The Ideology of the MEK

Maryam Rajavi and Nexhmije Hoxha: The black widows of the Balkans

Maryam Rajavi and Nexhmije Hoxha are both widows of two dictators whose dark past has been known to the world.

Most dictators have several characteristics in common. They often resort to force or fraud to gain despotic political power, which they maintain through the use of intimidation, terror, and the suppression of dissidents. Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MEK/ MKO/ PMOI) shares the prominent characteristics of most dictators around the world. He was disappeared in 2003 when the coalition forces invaded Iraq. Since then, Maryam Rajavi has been the public leader of the group.

In 2015, the MEK was completely relocated in Albania, one of the best-known examples of Balkan countries “experiencing” authoritarianism. The end of World War II and the bloody conflicts marked the beginning of a series of industrialization and economic self-sufficiency efforts by the leader of the Albanian Labor Party, Enver Hoxha. However, Hoxha’s adherence to a model of governance similar to that of Stalinism showed authoritarian and violent actions against dissidents. His policy throughout his life led him to be described as a “communist dictator” and as the “Stalin of the Balkans”.

Massoud Rajavi took his ideology from Stalinist Russia too. He founded his cult of personality on the basis of an ideology which is a mixture of Islam and Marxism. He claimed to seek a classless society in his organization and eventually in future Iran. He did not succeed to overthrow the Iranian government in spite of launching the most violent terror acts against the Iranian civilians, authorities and nuclear scientists during three decades.

Massoud together with his wife Maryam Rajavi developed their despotic rule on their own rank and file. Under the Rajavi’s cult of personality members are subjected to mandatory divorce, forced labor without payment, self-criticism meetings and other cult-like suppressive practices. In the Cult of Rajavi, dissident members have been jailed in solitary confinement, tortured or even killed. This is what the Albanian nation experienced during the rule of Enver Hoxha. Hoxha and Rajavi’s method of conducting politics had ideological bases similar to those of Stalinism, aiming more and more at personalistic aspirations.

Nexhmije Hoxha & Maryam Rajavi

The 40-year period of Hoxha’s rule was characterized by confiscation of property, many years of imprisonment or forced labor in camps, the imposition of the death penalty and the banning of all religious activities. Hoxha’s wife Nexhmije, who was an active member of the Communist Party took on various key positions in Albania. She was a supporter of her husband’s political actions and she directly mixed with a series of murders and persecutions of thousands of people, mostly prominent women of the post-war period.

Hoxha remained the dictator of Albania until his death in 1985. His widow, Nexhmije Hoxha, the “Black Lady” or the “Devil Woman”, as she has been described, lived for 35 extra years after the death of her husband, in an area just outside Tirana. She passed away in February, 2020, at the age of 99. It is important to note that, in none of her interviews did she express remorse for the regime’s past and their crimes.

Maryam Rajavi can be considered a widow because her husband Massoud Rajavi has disappeared since 2003. Addressing Maryam Rajavi, in his paid speech in an MEK-run event in 2015, Turki Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s former chief of Intelligence also spoke of Massoud Rajavi as “your late husband”.

Today, three decades after the fall of the Hoxha’s dictatorship, Maryam Rajavi plays the part of the “black widow of the Balkans” in the Albanian territory. Although Nexhmije served five years in prison before she lived in isolation in her apartment in the suburb of Tirana, Maryam Rajavi lives in her headquarters in a village in North of Tirana, Manez, meeting her paid invitees. She boasts of her future plan for Iran, chanting slogans for a few thousands of her cult members who wave the MEK flags before her. She glorifies her disappeared husband for the crimes he committed against the Iranian nation and his own rank and file.

Maryam Rajavi is over 70 years old now. She will die someday and definitely, she will never remorse for the atrocities she committed together with her husband. An inherent lack of empathy, guilt or remorse allows the most malignant people to commit unspeakable atrocities and never feel regret.

Mazda Parsi

August 15, 2022 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

Appeasement in the MeK dictionary

"Appeasement" for the remnants of Rajavi is as a comprehensive dictionary to explain all problems, for example:

Appeasement is a term that Rajavi applies it to explain organizational inabilities of the MeK.

Appeasement is applied by Rajavi to justify her unreal analysis and delusive predictions.

Appeasement is also introduced cause of the failure in terrorist strategy and radicalism against Iran.

Appeasement in discourse of Rajavi’s gang has many of these functions and its domain gets wider and wider; as far as, even, Rajavi’s refusal of Iraqi laws and UN commands and her violation of multilateral agreements recently are being justified as effects of America’s appeasement with Iran.

For a decade the MeK was accusing Europe for appeasing with Iran and not following the America’s policy, but now it is the US which is bellwether of appeasers!

