Niyabati’s article “The necessity of releasing Mojahedin forces” in answer to Farrokh Negahdar’s article “Mojahedin must depart Camp Ashraf” contains some interesting and paradoxical points to which due attention is to be paid. It is somehow paradoxical since on the one hand, Niyabati has repeated the statements made by Farrokh Negahdar and on the other hand, he has drawn a border and red line between his own statements and those of Mr. Negahdar and has even threatened him of deserving trial and punishment by Mojahedin. First, it has to be pointed out that his article is a verification of Mojahedin’s typical insulting and offensive behavior against their critics that bears no rationalism and reasoning. On the one hand, he states:
It is simplistic if we seek a devil intention and political prejudice behind all dissidents’ position takings all the time. For sure it is not always so. 1
On the other hand, he is irritated by the statements made by Mr. Negahdar and writes:
If all those who have witnessed his betrayals pass away or forgive him, on the promised day of judgment the organization will not for sure leave him alone. 2
The reason why he takes a more aggressive attitude against Mr. Negahdar compared to other sympathizers of Mojahedin is pertinent to his past history. We have elaborated on the relationship between Niyabati and Mojahedin previously. It seems that his past semi-intellectual and megalomaniacal gestures insisting to show his superiority over Mojahedin and their leadership has been faded away and now he has turned to be a simple errand for Mojahedin. However, there are some significant points in his article. For example, he refers to Camp Ashraf and says:
The current issue is releasing Mojahedin and transferring them to a safe refuge. Nobody cares to ask Mojahedin if they are willing to leave Camp Ashraf or remain there. 3
The point is that even Mojahedin leaders refrain to pay attention to the will of Ashraf residents and ignore the fact that they have to let them choose their own destiny. In recent years, many have repeatedly focused on the necessity of holding a free referendum in Camp Ashraf. In this way, nobody would criticize Mojahedin leaders as for the decision made based on the demands of Ashraf residents and it will pave the way for Mojahedin to petition international bodies in order to achieve their demands. Earlier, Niyabati had elaborated on the psychological levers and factors aiming at convincing members to remain in the organization and made his attempts to justify the necessity of these factors; therefore, he dares not claim that all Ashraf residents are willing to remain in Iraq in the existing conditions. The main challenge of Mojahedin leaders at the time being is that MKO members cannot be transferred to another location as long as they are labeled as a Mojahed and are members of MKO due to their terrorist label. In fact, they would be recognized refugees if they declare their separation from MKO as did many former members who are now living freely in European countries. Niyabati writes:
In fact, there is not a country where they may ignore the terrorist list to consent giving asylum to residents of Camp Ashraf. 4
However, he desist to refer to the fact that there are many former members of MKO living freely in European countries and running an ordinary life. Niyabati has no doubt in the necessity of the transfer of Camp Ashraf residents to another country. Yet, his only disagreement with Mr. Negahdar is that the latter truly believes that there is no country at the time being to let Ashraf residents in due to their terrorist repute. He has indirectly implied that transferring Mojahedin members to another country even as MKO members, results in the loss of Camp Ashraf, i.e. the strategic and ideological bastion of Mojahedin. He has also focused on the significance of camp Ashraf in his book and elaborated on the close relationship between Ashraf and the ideological revolution of Mojahedin, writing:
There is no doubt that the remarkable resistance of [Camp] Ashraf under the hegemony of Mojahed women has its roots merely in the internal ideological revolution of Mojahedin. 5
Evidently, Niyabati is well aware that the sole solution for the survival of Mojahedin is keeping Camp Ashraf ongoing. Therefore, it seems that Mojahedin prefer not to be removed from the terrorist list since in that case they would have no excuse to remain in Camp Ashraf and have to leave it and lose their organizational unity. Now the US presidential election coming to an end, the two-year pledge of Rajavi to overthrow the Iranian regime proves futile once more. These events have intensified Mojahedin crises. According to Niyabati:
I have no doubt … that deserting Camp Ashraf and compulsory transfer of Mojahedin, would be more advantageous for keeping the security of [Iranian] regime rather than that of Mojahedin. 6
In a nutshell, Niyabati and Mojahedin sympathizers’ insistence on keeping MKO members in Camp Ashraf aims mainly at maintaining the ideological and strategic container of Mojahedin and has nothing to do with posing a threat for the Iranian regime.
References:
1. Niyabati, Bijan, The necessity of releasing Mojahedin forces, two different view points
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Niyabati, Bijan, A different look at the internal ideological revolution of Mojahedin
6. Niyabati, Bijan, The necessity of releasing Mojahedin forces, two different view points
