As mentioned before and according to a traditional tendency within Mojahedin, they deliberately conceal the events and happenings. An example to mention is the ideological schism within the group in 1975. In this phase, they ducked to impart the news of schism before the declaration of the ideological schism by Taqi Shahram. On the other hand, they strived to convince the converted Marxist members in the prison not to reveal their conversion and keep behaving as a religious member. It was only after the declaration of the Marxist wing that Mojahedin announced the so-called twelve-clause statement. Many separated members of Mojahedin, including Saeed Shahsavandi, Lotfollah Meisami who were in prison at the time, have talked about the issue in detail.
Mojahedin insisted on holding in the schism at a time when such events and splits were common and inevitable in any revolutionary organization. But Mojahedin, believed to be a political group, chose to impart no piece of information. It could be that the group was worried to lose the support of the religious forces at the time. That is to say, Mojahedin utilized the concealment as a tactic in continuation of taking advantage of the financial aids and recruiting the religious, political forces. Following such a double-faced policy, it was the same case with Mojahedin’s position towards the Islamic revolution in 1979 and its cleric leader. In fact, the adopted tactic granted Mojahedin an opportunity to reorganize as well as to recruit and train new forces.
In the historical process of Mojahedin there can be found numerous instances of adhering to the tactic of camouflage for organizational, political, and … interests. But, following the ideological revolution inside Mojahedin, they took a different trend. The only thing sneaked out of the organization was its qualitative echoes on the members and sympathizers. Of course, the left impression differed in respect to the ranks and organizational echelon. Those nearer to the leading cell at the top felt a closer pertinence to the issue and, as a result, showed more emotional and sentimental reaction. Mehdi Abrishamchi quoting Massoud Rajavi talking about the impact of the ideological revolution on Mahmood Ataei, a member of the Central Cadre, said:
Don’t you remember that Rajavi in his speech referred to Mahmood Ataei who had written that ‘let me cut off my hands so you may believe’? What does it mean? It means that Massoud’s self-confidence does not mean self-confidence in himself, Massoud’s self-confidence means trust of Mojahedin in Mojahedin. [109]
In a report prepared following the video-taped display of the ideological revolution in an organizational meeting in the Europe, Mojahedin talk of similar impacts on lower rank sympathizers residing in European countries. In a part of this report annexed to the pamphlet “The ideological revolution within Mojahedin Khalq” Mehdi Abrishamchi states:
England – A lady who had a Ph.D. in political science said while crying ‘so long I have studied in the university but after my few hours of being present in this meeting, I felt I have learned something and came to know what position a woman occupies and what price should one pay to perceive it. I bow my head. Anybody who conceives should bow his head.’ This lady at first refused to watch the video-taped ceremony of the Norooz meeting; she at times got angry and swore at the organization.
Somewhere else, reporting the reaction of a woman while watching the video display, the report reads:
France – An Iranian woman said ‘the move dissolved the inwoven complex in women. I was not a sympathizer but tonight, for the first time, I quivered and cried. I have bought the book “woman on the course of freedom” and a poster of Ashraf to hang it before my eyes. Tonight, I have achieved freedom’.
Here is another remark:
Germany – An Iranian carpet dealer: ‘I underwent a change. I could not believe. For the first time in my life I sat motionless for 5 hours not knowing how it passed. I had improper ideas about Women but now they are corrected. The words changed me. I want to write a letter to the leadership.’
Regardless of these claims whether being true or not, the importance lies in the irrational and sentimental aspects that have impacts on people. They are the factors that are in themselves considered unconventional in relation to conducts within other similar political organization and which turn to be the criterion to gain organizational legitimacy. Talking on the primary importance of this aspect to comprehend the ideological revolution, Niyabati in his book “The Mojahedin ‘s ideological revolution” writes:
It is obvious that the process does not follow a rational approach. The dominant element in the process is not “logic and reason” but “love” and “emotion”. The means are not dispute and contentment but devotion. That is the point wherein Massoud claims the heart of Mojahedin. [113]
And so as to apprehend the evolution:
In this great scene neither is the campaign background of any importance nor the organizational qualification and even the political conscious. [114]
Actually, the benchmark that qualifies a member to be received in the precinct of the ideological revolution is thus defined:
The wayfarer devoid of any will should stand like a log surrendering himself to the axe of the carpenter to be carved in any form he wills.
To have a good understanding of the correlation, it is necessary to have a good recognition of the content which Mojahedin strongly shun to be revealed. However, the Niyabati’s book as well as the detached members’ testimonies there can be found details of some kind.
Bahar Irani – Mojahedin.ws – April 15, 2007