Europe was being accused by the MeK leadership for appeasing with Iran, because it had placed her terrorist organization in the terrorist list, with the argument that Europe cannot lay away appeasement since it is willing to economic relationship with Iran.

In fact, any policy or action that does not agree with the logic of Rajavi is considered an appeasing behavior and, from this perspective, one can say that "appeasement" for the Rajavi’s gang is just a childish excuse to escape from responsibility.

August 23, 2012 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

On the Formation and Survival of Terrorism

Over the past two centuries terrorism has been used for various reasons to achieve various goals. Terrorism has been used by a variety of social, religious and political zealots and ideologues and the historical development of terrorism shows that it is a tool mostly manipulated Mujahedin insisted to continue their armed strategy and rejected new rules as they had their own interpretation and analysis of the post-revolution era for a change. So far, and despite extensive academic and non-academic studies to examine the reasons behind the formation of terrorist groups, little has been done to investigate the role of the states in either the emergence of terrorist groups or sponsoring them. It can be examined at least from two perspectives; first, the role of authoritarian and dictatorial regimes in the emergence of violent underground and terrorist groups, and second, the catalyst role the terrorist groups play for some states.

Authoritarian and repressive governments and regimes are themselves a cause of terrorism since they routinely stifle civil liberties in order to maintain their hold on power and keep society in check. These regimes instigate public discord and cause the emergence of violent underground groups to fight for a change. As they are also corrupt governments, resources, privileges, and advantages are reserved for a select group of the people or ruling elite and thus, corruption encumbers the fair distribution of social services and adds another layer to the resentment caused by the lack of political participation. To combat the authority of the repressive regimes, the emergence of campaigners and groups, some already committed to pursuing their goals through nonviolent means, proves to be a necessary. At least in the past century it has been the cause behind emergence and formation of violent groups in Iran. Hardly can we distinguish between the political groups whose main approach is armed warfare and the terrorists because the very same political groups end to terrorism due to their infrastructural ideology of armed and militant struggle. Of course, there are few that make a revision and adapt to the made change and get advantages of their democratic potentialities to secure their political interests through peaceful means. We have the example of the both groups in Iran’s history of the past century; the People’s Devoted Guerrillas and the Mujahedin Khalq.

The People’s Devoted Guerrillas, the majority, made a thorough revision in the principles of its political and strategic struggle after a fairly realistic analysis of the Iranian post-revolution situation and became a political process. However, a few of the survivors remained loyal to the armed policy, but because of their extremist inclination to Leninist ended to the abyss of terrorism and, for several reasons like weakness in organizational structure and the like, accepted the hegemony of Mujahedin Khalq. Thus, a militant group formed to fight the ousted Pahlavi’s regime divided into two branches each dedicating itself to a separate path of struggle.

The second group surviving pre-revolutionary armed warfare was Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO, MEK, PMOI, NCR, NLA). Mujahedin insisted to continue their armed strategy and rejected new rules as they had their own interpretation and analysis of the post-revolution era. They refused to deliver their weapons over to the newly formed regime and instead opened a front of controversy that led them to pursue their goals through violent means that eventually culminated to terrorism. The role of Pahlavi’s authoritarian and repressive regime for the birth of the two challenging groups, among many other armed groups, was inevitable and the shaping of all these groups, because of the regime’s non-flexibility and quashing of the scattered opposition and opponents, could in some way counterpoise the draconian pressure of the regime. Here, we can well see the connection between dictatorial governance and the formation of an armed movement that was wholeheartedly transformed into a global terrorist group.

The catalyst role the terrorist groups play for some states has to be also explored. That is, some imperialist and colonizing states facilitate the formation of terrorist groups and provide for them under a variety of freedom fighting names in different part of the world in an attempt to secure their long-term strategic interests and objectives. While some counter-terrorist theoreticians highlight the need to understand the organizational, ideological, and financial aspects of a global threat as al Qaeda in order to defeat this global network of terror, little is said about the powers that fed it to become the notorious al Qaeda. There are proven evidences that the US government was funding and working with Al-Qaeda up to September 11, 2001. However, as these collaborator groups have their own expiry date, they are soon in disgrace with their sponsors. The outcome will be nothing but to turn them into global threats and become claimants of some power and authority.

Regardless of the manipulation of al-Qaeda by the US, terrorism is the outcome of both regional or global power imbalance and authoritarian influence. But what is of significant importance is that along with the birth of these purposeful terrorist groups other forms of violent groups pop out of the created chaotic situations. These parallel violent groups well fill the created social and political gaps and are even manipulated as puppet terrorists by rival political campaigners and the mafia-like criminal networks for a variety of purposes.

