The first sentence of Masoud Rajavi’s message in December, 27th on MKO’s removal from the EU terrorist list referred to his ecstasy of delight for excluding the possibility of Mojahedin’s expulsion from Iraq. He resorted to the point that 
since the EU has removed MKO from its terrorist list, terrorist accusations of MKO are no longer of any effect and Iraqi government cannot prevent their presence in Iraq due to their terrorist charges. Surprisingly enough, from among all possible positive consequences of the decision made by the EU, this aspect is a priority and of utmost significance for Rajavi. Making a comparison between Rajavi’s new position taking and previous claims on considering MKO’s inclusion in terrorist list as their main barrier to overthrow the Iranian government and also their democratic claims and rejecting the policy of armed struggle reveals an apparent paradox.
Now, the newly made messages of Rajavi suffice to prove their false claims of stopping armed struggle since it is ambiguous that after their removal from terrorist list and their opportunity to pursue their political activities in the west, as repeatedly petitioned by Rajavi when MKO was blacklisted, why Mojahedin insist on staying in Iraq? Is the answer anything other than the fact that Rajavi seeks to misuse the tensions inside Iraq to follow his past strategy of armed struggle to fulfill his never achieved promise of overthrowing the Iranian government? This is a question to be answered by MKO’s western advocators who dared to remove the name of a notorious terrorist group from the EU blacklist.
Rajavi further expounds on his other demands like making all traffics to and from Camp Ashraf smooth and limitless. He has also warned Iraqi government of the point that any measure taken by Iraqi officials in putting bans and limits on MKO as well as their expulsion or relocation may trigger Mojahedin’s severe reaction even up to their sacrifice. His message implies that removing MKO from the EU terrorist list has solved their problems in Iraq as well as the west. However, the fact is that it has nothing to do with the decision made by Iraqi government on their expulsion since part of the blame placed on Mojahedin on the part of Iraqi government is its terrorist nature and activities during the reign of Saddam in Iraq. Evidently, the stance of the EU toward MKO in itself suffices not to recognize the legitimacy of MKO’s remaining in Iraq acquitting them of all terrorist charges.
Furthermore, it has to be noted that despite the EU’s removing MKO from its terrorist list, the US state department issued a statement in an immediate reaction on the terrorist nature of Mojahedin and asserted that there are no evidence or sign of a shift in the policy and position taking of Mojahedin. Obviously, the viewpoint and decision of the US that is present in Iraq and is considered one of the parties involved in the settlement of tensions therein is more authentic than that of the EU. Also many European countries like France, England, Italy, Czech… acknowledge the terrorist nature of MKO despite the decision of the EU and some regard it a hasty decision to be reconsidered. Therefore, the illusion of Rajavi on a shift in the policy taken by Iraq toward MKO has no rationale and is more like a kind of psychological and propaganda war initiated by him and now followed strongly in Mojahedin media.
As it was mentioned, the rationale behind the Iraqi government’s decision on expelling Mojahedin from Iraq is not limited to the terrorist accusations of MKO rather according to Iraqi officials there are many evidences on crimes and cooperative activities of MKO with Saddam against Iraqi people and also their present efforts to misuse the unstable conditions of Iraq to intensify sectarian conflicts and make contacts to Iraqi problematic groups to commit terrorist activities against Iraqi people and neighboring countries. Therefore, Rajavi’s resorting to the vote of the EU is unlikely to solve his problems and Iraqi government recognizes the obligatory settlement of Mojahedin in Iraqi soil contrary to asylum rights and conventions. In addition, whenever a country consent to offer asylum to Mojahedin, their insistence on remaining in Iraq would be of no effect.
Before, it seemed that removing MKO from blacklist would makes the ground for their transferring to a western country to pursue their political activities in security therein yet as it is evident, Rajavi prefers an unquiet and war-torn country to European countries for MKO’s settlement. In addition, according to common sense, if Mojahedin are to force a country to provide them with asylum it should be one of the members of the EU that dared to remove MKO’s terrorist label whereas Rajavi refrains to express the least inclination to do so and ever-increasingly insists on keeping Mojahedin in Iraq. The reason is clear. Rajavi has two major factors in Iraq without which the survival of MKO is unlikely. First, Camp Ashraf as the ideological container of Mojahedin and second, the Iraqi soil as a strategic lever in the hands of Rajavi to follow his struggle of armed struggle against Iran therein. The main challenge posed on Iraqi government as a result of the settlement of Mojahedin in Camp Ashraf is security considerations and the danger posed by Mojahedin for national interests and stabilization of peace and security in Iraq. Mojahedin have also warned Iraqi government that they would resort to group self-immolations in case if Iraqi government consents not to satisfy their demands. In fact, they are threatening Iraqi officials to enforce them to let Mojahedin reside in Camp Ashraf.
The Iraqi government is to be aware that even its least tolerance toward Mojahedin in the present conditions may result in the stabilization of MKO status in its soil and freedom of action therein. Iraq should engage those countries removing MKO from the EU terrorist list in this challenge and ask them to provide asylum for MKO if they have been convinced of the termination of terrorist activities of MKO rather than advocating their residence in a place too far from their soil and people where Mojahedin can pose no danger for their national interests and security considerations.
