Abdulmalik Rigi, the leader of the terrorist group of Jundullah in an interview with Rangarang TV has acknowledged his relations with MKO and the fact that he had received information from
1.The silence of the organization on these statements proves its complicity in these attacks and an approbation of Rigi’s statements.
2.International bodies and the EU in particular are responsible for illegal activities of MKO.
3.Human rights organs, England and its supreme court as well as the western advocates of Mojahedin who have prompted MKO’s removal from the terrorist lists have to be held responsibile of these terrorist perpetrations.
The extent to which the statements of Abdulmalik Rigi on his relationship with MKO are enforceable depends first of all on the will and desire of Western politicians, organs and governments. It has to be pointed out that removing the name of Mojahedin from the EU terrorist list was basically coupled with the claims that the group had stopped its terrorist activities since June 2001.
However, there are many evidences disregarded by the judges that the organization has committed various terrorist attacks since then. This negligence, knowingly or unknowingly, implies that proving the terrorist nature of the organization is more a matter of political considerations than mere truth. Therefore, all attempts for showing the contradictions of this vote seems futile and even may pave the way for the organization to cooperate with other problematic trends in committing terrorist attacks against Iranian citizens.
The statements of Rigi at a time when MKO insists to remove its name form the terrorist list of the US State Department indicates that Mojahedin are well aware of mechanisms and levers to play with westerners. They realize the fact that the process of making any decision in the global scene is a long one when time has a determining role in their future. In other words, labeling a group as a terrorist one or removing it from terrorist lists necessitates a long process and time is the Achilles’ heel of international bodies misused by MKO under several pretexts.
Another point is that Mojahedin have always acted paradoxically. As they chant pro-democratic slogans, they rely in practice on their terrorist and violent levers and principles. However, they do so in a way unfamiliar for the culture of the West. For example, along with their removal from the EU terrorist list, they commemorated the events of 30 Khordad (20 June) as a symbol of the initiation of their terrorist activities. Furthermore, they respect armed struggle and emphasize that the achievement of their objectives is impossible unless through armed struggle, terror, and violence. They also accuse the critics of armed struggle, make threats against them and finally claim that they have been oppressed while they spare no effort for provoking violence and terrorism in the region.
Abdulmalik Rigi refers to a key point on the present situation of the organization. He implies that the reason why Mojahedin have stopped their armed struggle at the time being is that they have encountered a cul-de-sac in Iraq as well as Auver-sur-Oise rather than making a decision for changing their policy. As he states:
Of course we’d like to do whatever they (Mojahedin) are after, we can perform something and they can do something else. We are able to transfer their members but I think they have some limitations in this regard and cannot make any movement in their [host] countries.
Evidently, what he means by things to perform is terrorist attacks like those carried out in Iranian Province of Zahedan and killing innocent citizens and the role of Rajavi would be transferring information, planning the attacks and finally hiding behind the EU and initiating propaganda blitz. According to Rigi, the organization has been mired in Iraq and cannot take any action. It also refrains to consent to the transfer of its forces to Iran by Rigi for committing terrorist activities since Mojahedin have been disarmed in Iraq and all their activities and movements are under the severe control of Iraqi government. They can neither pursue their terrorist actions in France at the time being since they are after using international pressure-levers for seeking refuge therein. However, they cannot conceal their aggressive and violent nature and make their best to instigate those like Rigi to envenom the atmosphere inside Iran.
In this way, Rajavi can both pursue his objectives in Europe to convince international bodies and grab at his old strategy of armed struggle and violence. The statements of Rigi imply that his future activities may be plotted and organized by Rajavi too. Whatever the extent of the simple-mindedness, simplicity, and optimism of the Europeans on turning a terrorist group into a political party, they have to take a realistic position toward an organization that never consent to revise its deeply rooted organizational principles and manifestos due to a variety of extremely ideological, strategic, political, psychological, cultic, egocentric, totalitarian, and egoistic leanings. In Mojahedin’s terminology, terrorism has a different definition. They believe violence improves the value of their struggle for freedom and democracy. That is to say, when they perform, or glorify, violent acts upon others, they attempt to raise or defend their organizational or collective value as seen through their own eyes. No problem, let the outsiders call it terrorism or whatever they like!