Natural enough, they can be also manipulated and sponsored by behind-the-curtain controlling powers that get their benefit from the terrorist-infected regions and countries.
Similarly, we can observe such an engagement in global relations. In an initiative to counter terrorism, some states arrange a blacklist of groups that are considered to have posed a threat not only against their nations but also against the global peace and security while the very same groups are proclaimed by some other states as freedom-fighters and even counter-terrorists. The duality before anything benefits the terrorists themselves who enjoy the support of their sponsors to survive. That is the present condition of MKO; it is a blacklisted terrorist group on the US terrorist list and considered a global threat while it is removed from the EU terror list believing to be a pro-democratic and freedom-seeker group. And MKO owes its survival much to these states, claiming to be policymakers of combating against terrorism that have made a compromise with the group under a multifaceted contract to advance their political goals. Words and policies are of no use and can help in no way to curtail terrorism unless there is a universal willingness to stop compromising with terrorists.

January 19, 2011 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

MKO Armed Warfare, an Ideological Necessity

Mojahedin-e Khalq strategy of armed struggle that constitutes its organizational infrastructure from its very formation has now confronted the organization with a new challenge in spite of its widespread propaganda to convince the West it has made revisions. Although the challenge has failed to break the deadlock over Mojahedin’s proceeding with its revolutionary diplomacy in the outside world, the strategy is the main factor that stabilizes the group’s internal relations especially within Camp Ashraf. That is to say, for the outsiders the organization displays the dual policy of abandoning militarism and armed activities; for the insiders it is a strategically unquestionable principle.

That is a contradiction pervading MKO and, of course, the group has not resolved to convince the Westerners to have adopted a different attitude. It seems that MKO gets much advantage out of an equivocal attitude. In many occasions, MKO has admitted the necessity of armed struggle as an ideological necessity that constitutes the violent ontology of MKO. Definitely stated in the State Department’s report presented to Congress on the People’s Mojahedin of Iran in 1994, MKO developed an eclectic ideological blend of Islam and Marxism that dictated both a war of armed struggle and a war of propaganda to achieve political power.

They [Mojahedin] established an organization dedicated to armed struggle. As they explained in a 1974 newspaper article, "We had to ask ourselves the question, "What is to be done?" Our answer was straightforward: ‘Armed Struggle.,"(1) Commitment to this strategic principle has defined the history of the Mojahedin, from the group’s formal establishment in 1965 until today…. The MKO’s embrace of armed struggle flows from the group’s ideology. Its conceptual framework was painstakingly developed through years of study and discourse and aggressively disseminated throughout Tehran.

Being so fervently devoted to a violent strategy, MKO should undergo a complete ideological cleansing before renunciation of terrorism and militarism. But first it has to be investigated that is it possible by any means to change an ideology that institutes infrastructure of an organization?

During the past two decades, majority of MKO’s propaganda and published documents strongly advocate the strategic importance of the adopted tactic of armed warfare following the organization’s first mass movement on 20 June in 1981; the turning point that was broadly being propagated at the time and which was supposed to speed up the inevitable collapse of the regime. In his first series of speeches delivered on the first anniversary of the phase Khordad 30th (20 June 1981), Massoud Rajavi talked about the influential role of MKO’s ideology on the event:

A one-year review of implacable struggle indicates that it is a widespread, organized struggle and resistance matchless in Iranian history. It is not a merely review of political, military, strategic and tactical issues. All of them together, as different organs of body, constitute a cohesive essence that is Mojahedin’s ideology; they all remarkably signify this truth.*

In Rajavi’s analysis of the year-long armed struggle, you come across issues focusing on the inevitability and necessity of armed struggle and violent acts. Rajavi is in no way sceptical about the adopted strategy of armed struggle and is critical of anybody who may oppose the strategy:
All the nonsense woven against the armed struggle during this one year is loathsome and even ludicrous to listen to for those who are in close contact with reality.

In fact, the telling reality Rajavi points out is that armed struggle is the spirit of the organization without which it cannot survive:

In essence, we owe our existence and survival before anything to the widespread armed combat of the Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization.

There are much more evidences found in MKO’s ideological sources that implicitly and explicitly denounce abandoning the strategy of armed warfare adopted by Mojahedin and consider any made criticism and disapproval as definitely illegitimate. Those who are familiar with the group’s dual nature consider MKO’s claimed renunciation of militarism nothing beyond a tactic of duplicity.

Since MKO’s resort to armed combat and militarism is an internalized ideological principle, its renunciation also needs a similar process of ideological revision. If MKO is standing resolute to abandon terrorism as it claims, at least a review of its previously adopted resolutions will imply the earnestness of its decision. Renunciation of terrorism and militarism, although MKO has refrained to denounce publicly, first needs a through ideological polish, something MKO has dodged to go through at least up to now. MKO should explain how commitment to an ideological necessity can possibly be deserted while the ideology itself remains intact.

