USA

US Intelligence Assessments Warn about MKO’s Terrorist Activities

The recent US intelligence assessments said that the anti-Iran terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO) still retains the ability to stage terrorist operations.

According to a Saturday report by the Habilian Association, an Iran-based human rights group, the US Department of State made the announcement in newly declassified documents for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit.

Among the disclosures in the declassified material was an August 2008 US Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, which clearly states that "the MKO retains a limited capability to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism".

"The MKO publicly renounced violence in 2001, but limited intelligence reporting indicates that the group has not ended military operations, repudiated violence, or completely or voluntarily disarmed," the US intelligence report said.

"The intelligence community assesses that although there has not been a confirmed terrorist attack by the MKO since the organization surrendered to Coalition Forces in 2003, the MKO retains a limited capability and the intent to use violence to achieve its political goals," the document added, ignoring the several terrorist operations conducted by the MKO in Iran and Iraq since the US invasion of the country in 2003..

"UN inspectors say that much of the information provided to the UN by the MKO about Iran’s nuclear program has a political purpose and has been wrong," the document noted.
The US announced last month that the group will remain in the US list of terrorist groups and organizations.

The announcement came despite intense efforts by Zionist lobbies and a number of the US Congressmen to delist the group.

The US State Department announced in its recent annual report on terrorism that no change has been made in the MKO’s status.

The MKO insists that the US should delist it as a terrorist organization, a demand which has been rejected so far by Washington.
An appeals court in the US had earlier ruled that the State Department should review the terror status of the MKO.

The MKO had filed a petition against the US blacklisting in 2008.

The Bush administration, however, rejected the request in its final days in 2009, after examining the material submitted by the group and the US intelligence community, including classified information.

In July 2010, a three-judge panel of the US Court of Appeals in Washington said in a 22-page decision that the US government failed to give the group a fair chance to rebut unclassified information that claimed the group supported terrorist activities.

In a statement, the State Department said it would study the decision, but added that the US government continues to view the group as a terrorist organization.
The MKO, whose main stronghold is in Iraq, is blacklisted by much of the international community, including the United States.

Before an overture by the EU, the MKO was on the European Union’s list of terrorist organizations subject to an EU-wide assets freeze. Yet, the MKO puppet leader, Maryam Rajavi, who has residency in France, regularly visited Brussels and despite the ban enjoyed full freedom in Europe.

Some other members of the MKO who have had a role in the assassination of a large number of Iranian citizens and officials are currently living in France.

The group started assassination of Iranian citizens and officials after the Islamic Revolution in a bid to take control of the newly established Islamic Republic. It killed several of Iran’s new leaders in the early years after the Revolution, including the then President, Mohammad Ali Rajayee, Prime Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar and the Judiciary Chief, Mohammad Hossein Beheshti who were killed in bomb attacks by MKO members in 1981.

The group fled to Iraq in 1986, where it was protected by Saddam Hussein and where it helped the Iraqi dictator suppress Shiite and Kurd uprisings in the country.
The terrorist group joined Saddam’s army during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) and helped Saddam and killed thousands of Iranian civilians and soldiers during the US-backed Iraqi imposed war on Iran.

Earlier this year, Iraqi security forces took control of the training base of the MKO at Camp Ashraf – about 60km (37 miles) north of Baghdad – and detained dozens of the members of the terrorist group.

The Iraqi authority also changed the name of the military center from Camp Ashraf to the Camp of New Iraq.

Many of the MKO members have abandoned the terrorist organization while most of those still remaining in the camp are said to be willing to quit but are under pressure and torture not to do so.

A May 2005 Human Rights Watch report accused the MKO of running prison camps in Iraq and committing human rights violations.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, the outlawed group puts defectors under torture and jail terms.

Numerous articles and letters posted on the Internet by family members of MKO recruits confirm reports of the horrific abuse that the group inflicts on its own members and the alluring recruitment methods it uses.

The most shocking of such stories includes accounts given by former British MKO member Ann Singleton and Mustafa Mohammadi — the father of an Iranian-Canadian girl who was drawn into the group during an MKO recruitment campaign in Canada.

Mohammadi recounts his desperate efforts to contact his daughter, who disappeared several years ago – a result of what the MKO called a ‘two-month tour’ of Camp Ashraf for teenagers.

He also explains how the group forces the families of its recruits to take part in pro-MKO demonstrations in the western countries by threatening to kill their loved ones.

Lacking a foothold in Iran, the terrorist group recruits ill-informed teens from Iranian immigrant communities in western states and blocks their departure afterwards.

August 15, 2010 0 comment

USA

U.S. Intelligence Community: MEK trained females for suicide attacks

In newly declassified documents for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit, US department of State unveiled that based on the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the MEK trains female members of the organization for committing suicide operations in Karbala. The documents also say that the MEK solicits money under the U.S. Intelligence Community: MEK trained females for suicide attacks false pretext of humanitarian aid to the Iranian population.

Among the disclosures in the declassified material: “the MEK trained females at Camp Ashraf in Iraq to perform suicide attacks in Karbala”; “the MEK solicits money under the false pretext of humanitarian aid to the Iranian population”; “an August 2008 U.S. Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment, clearly states that the MEK retains a limited capability to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism”; “[t]he MEK publicly renounced violence in 2001, but limited intelligence reporting indicates that the group has not ended military operations, repudiated violence, or completely or voluntarily disarmed”; “[t]he [intelligence community] assesses that although there has not been a confirmed terrorist attack by the MEK since the organization surrendered to Coalition Forces in 2003, the MEK retains a limited capability and the intent to use violence to achieve its political goals”; and “UN inspectors say that much of the information provided to the UN by the MEK about Iran’s nuclear program has a political purpose and has been wrong.”

Habilian reporting from declassified Court documents, August 12, 2010

August 14, 2010 0 comment

USA

MKO Remains in US Blacklist

The anti-Iran terrorist group, the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO), remained in the US list of terrorist groups and organizations despite intense efforts by Zionist lobbies and a number of the Congressmen to delist the group.

The US State Department announced in its recent annual report on terrorism that no change has been made in the MKO’s status.

The MKO insists that the US should delist it as a terrorist organization, a demand which has been rejected so far by Washington.

An appeals court in the US had earlier ruled that the State Department should review the terror status of the MKO.

The MKO had filed a petition against the US blacklisting in 2008.

The government was obligated under a 1996 antiterrorism law and 2004 revisions to give the group the chance to rebut unclassified information, the appeals court said, adding that the group was "permitted access to the unclassified portion of the record only after the decision was final."
In a statement, the State Department said it would study the decision, but added that the US government continues to view the group as a terrorist organization.

The MKO, whose main stronghold is in Iraq, is blacklisted by much of the international community, including the United States.

Some other members of the MKO who have had a role in the assassination of a large number of Iranian citizens and officials are currently living in France.

The group started assassination of Iranian citizens and officials after the Islamic Revolution in a bid to take control of the newly established Islamic Republic. It killed several of Iran’s new leaders in the early years after the revolution, including the then President, Mohammad Ali Rajayee, Prime Minister, Mohammad Javad Bahonar and the Judiciary Chief, Mohammad Hossein Beheshti who were killed in bomb attacks by MKO members in 1981.

The group fled to Iraq in 1986, where it was protected by Saddam Hussein and where it helped the Iraqi dictator suppress Shiite and Kurd uprisings in the country.

The terrorist group joined Saddam’s army during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran (1980-1988) and helped Saddam and killed thousands of Iranian civilians and soldiers during the US-backed Iraqi imposed war on Iran.

