacks on US military personnel and civilians in Iran in the 1970s. Although the group initially supported the 1979 revolution and the overthrow of the Shah, the group’s secular perspective led to an eventual crackdown by the Khomeni regime following MEK’s call for a mass demonstration after the 1981 impeachment of Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, the elected President and chairman of the Islamic Revolutionary Council. Thousands of MEK members were killed and imprisoned during the repression. The MEK’s leaders fled to Paris and their military infrastructure moved to Iraq. The headquarters were relocated to Iraq in 1987, the MEK’s military wing, the NLA was formed and began using Iraq as a base for cross-border raids into Iran. In 1991, it assisted Saddam Hussein in suppressing the Shia and Kurdish uprisings, and continued to perform internal security services for the Government thereafter. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian Embassies and installations in 13 countries. More recently, the MEK assassinated the deputy chief of the Armed Forces General Staff of Iran in April 1999, and was involved regularly in mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids on Iranian military and law-enforcement units and government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border throughout 2000 and 2001.
Current Goals: The MEK’s goal is to overthrow the Iranian government and replace it with the NCRI. At a 1995 conference, the group outlined a 16-point plan:
1) Guarantee freedom of belief, expression and the press, without censorship; 2) Guarantee freedom for political parties, unions, groups, councils, forums, syndicates, except those loyal to either the Shah or Ayatollah Khomeini, provided they stayed within the law; 3) Ensure governments would be elected; 4) Respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; 5) Abolish courts, tribunals, security departments introduced by the Ayatollah Khomeini regime; 6) Ensure women enjoy the same social, political and cultural rights as men (including a ban on polygamy); 7) Abolish privileges based on gender, religion or ethnic group; 8) End discrimination against religious minorities; 9) Abolish compulsory religious practice; 10) Secure Iranian territorial integrity while recognising the right of Iranian Kurdistan to autonomy; 11) Safeguard all social, cultural and political rights for ethnic minorities; 12) Repeal what the MEK deems to be `anti-labour, anti-peasant laws’; 13) Encourage a return from exile for all who fled either the Shah or Khomeini regime; 14) Base the economy on the free market, national capitalism and private ownership; 15) Provide welfare needs to the poor; 16) Improve Iran’s foreign relations with neighbouring and other states; to live in peaceful co-existence.
The Mujahedin-e-Khalq have periodically released information on Iran’s developing nuclear weapons program, however the information cannot usually be verified. The group’s information was, however, crucial in the 2002 revelation of Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Its latest release came in February 2005, when the group passed on information to the International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA) that Iran now possesses sources for polonium-210 and beryllium, crucial components in building an “initiator.” The group claims that this is the last objective that Iran needed to fulfill and that they plan to have a nuclear weapon by the end of 2005.
Date Formed: Formed in 1963; began armed operations in 1971
Strength: Greater than 500 members
Classification: Leftist
Last Attack: Jan. 21, 2001
Financial Sources: For years the group recieved all of its military assistance, and most of its financial support, from the Iraqi regime. In addition, the MEK uses front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities, as well as a number of charities which operate as human rights organisations monitoring the Iranian government, or which claim to provide relief for Iranian refugees, are in fact collecting funds for the MEK.
U.S. Terrorist Exclusion
List Designee: No
US State Dept. FTO: Designated: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004
Watched: No
Key Leaders: Rajavi, Maryam Rajavi, Massoud
Related Groups: Muslim Iranian Student’s Society • Financial Associate
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) Umbrella Group
National Liberation Army of Iran (NLA) • Political Wing