*All Rajavi’s quotes are from Mojahedin’s published A one-year review of the armed struggle

June 22, 2010 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

Rajavi, a devotee of the deviated

On April 26 many from among the early MKO sat commemorating the 35th anniversary of the martyrdom of Majid Sharif Vaqefi, of the early founders of MKO murdered by the separated Marxist wing. This event has been studied from different angels in the past three decades and it seems that after years of cliché glorifications and double-faced lamentation over his murder, it is indispensible to depict a truthful image of him in which we have to distinctly distinguish between his ideology and practical struggle from that of his opponents. Only those who take a clear position against his murderers and also try to analyze the reasons leading to the growth of Taqi Shahram, who along with his comrade Bahram Aram developed and formed the Marxist branch of the organization, can claim to be the true followers of Sharif Vaqefi. To know his real murderers in the past and their advocates in the present, namely hypocritical colporteurs, we have to take a look at the past history of the organization and have a review of the statements and the ideological orientation of those who managed to assume the organization’s leadership after the execution and murder of the early founders.

Although the dispute over the acceptance of Islam or Marxism as the ideological infrastructure of the organization caused a schism in the organization with the consequent murder of Sharif-Vaqefi and emergence of the Marxist wing, it will be naïve to put all the blames just on Taqi Shahram and Bahram Aram as the opportunists that betrayed their comrades. If it was so, the martyrdom of Sharif Vaqefi had to be the last ring of an opportunistic chain in MKO. However, the course of events afterwards reveals that the ideological logic and thought pattern of the two have still their roots left in the organization.

In the intra-organizational article titled “Let’s raise the flag of ideological struggle”, which later became the hardpan of the announced ideological schism by Taqi Shahram, the two distinctively express the reasons that necessitated the elimination of three leading MKO members as well as its theoretical justifications as an evolutionary phase of anti-imperialist and anti-exploitative struggles are explained. This article turned to be the basis of the declared manifesto of the ideological shift by Taqi Shahram. There, he states:

Religious dogmatists are known to be the greatest enemies of the evolution of the organization. They are stubborn, hardened, and adamant enemies who are as virulent as germs… The bog of their absurd ideas is like fetid vapors and gases ascending from the sludge dredged up from inside of the organization… They are as individualists who attribute determinism to others and say if it had not been because of the so-and-so comrade, it would have never happened… They see masses as flocks and sheep that pastored by the shepherd… A relentless struggle against the non-revolutionary idealism hidden in these ideas is the prime duty to be accomplished in this phase of the ideological warfare. Smash the head of these wounded snakes… . 1

According to Shahram, Sharif Vaqefi was condemned to death just for defying what they believed to be a vital ideological shift to evolve into a more developed, historical stage, that is to say materialism, from the backward stage of idealism, transition from idealism to materialism. Shahram and Bahram’s rationale was that the resistance of Sharif Vaqefi and his fellows was in fact the resistance of the representatives of petit bourgeois of the organization against the true representative of working class. Therefore, the murder was theorized founded on what Dr. Shariati symbolized in the myth of Abel and Cain that represented Cain more progressive than his brother and whose action of murdering Able was a justifiable historical necessity. In fact, Sharif Vaqefi was the victim of Shahram and Bahram’s instrumentalism. Disregarding the authoritarian ambitions behind this ideological justification, this Marxist cliché view well legitimized the terror. In other words, since Cain was one step closer to the last phase of evolution, he is more liberal, progressive and legitimate than Abel. As a result, the real murderers of Sharif Vaqefi are those who cannot detach themselves from the ideology and way of Shahram and Bahram theoretically and practically and are still victimizing a great number of individuals. Likewise, Rajavi is one of those adhering to very same cliché view under a disguise of religious banner.

In practice, Rajavi has since long acquitted Shahram and Bahram of charges and made an all-out support of Taqi Shahram when he was arrested and did his best to avert his punishment. Rajavi’s position takings against the leaders of Iranian revolution of 1979 and his virulent hostility in subsequent years that culminated in an authored article by Rajavi, “Who is reactionary and what is reaction?” in the early 1980s, are all evidences of his drift towards Shahram’s leftward viewpoints:

Liberal petit bourgeois that is dependent upon American imperialism is more progressive than reactionary and traditional petit bourgeois. 2

He openly asserts that the liberal petit bourgeois fully dependent on the US is more progressive than the clergy who sees the US as the main enemy. Rajavi uses the same reasoning of Shahram in liquidation of Sharif Vaqefi and follows liberal bourgeois in fighting against the clerics. He states to be loyal to Sharif Vaqefi while he would concur with his killers in theory and practice in the early years after the Iranian revolution. This ideology and pattern of thinking can be traced in many of his statements and lectures. For instance, he believes that:

Looking from a political methodology, when we are against something, we have no right to attack and weaken it when examining it against something that is older and more reactionary. On the contrary, it has to be strengthened in the points where it is one step forward and more progressive. 3

In a nutshell, despite his verbal and dual position takings in condemning murder and murders of Sharif Vaqefi, Rajavi fails to be uninterested in the political and ideological inclinations of Shahram and Bahram. Giving the priority to instrumentalism for the purpose of adjusting the economical and social status, he deliberately distances from Sharif Vaqefi’s authentic ideology and has taken sides with his murderers although there are far more evidences to prove it.