The Iraqi authority also changed the name of the military center from Camp Ashraf to the Camp of New Iraq.

Many of the MKO members have abandoned the terrorist organization while most of those still remaining in the camp are said to be willing to quit but are under pressure and torture not to do so.

A May 2005 Human Rights Watch report accused the MKO of running prison camps in Iraq and committing human rights violations.

According to the Human Rights Watch report, the outlawed group puts defectors under torture and jail terms.

Mohammadi recounts his desperate efforts to contact his daughter, who disappeared several years ago – a result of what the MKO called a ‘two-month tour’ of Camp Ashraf for teenagers.
He also explains how the group forces the families of its recruits to take part in pro-MKO demonstrations in the western countries by threatening to kill their loved ones.
Lacking a foothold in Iran, the terrorist group recruits ill-informed teens from Iranian immigrant communities in western states and blocks their departure afterwards.

August 8, 2010 0 comment

USA

Open Letter to United States Secretary of State considering MKO

Mrs. Hillary Clinton
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton, Honorable Secretary of State

My name is Mohammad Karami. I began my political activities with the People’s Mojahedin organization of Iran (aka MKO, NCR,PMOI) during 1976 and 1977. I was imprisoned in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s prison on political charges. I was sentenced to death in 1981 in the prison, but I and six other political prisoners managed to escape from the prison. I was also imprisoned by the PMOI in 1985 as a result of my disagreement with their sectarian approach and platform in their internal relations, and was also put on trial in the PMOI many times just because of my disapproval of and disagreement with their cultic politics.

I was threatened four times by Massoud Rajavi himself that if I wanted to leave the organization I would have been sent to the PMOI’s jail for two years and after that I would spend eight years of my life in Iraq’s notorious prison, Abu Ghraib as a prisoner where I was going to be put on trial by an Iraqi court for illegal entry into Iraq. It is interesting to note that during Saddam’s reign illegal entry into Iraq was considered as a deadly crime and the punishment for that was a death sentence. As a result of that threat I was forced to stay in the PMOI, despite my unwillingness, until the downfall of Saddam Hussein and his government.

I escaped from the PMOI after the downfall of Saddam Hussein and I took refuge in the American Camp Grizzly (Ashraf Camp) which was located next to the PMOI garrison. I lived in Camp Grizzly, which was run by coalition forces led by the US Army for four years and I was under their protection until my exodus from that camp. After leaving the American Camp, I found my way to Europe. But even in Europe I have not had tranquility in my life because of the presence of PMOI agents here, which is another story to tell.

The People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran was founded in 1965. Its ideology is a combination of Marxism and Islam which in many areas of their work they the Marxist resources, some of which are as follows:

What should be done by Lenin, four philosophic articles by Stalin, where does the science go? by Max Plong, the source of evolution and life by Aparin, From human being to the galaxy by John Fefer, How to be a good communist by Shaochi, Against liberalism by Mao, Imperialism and all the dogmatic in history are paper tigers by Mao, Rectification of party duties by Mao, Vietnam under fire, Mao Red booklet ,Nahjol Balagheh, God in Society, Qoran, etc,. Their ideology is based on fighting against capitalism and they believe that the United States of America is the symbol of global capitalism and they call the USA ‘the World-Eater Imperialism’. Their ideological principle and objective is based on fighting against the United States and its interests, and in this regard they have written and published many books such as, The Carter Presidency (World Eater Imperialism), Response to Current Capitalism, Thirty Questions, The Discernment of the World; the majority of these books’ resources are from Marxism Ideology. In this regard the PMOI has many songs and anthems which come directly from their anti American ideology. Some of the most important of them are as follows:

1. The song, War with America which is an epic song.

2. The anthem, The Mojahed full of hatred and vengeance is sitting in ambush.

With such an ideology and approach which exists in the Mojahedin, they began their terrorist operations against American citizens and American offices located in Iran in 1971 which are as follows:

– June 22, 1972- U.S. Air Force Brigadier General HAROLD PRICE, chief of the Air Force Section of U.S. Military Advisory Group in Iran.

– January 1973 – bombing the office of Shell Oil Company.

– A few days later bombing the office of Pan American airlines

– 3 June 1973 – assassination of U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins, U.S. military mission.

– 25 May 1974 bombing of Jewish American establishments like General and British establishments like Yorkshire Bank and Tichno Co. HQs

– January 27 1975, in response to the visit of Henry Kissinger to Iran the explosion of the office of TT International and Joan Doer Company.

– 11 May 1975 – assassination of Colonel Paul Schaeffer and Lieutenant Colonel Jack Turner, U.S. Air Force officers in the mission.

– 4th July 1975, PMOI’s terrorists stopped the motorcade of the American Ambassador in Tehran and opened fired on his car, but because of the darkness inside of the car, an Iranian official who was working for American Embassy in Tehran and was the PMOI’s infiltration agent was killed by mistake.

– In July 1975, two bombs were exploded in two places, first in the USA and Iran Committee building and the second one in the English Consul in the city of Mashad.

– 28 August 1976 – 3 civilian employees of Rockwell International, Donald J Smith, Robert R Grangrad and William C. Catrel, advisor to the Iranian military were subject to bombing and kidnapping.

1. In December of 1970 carried out an abortive attempt to kidnap U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur.

2. President Richard M. Nixon’s trip was marred by a series of bombings, including one explosion at the tomb of the Shah’s father shortly before the President and his hosts were scheduled to arrive.

3. The offices of El Al Airlines, Shell Petroleum, British Petroleum, British Overseas Airways, a Jewish Emigration office in Tehran, and numerous other U.S. facilities and properties were bombed and victimized.

4. In 1979, they supported the American Embassy occupation in Tehran and participated in the occupation of the Embassy by their agents who were student leaders.

As a result of the terrorist operation which happened in 9/11 in the USA, every country became astonished and confused at such brutal and barbaric acts, which targeted thousands innocent people in the twin towers, and all these countries and their governments condemned such brutality and savagery. But, surprisingly the PMOI’s operatives and leaders threw a very big party in Bagherzadeh Garrison in Iraq and celebrated that incident and showed their admiration for that terrorist act by dancing, shouting and congratulating one another in front of their leaders, Massoud and Maryam Rajavi.

Massoud Rajavi was on the stage and while he had his hands on his waist he began a war cry against the USA, and in his admiration for Osama Ben Laden and his organization, Al Qaeda, he said, ”This was fanatical Islam which trembled and shacked the basis of US Imperialism and they destroyed the twin towers which were the symbol of their power, and successfully reduced it to rubble through their successful mission”. Then he (Massoud Rajavi) with a smile on his face continued his war cry and said, ”What will happen to the USA if revolutionary Islam with our Ideology and Maryam’s leadership comes to power, then this paper tiger (the USA) will be destroyed as a whole.”

After the downfall of Saddam Hussein, all the PMOI members underwent various interviews for recognition of their identification by the US State Department’s agents, the CIA, FBI, and specifically US Military Information section MI. They gained a huge amount of very valuable information from the PMOI members – all of which documents and information substantiate and prove that the ideology and the strategy of the PMOI are all anti-western, and particularly anti USA.

After the downfall of Saddam Hussein, the PMOI rapidly mobilized all its organization for three weeks to destroy all books, CD’s, tapes, newspapers, archives, and even the members’ personal memorandums which were produced in various of Rajavi’s sessions and gatherings. Whatever could be interpreted as anti-USA were pulled out of their library, archives, offices, storage rooms and etc, and were all burned to ashes under the direct supervision of the PMOI’s commanders. Right now if you go to the PMOI’s main garrison Camp Ashraf, you won’t find even a single piece of paper which is anti-USA. They performed the same exercise with their computers as well.

