The first unfavorable outcome of Saddam’s fall for Mojahedin was their disarmament by the coalition forces. Consequently, Massoud Rajavi, in justifying the situation, announced that between the arms and arms-masters, namely the Americans, they preferred the latter. Mojahedin hoped that the future would grant them the opportunity of being rearmed. For them, belief in armed struggle and holding it dear had priority over its practice.
His crimes against humanity exceeded the 1982 killing of 148 Shiites in the city of Dujail for which he received the sentence. Besides of his many evident instances of human-slaughters and bloodbaths, he was openly sponsoring terrorism. He had turned the soil of Iraq into a fertile land for the seeds of terrorism to germinate and MKO was really a favorite.
Whenever confronting an obstacle in its antagonistic campaign against the presence of Iranian authorities and individuals in a country where its political activities is banned, MKO relay on supporters who enjoy a rather good social status. These supporters are mainly found among the parliamentarians who, for certain political and social reasons and even personal interests, consent to advocate an officially blacklisted terrorist, criminal group.
The scant number of the participants, two hundred is MKO’s own exaggerated number, might indicate that the sympathizers residing in the Western countries cannot be easily deceived by Mojahedin’s advertised demands that only serves to further the organizational objectives rather than being concerned about the plights of members held in Camp Ashraf.
In your articles, you have dealt in detail with the internal deterrents that hinder normalization of relations but you avoid discussing the disruptive role of the opposition and Mojahedin-e Khalq in particular….I say that if these deterrents are to be analyzed in general and their supposed interests out of these challenges are delineated, MKO’s role in escalation of the tension should never be overlooked. Are you in doubt that MKO consent to any political bargain on the expense of the country’s national interests?..
The presense of Mojahedin Khalq in Iraq is really one of those critical problems for the Iraqi government to tackle. Banned to conduct direct propaganda activities, the group takes advantage of the Iraqi dissenters, parties and individuals, to muster supporters advocating its stay in Iraq. In many cases, these publicized instances of supporting serves as a means of warnings by minorities directed at the legally elected government
It is an accepted tactic of struggle for MKO to hold protesting rallies against the presence of Iranian officials in international occasions. The question is pointed at the US government that who is it possible to let a proscribed terrorist organization openly hold ..
The signed statement is all compiled and prepared by MKO itself because the stated points are exactly what the group intends to pose against the drafted national reconciliation plan. As a proof, please have a look at this excerpt from the statement claimed to be issued by the above mentioned tribal leaders where MKO are referred to as promising to be good boys since they have rejected violence
Facing its most crucial days in Iraq, MKO gets advantage of any chances to muster sympathizers and supporters to reaffirm its status as political refugees in Iraq. As the organization is banned, under the adopted anti-terrorism laws, to hole open rallies and meetings …
..This leaves the Administration to work with only two groups, as well as some ambitious Iranians in exile who envision themselves as Iran’s future leaders. One is the Mojahedeen Khalgh Organization (supported by some neoconservatives and misguided members of the Congress). The MKO is universally despised by Iranians for acting as Saddam Hussein’s spies during the Iran-Iraq war, and as his agent for suppressing the Iraqi Kurds and Shi’ites…