References:
1. Bayanieh e’lame mavaze’ ideolozhik-e Sazeman-e Mojahedin Khalq Iran (Manifesto explaining the ideological position of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran), Mojahedin Press, 1975.
2. Mojahed, “Who is reactionary and what is reaction?”, 1981.
3. The ideological teachings of Masoud Rajavi in Sharif University, Tabyin-e jahan (Explaining the world), 1980, vol. 15.

May 27, 2010 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

Reality Check: MKO Terrorist, Marxist

In the early March, 2010, Ali Safavi (MKO spokesman) wrote an article on Huffington Post in an effort to purify his terrorist Marxist designated organization’s background. He claimed that the purpose of his forum is “to dispense with some of the myths originally propagated by Tehran’s intelligence service against MEK”. Ali Akbar Rastgou, former member of MEK:"the ideology of the organization can be evaluated as a blend of Marxist and Islam"

This is the first time MEK authorities are trying to “respond to various questions regarding the organization and its actions”. Ali Safavi initially deals with the Marxist label on MEK. He claims that MEK was founded as a “Muslim organization … and its founders sought a secular republic and establishment of a democracy in Iran.”(!)

A quick search on MEK ideology, history and the official reports by international bodies, gives you the connotation that the group has not been founded on secular basis and its founders had not been inspired by a secular doctrine.

Ali Akbar Rastgou, former member of MEK, in his book “Mujahedin Khalq in the mirror of history “, writes:”the ideology of the organization can be evaluated as a blend of Marxist and Islam”. He notes that the group’s leaders had focused on rhetorical work on the methodology of their organization particularly before 1970’s. He lists a number of books which were usually studied by Hanif Nejad ( A main founder of the group) in order to establish a firm, complete ideology for MEK. The books include: Mao’s Little Red Book, “Against Liberalism” of Mao, “Four philosophical Articles of Stalin”, “What is to be done?” of Lenin, ”On contradiction “ of Mao …. Then Saeed Mohsen (a founder of MKO) wrote a book titled “ An Introduction on Marxist studies” which was published in 1970’s.

The US State Department also describes MKO as an organization that was “formed in the 1960’s by the college-educated children of Iranian merchants, following a philosophy that mixes Marxism and Islam.”

“The escapees from this weird political sect, which combines Marxism ,elements of Islam and the Rajavi cult of Personality describe a harrowing experience, including torture, imprisonment and enforced brainwashing techniques.” writes Jusitn Raimondo in his article ”Assassins of Peace” published on Anti-war.com in 2008.

In contrast to what Ali Safavi propagandizes on the separation of religion and state, MEK principally believes in an ideological system rooted in the religion. That’s the huge contradiction in Safavi and his comrades’ claims. He claims to be a member of a Muslim organization; he quotes Masud Rajavi as saying that “believing in Muhammad is incompatible with the philosophy of Marxims.” and on the other side, he claims that MKO “founders sought a secular republic in Iran”

MEK might be able to deceive a part of public opinion by its fake slogans but in nature the only difference between its ideology and Marxism is the substitution of the term Marxism with new ones. The organizational system is based on individuality denial, censorship, violation of freedom, civil laws. A glance at the Marxism-based governments (socialists, communists like Mao and Stalin) shows up a lot of similarities between MKO’ s organizational system and those of Stalin or Mao.

Professor Paul Sheldon Foote of California State University calls Massoud Rajavi as Polpot of Iran. He thinks that the history of Polpot, the communist terrorist leader of Cambodia is very similar to that of MEK.

Another reason for labeling MEK as a Marxist group is its commitment to guerilla Warfare that caused them to commit numerous terrorist activities against civilians. Marx was an expert on military history and noted many cases of the use of armed struggle to achieve political power.

In the early 21th century, when Marxism is viewed as an old, abolished, rejected ideology, MEK ashamed of its scandalous background and along with its deceitful propaganda campaign, makes too much effort to purify its past. That’s why Massoud Rajavi and his accomplices like Ali Safavi view themselves forced to respond the numerous questions surrounding their ambiguous cult of personality.