The US State Department has justly listed the PMOI and its political wing the National Council of Resistance (NCRI) as a terrorist organization in its terrorist list. While the State Department listed them as a terrorist organization, it did not have the valuable information which it now has now. In a report that was published in 2005 by the US State Department regarding the terrorist organization list, it mentioned justly that the PMOI is a potential threat and is a very dangerous terrorist organization. In that report it was mentioned that the PMOI has the potential to become a dangerous organization in any period of time because of their special terrorist training and cohesive organizational structure. For instance, on 17th of June 2003 when Maryam Rajavi was arrested by French Police, PMOI leaders ordered their members to set themselves on fire in public streets. If there was no complaint and protest from the international bodies and humanitarian organizations against this kind of brutality and savagery, it was still going to become one of the biggest of human catastrophes.

Mrs. Hillary Rodham Clinton, the US State Department has justly listed the PMOI as a terrorist organization in the terrorist list and has justly mentioned in the US State Department report that the PMOI has signs of being a cult. I must stress that even though the State Department reports of 2005 and 2006 are not complete, that the report shows that this organization is a religious cult.

In this regard, should you look into Mr. Alireza Jafarzadeh’s request (PMOI’s spokesman in USA), you can find more about the authenticity of their cultish culture and thoughts. According to the information that the US State Department and US Army (Military Intelligence) have about the PMOI, they should not be allowed to tell their lies as vital news to US politicians and Senators. I urge you to list the PMOI as a terrorist organization again and do not let them deceive and delude international society and the US administration.

As adjunct to this letter, I have attached some documents which prove and substantiate their cultic identity.

Lets create another Vietnam for America(pdf).
(Mojahedin English language paper April 1980)

Letter to Imam (Khomeini) (pdf).
(Mojahedin English Language paper April 1980)

Some questions unanswered regarding the US military invasion of Iran (pdf).
(Mojahedin English Language paper June 1980)

Respectfully,

Mohammad Karami, Paris, a victim of the Rajavi Cult -oyanyoldash@yahoo.com

August 7, 2010 0 comment

USA

The MEK remained in US terror list

The MEK remained in US terror list Despite all the vast propaganda campaign and pulling any lobbying string, while leaving no stone unturned, for taking the name of MEK out of the US State Department terror list, once again this terrorist group was designated as a foreign terrorist organization.

In a new report by the US Department of State office of the coordination for counterterrorism which was released on August 5, 2010, Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization was referred to as a terrorist organization.

MUJAHADIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION
aka MEK; MKO; Mujahadin-e Khalq (Iranian government name for group); Muslim Iranian Students’ Society; National Council of Resistance; NCR; Organization of the People’s Holy Warriors of Iran; the National Liberation Army of Iran; NLA; People’s Mujahadin Organization of Iran; PMOI; National Council of Resistance of Iran; NCRI; Sazeman-e Mujahadin-e Khalq-e Iran
Description:

The MEK was originally designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The MEK is a Marxist-Islamic Organization that seeks the overthrow of the Iranian regime through its military wing, the National Liberation Army (NLA), and its political front, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).

The MEK was founded in 1963 by a group of college-educated Iranian Marxists who opposed the country’s pro-western ruler, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The group participated in the 1979 Islamic Revolution that replaced the Shah with a Shiite Islamist regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini. However, the MEK’s ideology – a blend of Marxism, feminism, and Islamism – was at odds with the post-revolutionary government and its original leadership was soon executed by the Khomeini regime. In 1981, the group was driven from its bases on the Iran-Iraq border and resettled in Paris, where it began supporting Iraq in its eight year war against Khomeini’s Iran. In 1986, after France recognized the Iranian regime, the MEK moved its headquarters to Iraq, which facilitated its terrorist activities in Iran. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Camp Ashraf in Iraq.

Activities:
The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian government uses propaganda and terrorism to achieve its objectives. During the 1970s, the MEK staged terrorist attacks inside Iran and killed several U.S. military personnel and civilians working on defense projects in Tehran. In 1972, the MEK set off bombs in Tehran at the U.S. Information Service office, a U.S. diplomatic facility staffed by internationally protected persons, the Iran-American Society, and the offices of several U.S. companies to protest the visit of President Nixon to Iran. In 1973, the MEK assassinated the deputy chief of the U.S. Military Mission in Tehran and bombed several businesses, including Shell Oil. In 1974, the MEK set off bombs in Tehran at the offices of U.S. companies to protest the visit of then U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger. In 1975, the MEK assassinated two U.S. military officers who were members of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Tehran. In 1976, the MEK assassinated two U.S. citizens who were employees of Rockwell International in Tehran. In 1979, the group claimed responsibility for the murder of an American Texaco executive.

In 1981, MEK leadership attempted to overthrow the newly installed Islamic regime; Iranian security forces subsequently initiated a crackdown on the group. The MEK instigated a bombing campaign, including an attack against the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Prime Minister’s office, which killed some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. These attacks resulted in a popular uprising against the MEK and an expanded Iranian government crackdown that forced MEK leaders to flee to France. For five years, the MEK continued to wage its terrorist campaign from its Paris headquarters. Expelled by France in 1986, MEK leaders turned to Saddam Hussein’s regime for basing, financial support, and training. Near the end of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad armed the MEK with heavy military equipment and deployed thousands of MEK fighters in suicidal, mass wave attacks against Iranian forces.

The MEK’s relationship with the former Iraqi regime continued through the 1990s. In 1991, the group reportedly assisted the Iraqi Republican Guard’s bloody crackdown on Iraqi Shia and Kurds who rose up against Saddam Hussein’s regime. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In June 1998, the MEK was implicated in a series of bombing and mortar attacks in Iran that killed at least 15 and injured several others. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key Iranian military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff, Brigadier General Ali Sayyaad Shirazi.
In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during “Operation Great Bahman” in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One attack included a mortar attack against a major Iranian leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved in regular mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids against Iranian military and law enforcement personnel, as well as government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border. Also in 2001, the FBI arrested seven Iranians in the United States who funneled US$ 400,000 to an MEK-affiliated organization in the UAE, which used the funds to purchase weapons. Following an initial Coalition bombardment of the MEK’s facilities in Iraq at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, MEK leadership negotiated a cease-fire with Coalition Forces and surrendered their heavy-arms to Coalition control. Since 2003, roughly 3,400 MEK members have been encamped at Ashraf in Iraq.

In 2003, French authorities arrested 160 MEK members at operational bases they believed the MEK was using to coordinate financing and planning for terrorist attacks. Upon the arrest of MEK leader Maryam Rajavi, MEK members took to Paris’ streets and engaged in self-immolation. French authorities eventually released Rajavi. Although currently in hiding, Rajavi has made “motivational” appearances via video-satellite to MEK-sponsored conferences across the globe.
According to evidence which became available after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the MEK received millions of dollars in Oil-for-Food program subsidies from Saddam Hussein from 1999 through 2003. In addition to discovering 13 lists of recipients of such vouchers on which the MEK appeared, evidence linking the MEK to the former Iraqi regime includes lists, as well as video footage of both Saddam Hussein handing over suitcases of money to known MEK leaders, and of MEK operatives receiving training from the Iraqi military.