By Mazda Parsi

March 17, 2010 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

MKO; Ideology Vs Ideology – 2

History has seen various ideologies that generally have been of the closed type. The most famous ideologies “Liberalism “ , “ Marxism” and “ Religion” are significant examples of closed ideologies that undemocratically view themselves as righteous.
Mujahedin Khalq Organization is the living instance of closed ideologies
The followers of such ideologies have prepared superficial answers to every question. They simply formulate and solve the most complicated problems of the world and never see any ambiguity or mistake in their analysis. The leaders of closed ideologies are not knowledgeable enough although they have enormous claims of helping humanity. They don’t believe in necessity of challenge, research and efforts to progress in their path. Thus their absolute approach and their non-dimensional view lead them to decline.

Mujahedin Khalq Organization is the living instance of closed ideologies which fanatically sticks to its cult-like doctrine. Justifying all phenomena along with its objectives, MKO represents a thought of which the social function supposes the absolute right of understanding the truth for itself and never believes in exchanging, choosing or adapting other thoughts. The consequence of closing the doors against external thoughts or communities is the declining situation in which MKO is trapped now.

On the opposite side, the supporters of open ideologies view problems relatively, dynamically and depending on phases. Although they believe in the righteousness of their values and ideas, they see themselves as responsible for moving toward growth of the values they are constantly reconstructing, elevating and flourishing.

The absolutism of MKO ideology has led it to an irrational society without variety of thoughts and a cult of personality.

The type of relationship between human and ideology has caused violence and tyranny in MKO. The closed ideology of MKO wants the human for the ideology so the members of Mujahedin serve their ideology.

That’s why they see an undemocratic legitimacy in their social and political functions.

The leaders of mujahedin and especially Massoud Rajavi do not recognize the knowledge and will of individual human beings denying their rights to decide for their own future. That’s the substantial characteristic of their closed ideology which ends in the cult of personality around Massoud Rajavi. For MKO change, evolution, perfection and continuous growth have been replaced by fossilization and dogmatism.

Thus, one cannot see any change in the cult-like system organized in MKO or in MKO’s language toward its supporters or against its dissidents. Although Maryam Rajavi makes too much effort to draw a democratic, modern progressive image of its organization, the reality, based on testimonies and evidences, proves the opposite fact.

By Mazda Parsi

February 24, 2010 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

MKO; Ideology Vs Ideology

An ideology is a set of aims and ideas that directs one’s goals, expectations, and actions. Many political parties base their political action on an ideology. In social studies, a political ideology is a certain ethical set of ideals, principles, doctrines, myths or symbols of a social movement, institution, class and or large group that explains how society should work, and offers some political and cultural blueprint for a certain social order.

There are two available types of ideology: open and closed. When a political party accepts and interprets and possibly adopts change it symbolizes an open ideology. When they represent a closed ideology, they do not accept any change. The majority of ideologies in the history were closed and consequently dangerous. For instance Stalin era stands for the crimes committed under the name of ideology.

Proud of their ideology and dedicated to their ideological revolutions, MEK (Mujahedin-e-Khalq ) leaders represent the most recent version of a criminal closed ideology believers who view their dissidents as victims who should be eliminated . They never see their opponents as a minority that they can tolerate or deal with moderately. Such an ideological system just archives a black list of criminal activities as its background.

A fanatical formalistic belief in their ideology has led MEK to a complicated classified system where no human being is allowed to build his world with his own dynamic analytic thought.

Instead of portraying saint figures for Masud and Maryam Rajavi and staying in some special fixed forms, MEK should respect common values like freedom, justice, honor, honesty, friendship and love … That’s what that can make an ideology universal.

As the MEK see the world from behind its own glasses made of some fixed configurations and formulations, they can never see the reality of the affairs from different aspects. This is what leads them to dogmatism. The absolute power of the Rajavis is the outcome of such a view in their cult-like organization.

The absolute power has made the Rajavis to grant an undemocratic right to themselves. They view themselves higher than everyone so they decide for others’ fate. They impose their monarchy on their followers and that is why their ideology ends with totalitarianism.

By Mazda Parsi

February 6, 2010 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

Rajavi’s ideological purges

Besides approaches applied by Rajavi to purge qualified, old veterans while in Pahlavi’s jails, he devised whatever plots afterward to exclude the remnants of MKO’s early central cadre and intimates of Hanifnejad. Soon after the victory of Iranian revolution, they criticized Rajavi for his egotistic, ambitious, and totalitarian ideals in a statement issued in an Iranian newspaper, Keyhan. Instead of giving a convincing answer to the criticisms, Rajavi took a hostile stance and asserted that they were no longer MKO members while he had introduced them as the official representatives of the organization abroad a few weeks before. Finally, they published a book entitled “The process of separation” and therein they openly declared their separation from the organization and Rajavi. In this regard, Mohammad Mehdi Jafari states:

As far as I remember, I think in 1981, Mr. Raisi Toosi and his friends detached MKO and even wrote some articles in Keyhan paper disclosing the feats done by the organization and then published a book entitled “The process of separation”. 1

He further refers to ungenerous attitudes of Rajavi in expelling a particular group of three, as they were close comrades of Hanifnejad, from MKO:

The way organization dealt with those three and Reza in particular was very ungenerous. The organization even claimed that he has never been a fighter and that he had been studying in the Europe in years before the victory of the revolution while Reza Raisi Toosi was one of the early founders of MKO. Keyhan paper referred to this issue, too; yet it was denied by Mojahedin officially. Reza and his friends were among those who bravely stood against those members that perverted from Islam in the Europe and issued a long and detailed statement on it. 2

In this regard, Anne singleton, a European member of MKO who had contact with them in the Europe introduces Raisi as follows:

Reza Raisi was one of the close friends of Mohammad Hanif-Nezhad. He had been in close contact with the Mojahedin since its inception and had escaped from Iran when they were being attacked in the early 70s. He took up residence in London, studying a PhD. in politics. Then, about two years before the 1979 revolution, Raisi started an organisation named Committee in Support of the Mojahedin. 3

Jafari also expounds on Rajavi’s mischievous adoption of the same tactics for the removal of other early members of the organization including Meisami and Mohammad Gorgani, who were experienced veterans of the organization and would criticized Rajavi’s totalitarianism and egocentrism:

I was not in prison but I heard the news that the organization had boycotted people like the engineer Meisami and Mohammad Gorgani because they had adopted a clear position toward ideological deviation and drift to Marxism and opposed to “peaceful coexistence” of the rival sides and believed in self-criticism. But the imprisoned rankings like Massoud Rajavi and Musa Khiabani did not concurred with any criticism and moved on their own way although they bragged of observing criticisms. 4

As it was mentioned before, these mechanisms were common in all phases of Rajavi’s hegemony over the organization. Parviz Yaqoubi, one of the earliest members, as well as Saeed Shahsavandi, a member of the organization’s central cadre up to late 1985, are other victims of Rajavi’s inflexibility in his views who were expelled or Rajavi claimed their expulsion despite their voluntary separation from the organization. Anne singleton refers to Parviz Yaqoubi and writes:

Parviz Yaqoubi, a member of the former Central Committee, was in Paris and married to Ashraf Rajavi’s (nee Rabii) sister. He refused to accept the marriage and Ideological Revolution and refused also to keep quiet about his objections. He was put on trial in a court, which Rajavi concocted and headed, and was condemned. He was ‘convicted’ for not taking the side of the revolution, but rather taking the side of Khomeini. Masoud in this court on one occasion refused to accept that Yaqoubi has the normal rights of a court and said this is not a court rather it is a learning session for others to listen and take note. Of course, only selected people were present. Yaqoubi was placed under severe hardship. He was isolated, his financial support from the organisation was cut and he was evicted from his home as an example to others. 5

In fact, the ideological revolution of Rajavi can be considered the final phase of extending his political purges in MKO. Expelling Ali Zarkesh, his trial and sentencing to execution, his exile to Camp Ashraf, and plotting his death in the operation Eternal Light (Forouq-e Javidan) is another instance of Rajavi’s misusing power to eliminate all members who were much more qualified than him. Also, there are a great number of MKO members who were killed after the declaration of the ideological revolution due to their disagreement and criticism. However, their exact number is unknown but a handful of them have been mentioned in Human Rights Watch report or have been referred to by eyewitnesses.

Still much remains untold of methods applied by Rajavi to purge the dissidents as well as the parameters and factors paving the way for him to achieve his egocentric objectives which have to be investigated in depth. It is up to conscience of readers to judge if these cruel acts have been deliberately planed and put into practice or regarded as common errors of Rajavi, something far beyond reality. However, the fact is that according to many early members like Meisami, things could be different if Rajavi had assumed a peaceful mannerism, goodwill, tolerance, and sincerity.

Still there are people who believe Rajavi’s grave errors can be compensated if he will resign and let more qualified people accede to the leadership. It really requires honesty and courage, which Rajavi lacks, to sacrifice oneself for the legitimate causes of a political organization and apologize for the errors made before an authorized court regardless of personal and organizational prejudices.

Resources:

1. Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari’s interview with Seyed Qasem Yahosseini, MKO from inside, Negah-e Emrooz publication, 2002, p.48.

2. ibid, p.78.

3. Singleton, Anne, Saddam’s private army, Iran-Interlink, 2003.

4. Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Jafari’s interview with Seyed Qasem Yahosseini, MKO from inside, Negah-e Emrouz publication, 2002, p.84.