Strength:
Estimates place MEK’s worldwide membership at between 5,000 and 10,000 members, with large pockets in Paris and other major European capitals. In Iraq, roughly 3,400 MEK members are gathered at Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s main compound north of Baghdad. As a condition of the 2003 cease-fire agreement, the MEK relinquished more than 2,000 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and heavy artillery. Between 2003 and 2006, a significant number of MEK personnel voluntarily left Ashraf, and an additional several hundred individuals renounced ties to the MEK and been voluntarily repatriated to Iran.

Location/Area of Operation:
The MEK’s global support structure remains in place, with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America. Operations target Iranian government elements across the globe, including in Europe and Iran. The MEK’s political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, has a global support network with active lobbying and propaganda efforts in major Western capitals. NCRI also has a well-developed media communications strategy.

External Aid:
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003, the MEK received all of its military assistance and most of its financial support from Saddam Hussein. The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime has led the MEK increasingly to rely on front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140900.htm

August 7, 2010 0 comment

USA

The DOS responses to previous demands of MKO designation review

The judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia urging the State Department to review its decision to label MKO as a terrorist is the last of a quintuple series concerning MKO’s designations by the Secretary of State. The following text is the last response by the Department of State denying MKO petition for review of the order in question. The three previous responses are also linked in this last one. The response well indicates that the State Department has never changed its views about the inclusion of the notorious MKO terrorists and has ever insisted that the group’s designation complied with the governing statute and all constitutional requirements. We have to wait to see how sincere and determined America is in its war against terrorism when it designates a group as a FTO on sound evidences.

National Council of Resistance of Iran, Petitioner, v. Department of State and Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, Respondents

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. – 373 F.3d 152

Argued April 2, 2004 Decided July 9, 2004

On Petition for Review of Orders of the Department of State.

Paul F. Enzinna argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner. Martin D. Minsker entered an appearance.

Douglas Letter, Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General.

Before: HENDERSON, GARLAND, and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROBERTS.

ROBERTS, Circuit Judge:

1 This is the fourth in a series of related cases concerning the biennial designations by the Secretary of State of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)1 and its aliases as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C.Cir.1999) (PMOI I); National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C.Cir.2001) (NCRI); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238 (D.C.Cir.2003) (PMOI II); see generally 8 U.S.C. § 1189. In 1999, and again in 2001, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) was determined by the Secretary of State to be an alias of MEK and was accordingly also designated an FTO. See 1999 Designation, 64 Fed.Reg. at 55,112; 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089. In May 2003, after a remand to cure certain due process deficiencies, see NCRI, 251 F.3d at 208-09, the Secretary decided to leave in place the 1999 and 2001 designations of NCRI as an FTO. NCRI now again petitions for review. After reviewing NCRI’s arguments, the entirety of the administrative record, and certain classified materials appended to that record, we conclude that the Secretary’s latest designation complied with the governing statute and all constitutional requirements. We therefore deny the petition for review.

2 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) empowers the Secretary of State to designate an entity as an FTO whenever the Secretary determines that (1) the entity is foreign; (2) it engages in terrorist activity; and (3) the terrorist activity threatens the security of the United States or its nationals. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). A designation as an FTO persists for two years, after which the Secretary may redesignate the entity as an FTO for a succeeding two-year period upon finding that the statutory circumstances still exist. Id. § 1189(a)(4)(B).

3 An FTO designation visits serious consequences on the affected organization: The Secretary of the Treasury may require financial institutions to freeze any assets of the FTO, id. § 1189(a)(2)(C); the members and representatives of the FTO become ineligible to enter the United States, id. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), (V); and anyone who knowingly provides "material support or resources" to the FTO — including any donation of money — may be prosecuted and imprisoned for up to fifteen years, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). The manifest purpose of these provisions is to deny terrorist organizations support — financial or otherwise — in and from the United States. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 43-45 (1995) (House Report on AEDPA’s primary predecessor bill).

4 Despite these serious consequences of designation, the governing statute affords suspect entities only "truncated" participation in the administrative process leading to the designation and "quite limited" judicial review after the fact. NCRI, 251 F.3d at 196. As we noted in PMOI I, "unlike the run-of-the-mill administrative proceeding," "there is [under AEDPA] no adversary hearing, no presentation of what courts and agencies think of as evidence, [and] no advance notice to the entity affected by the Secretary’s internal deliberations." 182 F.3d at 19. Once the Secretary has designated an entity an FTO, the statute directs us to "hold unlawful and set aside a designation" only if we find it to be:

5 (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;

6 (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

7 (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short of statutory right;

8 (D) lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified information submitted to the court [ex parte and in camera], or

9 (E) not in accord with the procedures required by law.

10 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3). Although the statute permits this court to base its review either "solely upon the administrative record" "taken as a whole," or as supplemented by any classified information submitted by the Secretary, the Act makes no provision for the disclosure of that classified material to the designated entity. See id. § 1189(b)(2), (3)(D); see generally 28 C.F.R. pt. 17 (governing access to classified national security information).

11 In 1997, and every two years since, the Secretary has designated MEK an FTO. See 1997 Designation, 62 Fed.Reg. at 52,650; 1999 Designation, 64 Fed.Reg. at 55,112; 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089; 2003 Redesignation, 68 Fed.Reg. at 56,861. Starting in 1999, the Secretary added NCRI to the list of designated FTOs, having concluded that NCRI was an alias of MEK. See 1999 Designation, 64 Fed.Reg. at 55,112 ("I hereby designate … the following organization as a foreign terrorist organization: … Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization … also known as National Council of Resistance, also known as NCR."). NCRI now, for the second time, seeks review of that designation. In NCRI’s previous challenge — brought jointly with MEK — we concluded that both the 1999 designation of MEK as an FTO and the designation of NCRI as an alias of MEK satisfied the requirements of the statute. Specifically concerning NCRI, we held — based on the record then presented to us by the Secretary — that the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI was an alias of MEK "does not lack substantial support and … is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise not in accordance with law." NCRI, 251 F.3d at 199.

12 As a constitutional matter, however, we determined that the procedures afforded by the statute and employed by the Secretary in arriving at those designations violated both organizations’ due process rights. See id. at 208-09. We did not vacate the Secretary’s designation as to either MEK or NCRI, but remanded to the Secretary with instructions that each entity be afforded the opportunity to: (1) respond to any part of the Secretary’s administrative record that is not classified material; (2) file evidence on its own behalf; and (3) be meaningfully heard by the Secretary. Id. at 210.

13 Both MEK and NCRI availed themselves of these opportunities. NCRI submitted voluminous materials that purported to demonstrate that it was sufficiently independent of MEK that it could not be considered an alias of that organization. On September 24, 2001, the State Department informed MEK and NCRI that the Secretary had decided to leave the 1999 designation of MEK in place but that "no such determination regarding the NCRI as an alias of the MEK is possible at this time." Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 2 (Sept. 24, 2001). This was shortly followed, on October 5, 2001, by the Secretary’s redesignation of both MEK as an FTO and NCRI as an alias of MEK. See 2001 Redesignation, 66 Fed.Reg. at 51,089. At that time, the State Department assured NCRI that although "the present situation… requires continued designation of [NCRI] as an alias of MEK for now," upon the completion of review of NCRI’s submissions, "the Secretary will make a de novo determination in light of the entire record, including the material you have submitted." Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Oct. 5, 2001).

14 Nearly a year later, the State Department provided for NCRI’s review additional materials obtained by the FBI in the course of "its long-running investigation of the MEK and NCRI." Letter of Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep’t of State, at 1 (Sept. 4, 2002). Within two months, NCRI submitted its response. See Letter of Paul F. Enzinna, Esq. (Nov. 1, 2002). In May 2003, the State Department completed its review process and, on May 24, the Secretary decided to leave in place the 1999 and 2001 "designations of the National Council of Resistance (NCR) and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) as foreign terrorist organization aliases of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)." Action Mem. from William Pope & William H. Taft, IV to the Secretary of State, at 3 (May 22, 2003) (Action Mem.). NCRI now petitions for review of this latest decision.

15 NCRI’s primary argument is that the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI is an alias of MEK lacks substantial support in the administrative record. NCRI insists that it is an umbrella organization of Iranian dissident persons and groups of which MEK is only a single member, no more powerful than any other. In addressing this contention, we begin with our earlier holding in this action. In NCRI, we concluded — based on the record then presented to us — that the Secretary’s designation of NCRI as an alias of MEK "does not lack substantial support and … is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise not in accordance with law." 251 F.3d at 199. Although that decision is obviously not determinative of the question before us today — we are now reviewing a record that has since been supplemented both by the Government and NCRI — its holding must nevertheless inform our decision here. Logically, NCRI’s challenge can succeed only if the new record materials establish its independence from MEK so that we can no longer affirm that "the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information before [him] to come to the conclusion" that NCRI is an alias of MEK. Id. Having reviewed the supplemented administrative record as a whole and the classified information appended to it, we conclude that NCRI has not met this burden.

16 To explain our decision, we must first review what it means — in the very particular context of AEDPA — for one organization to be an alias of another. On its previous appeal, NCRI argued that the Secretary lacked authority under AEDPA to designate an entity an FTO based on a finding that it was an alias of another designated FTO. See id. at 200. We rejected that contention, finding that the grant of authority to designate FTOs "implies the authority to so designate an entity that commits the necessary terrorist acts under some other name." Id. In so doing, we used a mathematics metaphor — specifically, the transitive property — to describe the alias concept: "Logically, indeed mathematically, if A equals B and B equals C, it follows that A equals C. If the NCRI is the [MEK], and if the [MEK] is a foreign terrorist organization, then the NCRI is a foreign terrorist organization also." Id.; see also id. ("If the Secretary has the power to work those dire consequences on an entity calling itself `Organization A,’ the Secretary must be able to work the same consequences on the same entity while it calls itself `Organization B.’"). Seizing upon our earlier invocation of the transitive property, NCRI now argues that the administrative record does not demonstrate that "A equals B" — that is, that NCRI equals MEK — and therefore NCRI cannot be an alias of MEK. Indeed, NCRI rightly points out that even the State Department acknowledges that NCRI and MEK are not " one and the same." See Pet. Reply Br. 4-6.

17 Implicit in NCRI’s argument, however, is a mistaken assumption that the alias concept, under AEDPA, is bounded by the transitive property. This reads too much into our mathematical metaphor in NCRI. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58 (1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."). While it is certainly correct to use the term alias to describe scenarios where a single entity is known by more than one name — for instance, Mojahedin-e Khalq is an alias for People’s Mojahedin, two names for the same organization, one Farsi, the other English — nothing in AEDPA or any more general rule of logic or language requires that the application of the alias concept be strictly limited to such circumstances.

18 To the contrary, our citation in NCRI to First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 103 S.Ct. 2591, 77 L.Ed.2d 46 (1983), indicates that we intended the alias concept to have a sweep beyond the transitive. In that case, which concerned a suit brought by Banco Para El Comercio Exterior (BPECE) against First National City Bank for performance under a letter of credit, the Supreme Court held that First National could counterclaim for setoff of the value of its assets that had been seized and nationalized by the Cuban government, notwithstanding the fact that BPECE had been established by the Cuban government as a juridical entity separate from the government. See id. at 623-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2598-2603. Acknowledging a presumption that "government instrumentalities established as juridical entities distinct and independent from their sovereign should normally be treated as such," id. at 626-27, 103 S.Ct. at 2599, the Court nevertheless concluded that the normally separate juridical status had to be set aside where the Cuban government was the real party in interest behind BPECE’s letter of credit claim, id. at 632, 103 S.Ct. at 2602. The Court, in reaching its conclusion, looked to ordinary principles of agency law, noting that "where a corporate entity is so extensively controlled by its owner that a relationship of principal and agent is created, we have held that one may be held liable for the actions of the other." Id. at 629, 103 S.Ct. at 2600 (citing NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 402-04, 80 S.Ct. 441, 442, 4 L.Ed.2d 400 (1960)). We think those same ordinary principles of agency law are fairly encompassed by the alias concept under AEDPA. When one entity so dominates and controls another that they must be considered principal and agent, it is appropriate, under AEDPA, to look past their separate juridical identities and to treat them as aliases.

19 The inclusion of these fundamental precepts of agency law within AEDPA’s alias concept is entirely consistent with — indeed, necessary to — the effective pursuit of the statute’s objective of denying support in and from the United States to terrorist organizations. Just as it is silly to suppose "that Congress empowered the Secretary to designate a terrorist organization… only for such periods of time as it took such organization to give itself a new name, and then let it happily resume the same status it would have enjoyed had it never been designated," NCRI, 251 F.3d at 200, so too it is implausible to think that Congress permitted the Secretary to designate an FTO to cut off its support in and from the United States, but did not authorize the Secretary to prevent that FTO from marshaling all the same support via juridically separate agents subject to its control. For instance, under NCRI’s conception, the Government could designate XYZ organization as an FTO in an effort to block United States support to that organization, but could not, without a separate FTO designation, ban the transfer of material support to XYZ’s fundraising affiliate, FTO Fundraiser, Inc. The crabbed view of alias status advanced by NCRI is at war not only with the antiterrorism objective of AEDPA, but common sense as well.

20 We need not plumb all the complexities of agency law to determine when an agent, under AEDPA, is the alias of its principal. It is sufficient for our purposes to note that the requisite relationship for alias status is established at least when one organization so dominates and controls another that the latter can no longer be considered meaningfully independent from the former. See, e.g., NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 403, 80 S.Ct. 441, 443, 4 L.Ed.2d 400 (1960) ("`Dominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent.’") (quoting Berkey, 244 N.Y. at 95, 155 N.E. 58); Casino Ready Mix, Inc. v. NLRB, 321 F.3d 1190, 1196 (D.C.Cir.2003) ("`agent’ is one who agrees to act `subject to [a principal’s] control’") (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1, cmt. a (1958)); cf. Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. La Republica de Venezuela, 200 F.3d 843, 848 (D.C.Cir.2000) ("A sovereign is amenable to suit based upon the actions of an instrumentality it dominates because the sovereign and the instrumentality are in those circumstances not meaningfully distinct entities; they act as one.").

21 We thus frame our inquiry here as whether "the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information before [him] to come to the conclusion" that NCRI was dominated and controlled by MEK. PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 25. Based on our review of the entire administrative record and the classified materials appended thereto, we find that the Secretary did have an adequate basis for his conclusion. While our determination is buttressed by classified information provided to us on an ex parte and in camera basis — the contents of which we cannot discuss — the voluminous unclassified materials contained in the administrative record by themselves and by a comfortable margin provide sufficient support for the Secretary’s conclusion, given the standard of review. It would serve little purpose to catalogue all the material in the administrative record supporting the conclusion that NCRI is dominated and controlled by MEK, but we will set out below a few of the pieces of information we found to be most compelling. As we do so, it bears repeating that AEDPA does not permit us, in exercising our limited judicial review, to make any "judgment whatsoever regarding whether the material before the Secretary is or is not true," but allows us to inquire only whether the Secretary "had enough information before [him] to come to the conclusion" that NCRI is dominated and controlled by MEK. Id.