5. Singleton, Anne, Saddam’s private army, Iran-Interlink, 2003.

March 26, 2009 0 comments

The Ideology of the MEK

Ethics defined by the cult of Mojahedin

One of the prevalent issues in studies on cultic relations of MKO is to determine to what extent the group acknowledges application of ethics in its internal as well as external relations. A review of the manifesto and publications of the organization and their ontological viewpoints indicate that MKO tend to equate ethics with their political feelings and ambitions. On the other hand, for MKO ethical standards are defined as whatever they relatively accept as the right and essential to the ultimate ends. It may give us a better understanding of the correspondence between MKO ethical standards and that of Machiavellianism as well as Marxism that incorporate a belief of “ends justify means”. In Machiavellian viewpoints, the application of levers including pressure, deception, breach of promise, betrayal, fabrication and all possible means for achieving and preserving political power is legitimate. Furthermore, in contrast to some contemporary thinkers who make an attempt to interpret ethics as a relative issue by means of complicated and equivocal philosophical discussions and theories, Machiavelli and his followers are outspoken in disregarding ethical principles.

However, the ideology and methodology of Mojahedin is based on the former policy. They managed to integrate philosophy and science to find a way of expressing their Machiavellian ideas in a novel form. As Machiavelli justifies using all means for achieving and maintaining political power, Mojahedin grab at ontological issues and the ultimate goal of creation. They feel much attachment to philosophical terms like dispensing of existence and absolute truth by which they try to justify their philosophical, political, social, and historical dogmatism. Here, the main viewpoints of Mojahedin on ethics as reflected in their pamphlets and organizational principles are to be reviewed.

Mojahedin distinguish between good and evil with regard to the factor of achieving objectives. In other words, they do not believe in substantive status of ethical values rather define them based on the extent to which they succeed to make the ground for attaining objectives. According to theoretical principles and doctrine of Mojahedin “Good and evil are always determined with regard to the objective”. 1

But what is the objective meant by Mojahedin? As it was mentioned before, Mojahedin believe in absolute good and absolute evil in their worldview yet on the other hand, recognize the legitimacy of using all possible means for achieving that absolute truth. In addition, they maintain the universality of material world and consider evolution as a general law governing all phenomena including man and the society. Consequently, all activities aiming at achieving absolute truth are considered an ethical issue and in contrast, all activities hindering the attainment of that absolute truth are regarded unethical. They define absolute truth and ethical values as follows:

The process that moves the society toward retaining the most dominant humanistic features, (unlimited to a certain time and place), is known as the absolute truth. Absolute good is those actions done for the achievement of absolute truth in any circumstance. 2

Therefore, according to Mojahedin, absolute truth and its opposite are two sides of a coin and there is no third option:

Non-truth is all actions done against truth as a barrier in its way unlimited to a certain time and place. 3

Also, absolute evil has been defined in the theoretical sources of Mojahedin as:

Absolute evil are all actions correspondent to non-truth unlimited to any certain form, time and place. 4

From this viewpoint, ethical standards have no value in themselves and it is only social and political conditions that determine their values. Consequently, in such a context individuals follow their own demands which may make them recoil from doing what is right and thus, they are frequently deviated from what is ethical. As a result, the concept of truth is metamorphosized into a relative issue, too, and is defined according to predetermined objectives as posed by Mojahedin. According to Mojahedin:

Based on circumstances, truth takes various forms. In other words, it is likely that a procedure in a certain time and place is considered as truth because of its furthering us in achieving our objective, yet in other circumstances it is considered false since it fails to help us and rather hinders the achievement of our objectives. 5

Undoubtedly, the terms “good” and “evil” have their roots in all acts that are accordingly evaluated and defined. It has to be pointed out that the terms objective, evolution, and truth are used as equivalence and complementary whenever needed. Mojahedin have elaborated on the integration of these concepts and their function, stating:

Truth is a practice moving parallel to evolution and all actions carried out in this regard are good. Non-truth is a practice done in opposite direction that is in the direction of decadency hence all actions done in the way of untruth are considered evil. 6

Coming to political power is the first step of achieving the stated objective, evolution, and truth. From this viewpoint, all actions are evaluated based on the extent to which they lead to getting the objective, evolution or truth:

All actions needed for achieving the final objective are evidently essential and necessary. 7

In a nutshell, positive ethical concepts like honesty, sincerity, … in contrast to negative ones like crime, absolutism, dishonesty, and betrayal cannot be evaluated and defined separate from conditions and their relation to the intended objectives rather they are defined according to external issues.

References:

1. Evolution, Second book of ideology. Theoretical sources of MKO, Mojahed publication, Tehran, 1979, p.97.

2. ibid, p.93

3. ibid.

4. ibid

5. ibid

6. ibid

7. ibid, p.96.

March 2, 2009 0 comments

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