22 After an extensive investigation of MEK and NCRI, the FBI reported to the State Department that "[i]t is the unanimous view of the FBI personnel who are involved in and familiar with the FBI’s investigation of the [MEK] that the NCRI is not a separate organization, but is instead, and has been, an integral part of the MEK at all relevant times." Letter of Charles Frahm, Section Chief, International Terrorism Operations Section II, at 1 (Aug. 28, 2002). Contrary to NCRI’s portrayal of itself as an umbrella organization, of which the MEK was just one member, the FBI concluded that it is NCRI that is "the political branch" of the MEK. Id. Attach. at 1.

23 This conclusion was based in large part on evidence gathered from the search — executed in December 2001 pursuant to a valid warrant — of a house in Falls Church, Virginia apparently used as office space by both NCRI and MEK. There, the FBI discovered NCRI and MEK materials "commingled together, and not separated," including bank records, signed blank checks, MEK propaganda, NCRI publications, travel documents, and letterhead which listed the same French address for each organization. Id. Attach. at 2-4. Crucially, among the recovered documents was a schematic breakdown of the "Iranian Resistance," which described NCRI as "The Political Branch" of the movement. Id. at Tab 6.

24 Additionally, earlier investigations of MEK and NCRI had revealed that the two organizations shared an essentially unitary leadership structure. The overall head of MEK, Massoud Rajavi, also leads NCRI. And Rajavi’s wife, Maryam Rajavi, was selected by NCRI to be Iran’s President-inExile. Id. Attach. at 2; see also id. Attach. at 4 ("The leadership of [MEK] and NCRI is intermixed, and the entities operate in a day-to-day way as a single unit."). These facts corroborated the FBI’s earlier conclusion prior to the 2001 designation of NCRI as an FTO that "the NCR/NCRI is in fact controlled by and inseparable from the MEK." Decl. of Agent Michael Rolince (quoted in Action Mem., Tab 2 at 11).

25 The State Department acknowledged that "NCRI has submitted numerous affidavits purporting to show that it is not controlled by the MEK and is not an MEK front," and even credited some of NCRI’s "subsidiary points." Action Mem., Tab 2 at 12, 9. The agency, however, concluded that "the evidence developed by the FBI is convincingly to the contrary." Id. Tab 2 at 12. It may be true that the State Department relied very heavily on the conclusions of the counterterrorism experts of the FBI. As noted above, though, under the narrow powers of judicial review Congress has accorded to us under AEDPA, it is emphatically not our province to second-guess the Secretary’s judgment as to which affidavits to credit and upon whose conclusions to rely. We are to judge only whether the "support" marshaled for the Secretary’s designation was "substantial." 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(3)(D). We conclude that the support for the Secretary’s conclusion that NCRI was dominated and controlled by, and thus was an alias of, MEK was indeed substantial, and we therefore reject NCRI’s statutory challenge to its designation as an FTO.

26 This leaves only NCRI’s constitutional challenges to certain procedures employed in making that designation. Specifically, NCRI argues that due process requires that (1) it be provided access to any classified materials that the Secretary relied upon in making the designation, and (2) it have an adversary hearing before the agency at which it could confront witnesses against it. Both these arguments are foreclosed by our earlier decisions in NCRI and PMOI II. See 251 F.3d at 208-09, 327 F.3d at 1242-43. Concerning NCRI’s claim that it is entitled to review classified materials, in NCRI we wrote that the government "need not disclose the classified information to be presented in camera and ex parte to the court under the statute." 251 F.3d at 208. In PMOI II, addressing the same claim, this time brought by MEK, we were even more emphatic: "We reject this contention…. We already decided in [NCRI] that due process required the disclosure of only the unclassified portions of the administrative record." 327 F.3d at 1242. PMOI II also disposes of NCRI’s claim for an adversary hearing. There, we held that NCRI established the constitutional baseline for fair process and, the Government having complied with those commands on remand, that "nothing further is due." Id. at 1243. We reach the same conclusion with regard to NCRI.

The Mojahedin-e Khalq translates into English as People’s Mojahedin. [AR268] The Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK) is known in English as the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). Our prior decisions have variously referred to the Mojahedin-e Khalq as MEK, People’s Mojahedin of Iran, and PMOICompare PMOI I, 182 F.3d at 20 ("the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran — the MEK, for short"), with NCRI, 251 F.3d at 197 ("petitioner People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (`PMOI’)"). To limit confusion, wherever possible we will use the terms Mojahedin-e Khalq and MEK, and, except in case names, not the terms People’s Mojahedin or PMOI. We adopt this convention because it is the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization that the Secretary has designated as a foreign terrorist organization. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed.Reg. 52,650 (Oct. 8, 1997) (1997 Designation); Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 64 Fed.Reg. 55,112 (Oct. 8, 1999) (1999 Designation); Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 66 Fed.Reg. 51,088, 51,089 (Oct. 5, 2001) (2001 Redesignation); Redesignation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 68 Fed.Reg. 56,860, 56,861 (Oct. 2, 2003) (2003 Redesignation).

July 21, 2010 0 comment

USA

US govt continues to view MEK as a terrorist organization

US govt told to review terrorist list decision

The State Department must review its designation of the People’s Mujahedin Organisation of Iran, or PMOI, as a foreign terrorist organisation, a US appeals court ruled on Friday.

In a 22-page decision, the US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said the State Department failed to give the group a fair chance to overturn the listing. It remanded the matter to the department.

PMOI filed a petition on July 15, 2008, saying it should no longer be listed as a terrorist group. On January 12, 2009, in the final days of the Bush administration, the State Department rejected the request after examining material submitted by PMOI and the US intelligence community, including classified information.

If a group is listed as a foreign terrorist organisation, the US government can freeze its assets, bar entry of group members and bring criminal charges against people who knowingly aid it.
The government was obligated under a 1996 anti-terrorism law and 2004 revisions to give PMOI the chance to rebut unclassified information, the appeals court said.

"This did not happen here. The PMOI was notified of the Secretary’s decision and permitted access to the unclassified portion of the record only after the decision was final," it said.

In a statement, the State Department said it would study the decision. Using the abbreviation for another name for the group, Mujahedin-e Khalq, it added, "The US Government continues to view the MEK as a terrorist organisation."

PMOI initially was listed as a foreign terrorist group in 1997. In 2008, it asked for removal of the designation, saying it ceased its military campaign against the Iranian government in 2001, handed over its weapons to US forces in Iraq in 2003 and had provided information to US officials about Iran’s nuclear program.

The State Department said PMOI "has not shown that the relevant circumstances are sufficiently different" to warrant a change. Material that was declassified in the autumn of 2009 contained allegations that PMOI trained women in Iraq to be suicide bombers, had not ended military operations and that much of its information about Iran’s nuclear program was wrong.

July 17, 2010 0 comment

USA

Open letter of the Participants in Paris Great Gathering to US Ambassador in France

We urge you to put pressure on Mojahedin Khalq, aka: MKO, MEK, NCRI, Rajavi cult

Dear Mr. Charles H. Rivkin

You may know that the leadership of PMOI, after blind and costly assassinations , escaped from We urge you to put pressure on Mojahedin Khalq, aka: MKO, MEK, NCRI, Rajavi cult Iran and he transferred his organization to Iraq territory which was in war with Iran at that time, and he began his military and terror apparatus again in Iraq with the assistance of Saddam Hussein, the dictator of Iraq.

That time Iraq was in war with Iran and as a result of the war , Saddam Hussein supported them financially and equipped them militarily and fed them by serious and confidential information, in return pmoi became Iraq’s Army mercenary and functioned as Iraq’s fifth column.

PMOI has preserved and kept its forces in a camp ,named Ashraf , which is an Iraqi military garrison ,close to city of KHALIS , and up to know no foreign viewer and proctor has succeeded to supervise their function and attitude regarding their subordinates and members , as a result of that they behave whatever they like and they ignore the basic rights of their forces.

During their staying in Iraq , there were members who did not want to continue cooperating with pmoi, so they separated from the organization , but there was a time that Rajavi decided not to allow any one to separate from the organization and he proclaimed that separation from the organization is equal to treason and deadly sin which the Human Rights Watch named it , Exit Prohibition , after Rajavi’s proclamation . Separation from this organization is almost impossible and even there is a chance that the person who wants to separate will face a great danger and even death threat.

Seven years ago , Saddam Hussein and his government was toppled , but even after the downfall of Saddam Hussein ,PMOI still act like before and there has not been any breakthrough in pmoi’s policy regarding separation of their members.

Your Excellency , with this preface we would like to draw your attention to this fact that we the backers and supporters of the Seminar , Support of the Rajavi’s castle victim’s families (Ashraf Garrison-Iraq) which occurred in Paris on 19th of June /2010, are separated and victimized members, critics and families of those stranded victims in Ashraf garrison who have a brother , sister, father or mother and friends in there who are under severe indoctrination and brain washing methods .We had been in the same situation as they are now ,but we could set ourselves free from all those indoctrinations and brain washing methods and fortunately we gained our freedom by separating ourselves from this organization, and now after gaining our freedom, together we want to help the other victims who are still kept in Ashraf Garrison and pmoi’s main headquarters in Paris .

Right now, there are around 3400 captivated people who have not seen or met other people outside of their garrison, and they have been deprived of getting in the city bus or taxi and they have not purchased anything from city stores and supermarkets for a long time. They have been deprived of having friends , family of their own and education and they have not had any communication with their loved ones and family since long time ago.

Few months ago , some of the victim’s family despite of serious life threat in Iraq , went to Iraq after many years to meet their loved ones, but the pmoi’s operatives and officials have prevented them of having any contact with their loved ones since their arrival, and pmoi’s officials have insulted those families as well as labeling them as Iranian intelligence service agents and they have denied their family connection with their loved ones in Ashraf garrison.

Your Excellency we , the families and friends and separated members urge you as honorable representative of United States government in France to step forward and put pressure on PMOI to allow the victim’s family to meet their loved ones and also we would like you to help Iraqi government to facilitate the families’meeting with their loved ones.

Preventing any meeting between families and their loved ones is a serious breach and violation of human rights.

We urge and entreat you to help us in this just and humanitarian matter .

Respectfully

Signatories:

1.Abas Sadeghi/Germany

2.Rana Samadzadeh Aghdam/Sweden

3. Maryam Ahmadi/Sweden

4. Hossein Samadzadeh Aghdam/Sweden

5. Ariya Abdollahi/Norway

6. Javad Abolhosseini/Netherlands

7. Alireza Bashiri/Norway

8.Batool Maleki/Switzerland

9.Massoud Jabani/ Netherlands

10.Mohammad Hossein Sobhani/Germany

11. Hadi Shams Haeri/Netherlands

12. Noshin Bashiri/Norway

13. Tovartan Babakhani/Netherlands

14. Tamin Abdollahi/Norway

15. Rabeae Shahrokhi/Sweden

16. Hashem Payro/Norway

17.Hamid Yazdanfar/Norway

18Jafar Ahmadi/Norway

19.Maryam Taheriyan Pajoh/Sweden

20.Mehdi Ahmadi/Sweden

21.Omid Ahmadi/ Sweden

22.Massoud Khodabandeh/England

23. Ayob Kord Rostami/Canada

24.Farshid Ahmadi/Sweden

25. Farid Armideh ,The son of Aliakbar Armideh/Sweden

26. Saeed Armideh ,The son of Aliakbar Armideh/Sweden

27.Mitra Yosefi/Sweden

28. Naser Rezvani/Sweden

29. Farshid Nazari/Norway

30. Farzad Farzinfar/SWeden

31. Nima Parniya/Norway

32. Anne Singleton/England

33. Saeed Khodabakhsh/Canada

34. Parvin Haji/Canada

35. Fereshteh Hosseini/Denmark

36. Parya Dabiryan/Greece

37. Hassan Faraji/Sweden

38. Omid Ariyapoor/ Norway

39. Faramarz Afshari/Greece

40. Elham Norouzi/Canada

41. Soheyla Norouzi/Canada

42. Babak A/France

43. Alireza Nasrollahi/France

44. Mostafa Mohammadi/Canada

45. Shan Kord Rostami/Canada

46. Marlen Kord Rostami/Canada

47. Bahareh Nikbakht/France

48. Hassan Piransar / France

49. Hamed Sarrafpour/France

50.Alireza Nabavi/Sweden

51. Anika Nabavi/Sweden

52.Sara Nabavi/sweden

53.Rohi Aslani/Sweden

54.Zahra Makari/Sweden

55. Kenar Jasem Ali/Netherlands

56. Horiyeh Mohammadi/Canada

57.Shirin Aghvami/Sweden

58. Zari Aghvami/Sweden

59. Mehri Nasiri/Sweden

60. Gholam Shirali/Norway

61. Habib Khorami/Netherlands

62. Marziyeh Gonjeshki/ Netherlands

63. Mahbobeh. Hamzeh /Canada

64.Narmin Jasem Ali/Netherlands

65. Zahra MOhammadi/Netherlands

66. Mohammad mohammadi/Canada

67. Morteza Mohammadi/Canada

68.Hamid Tavana /Netherlands

69. Mohammad harati/Netherlands

70. Tol Malavi

71. krigoriyan

72. Mohammad ellami

73. Khalil Taghavi/Netherlands

74. Mina Taghavi/Netherlands

75. Karim Haghi / Netherlands)

76. Khaled Taghavi/Netherlands

77. Zaghik Babakhani/Netherlands

78. Hamid Balfan/Netherlands

79. Maryam Jahanfard/Netherlands

80. Mohammad Karami/France

81. Javad Firozmand/France

83.Mehdi Sojodi/Germany

83. Mehrdad Sagharchi/scandinavia

84. Ali Jahani/ Germany

85. Majid Rohi/Denmark

86. Parvin Jafari/Denmark

87.Roya Haratipour/Norway

88.Bashir Hamdardzadeh/Sweden

89. Javid Hosseini/Greece

90. Mohammad Satari/NOrway

91. Jalil Hasimi/DEnmark

92. zayd Rahmanpour/Norway

93. Ashraf mohammadi/Norway

94. Hamid Balfan/Netherlands

95. Noor Dara/Netherlands

96. Soheyla Behboodi/Germany

97. Nasrin Behboodi/Netherlands

98. Kazem Hosseini/Netherlands

99. Ali Ghashghavi/ Germany

100. Amir Movasaghi/Germany

101. Edvard Tormado/Germany

102. Armineh Tormado/Germany

103. Behzad Alishahi/Netherlands

104. Nahid Amiri/Netherlands

105. Alireza Mirasgari/Germany

106. Mohsen Abaslo/Austria

107. Alireza Naghashzadeh/Germany

108. Elham Kakavand/Netherlands

109. Ali Akbar Rastgo/Germany

110. Majed Dara/Netherlands

111. Noryeh Dara/Netherlands

112. Nona Abdollahi/Netherlands

113. Ali Taghavi /Netherlands

114. Mehdi Fadayee/Germany

115. Khaled Taghavi/Netherlands

116. Yorik Ebrahimiyan /Germany

117. Farideh Barati/Netherlands

118. Mahbobeh Barati/Netherlands

119. Arash Moghadam/Netherlands

120. Batool Soltani

121. Armin Seraj/Netherlands

122. Kardo Dara/Netherlands

123. A Abkhaziyan/Germany)

124. Narineh Artesh/Germany

125. Ali Zirak/Netherlands

126. Sara SAdeghi/Germany

127. Bahadoor Khorami/Netherlands

128. Jafar Gonjeshki/Denmark

129. Jamshid Charlang/Germany

130. Ali Sheykhi/Netherlands

131. Hesam Sheykhi/Netherlands

132. Reza Sadeghi/Belgium

133. Eman Vaseti/Netherlands

134. Khalil Vaseti/Netherlands

135. Faramarz Pashayee / Canada

136. Mohammad Nabi Soleyman Nejat/Canada

137. Khoshnam Hesami/Canada

138. Hassan Saberi/Canada

139. Mehrzad Zardoshtiyan /Netherlands

140. Ghodrat Hamidi/Canada

141. Hasheh Mirza/Netherlands

142. Ershak Naghdali/Netherlands

143. Ebrahim Manaf/Netherlands

144. Sava Manaf/Netherlands

145. Amir Atefeh/Netherlands

146. Sanaz Dara/Netherlands

147. Saeed Soltanpour/Canada

148. Mahnaz Alavi/Netherlands

149. Christin Karkhaziyan/Germany

150. Habib Asadollahi/Germany

151. Millad Ariyayee/Germany

152. Ali GHashghavi/Germany

153. Shadi Doosti/Netherlands

154. Hassan Haghi/Netherlands

155. Mostafa Rahmani/Germany

156. Amir Movasaghi/Germany

157. Saeedeh Jabani/Netherlands

158. Maryam Vaseti/Netherlands

159. Hossein Ghanbari/Finland

160. Mansour Nazari/France

161. Hossein Naghdi/Germany

162. Mohammad Razzaghi/France

163. Nader Naderi/France

164.Yahya Haghjo/Sweden

165. Faramarz Niksefat/Denmark

166. Sepideh Aref/France

167. Dr. Farzad Rahnama/Carolina, USA

168. Mohammad Allavi/France

169. Shiva Mostafavi/France

170. Mehran Taghiabadi/France

171. Jamshid Peyvasteh/Netherlands

172. Mehrdad seyyedian/ Norway

173. Eshrat Fallah / Norway

174. Amir Taherloo / Sweden

175 . Shiwa Mostafavi / France

176. shokoufe Bayat /Sweden

177. Fateme Soleymani / Norway

178. Ali Mirzayi / Norway

179. Ashraf Amrolahi / Sweden

180. Ahmad Nooraei / Germany

181. Zohre Shams / gemany

182. Heydar Ghadiri /

Cc:

Relevant departments in EU and Iraq
Other Relevant recipients

June 27, 2010 0 comment

USA

US Troops left FOB GRIZZLY (New Iraq, Formerly Ashraf)

US troops to hand over major military base to Iraqi forces

… The US Army hands over an American military base near a compound housing an Iranian opposition group known as Mojahedin Khalq Organisation (MKO, MEK, Rajavi cult) to the Iraqi security forces. the step was taken as the US says it is preparing to withdraw its troops from Iraq by 2011 …Download US Troops left FOB GRIZZLY

June 27, 2010 0 comment

USA

US to close base near camp housing MKO exiles

The U.S. military will relinquish control of a base near a compound housing an Iranian opposition group next month, a move that will close a chapter on one of the most intractable issues in U.S.-Iraqi relations.

The presence of the People’s Mujahedeen Organization of Iran at Camp Ashraf has long been an irritant to Iraq’s Shiite-led government, and the exiles expressed fear that they would face violence without the Americans there to protect them.

The announcement Thursday of the base closure on July 1 came nearly a year after Iraqi security forces raided the camp, prompting a melee that officials said left 11 residents dead and dozens injured.

The U.S. military guarded the camp since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 under an agreement that made its more than 3,000 residents "protected persons" under the Geneva Conventions. The military stopped observing the agreement after a new security accord with the Baghdad government took effect last year but maintained the nearby base.

U.S. military spokesman Lt. Col. Bob Owen said Thursday that the closure of the base known as Camp Grizzly is part of the transition as American forces prepare to leave the country by the end of next year.

"U.S. forces will continue to reduce our footprint in Iraq, and this is another base that will be turned over to the (Iraqi government) as we continue our transition to stability operations," he said.

Members of the Iranian faction, which fought with Saddam Hussein’s forces against Tehran in the 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war, have made several claims about a host of alleged abuses and pressure tactics by Iraqi authorities who are eager to oust them from the country.

Ashraf’s residents are very reluctant to leave the camp because of fear of being detained and threatened with deportation.

Iraqi officials could not immediately be reached for comment. In the past, the government has said the exiles will not be forcibly returned to Iran, where the Islamic leadership considers the People’s Mujahedeen, or MEK, an enemy of the state.

The United States lists the MEK as a terrorist organization, though one that has provided the Americans with intelligence on Iran. The European Union removed it from its terror list last year.
A member of the European Parliament sent a letter this week to U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton raising concern about a U.S. departure from the area.

Struan Stevenson, the European Parliament’s point man on relations with Iraq, warned it would "be an extremely dangerous development that could lead to a new humanitarian catastrophe with far greater dimensions compared to the events of last July."

Shahriar Kia, a spokesman for the group who lives at the camp, expressed fears about the future.

"The American government is responsible for the future of the people in this camp," he said in a telephone interview from the camp. "This will give a green light to the Iranian regime for any future attack especially when a new government in Iraq hasn’t been established."

Iraqi politicians are jockeying over the formation of a new government after inconclusive elections on March 7.

Iraq’s two largest Shiite political blocs signaled Thursday that their alliance is still strong by giving it a name, keeping them on track to form the core of the country’s new government.
The alliance between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition and the hard-line religious Iraqi National Alliance was created more than a month ago. But there have been no outward signs of progress on key steps toward forming the government such as bringing in other partners that would give them a ruling majority in parliament or naming a candidate for the top government job, prime minister.

With behind-the-scenes negotiations moving slowly, there has been speculation in the Iraqi media that the alliance might not last.

But in a sign of its strength, lawmaker Khalid al-Attiyah said Thursday the union will now be called "National Alliance."

He said the coalition would have 159 seats in 325-member parliament, still four seats shy of a ruling majority.

No group won an outright majority in the parliamentary election, but the rival Sunni-backed Iraqiya list claims it should be allowed to form a government because it won the most seats, with 91 compared to State of Law’s 89.

Parliament must still formally approve the National Alliance as a recognized coalition after it convenes for the first time on Monday. Lawmakers will also elect a new president, who will task the largest bloc with forming the new government — including designating a prime minister, Cabinet officials and awarding other top political jobs to supporters.
——
Associated Press Writers Qassim Abdul-Zahra, Hadeel al-Shalchi and Lara Jakes contributed to this report

June 12, 2010 0 comment

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