Through his serial message of 27 April, Rajavi made its best, in addressing all factions of Iranian new generation, to present a partial and self-analyzed depiction of the post-revolution Iran. However, it is not clear why he suddenly stopped sending these so-called educational messages. The messages contained a chronological analysis of the Iranian contemporary history from the viewpoint of Masoud Rajavi and pursued various objectives. The main point of the messages was developing a link between Rajavi and the widespread post-election conflicts that troubled Iran for a certain period, through which a number of MKO’s sympathizers were also arrested. The degree and extent of the organization’s success and failure in this regard has to be discussed at length, yet the question here is why he changed his mind to proceed with clarifying the issues he deemed necessary. The abrupt interruption came when he was to start explaining the events of 1980s, the initiation of armed phase and Mojahedin’s rampant, aggressive and violent operations. The phase is recorded as the most convulsionary post-revolution chapter in the Iranian contemporary and the organization has since persisted in use of violence in its struggle in spite of its pro-democratic slogans. The struggle has so far resulted in 12000 death and assassinations, as recorded and asserted by the organization itself, as well as an escalating an atmosphere of hostility against the current ruling regime.
Through the messages, Rajavi was supposed to either accept the responsibility of the terrorist actions of 1980s, some of which he has denied, or deny it and in any case, he had to face challenges and blames directed at him by many other opposition, active both inside of Iran and in abroad, as well as being accountable for the deeds before the international societies and tribunals. Although Rajavi makes his utmost effort to rationalize and theorize his terrorist and aggressive actions by resorting to fabrication and distortion of the truth, he fails to deny the declaration of his armed struggle and the operations in succession; tragic bomb plants and assassinations condemned by majority of the Iranian masses and factions. He stopped just when all were waiting to see how he could acquit himself of the plain and obvious charges of terrorism that he considered as the organization’s integral ideological and political principles and indoctrinations.
He justified his terrorist atrocities as a response to the regime’s politically outrageous treatment while he initiated the phase long before receiving heavy strikes from the regime perpetrating terrorist and bomb attacks. In other words, he grabbed at armed phase at a time when the regime had a neutral position toward the organization. All groups and parties of any political and ideological thought and position as well as those who followed Rajavi until the commencement of the armed phase have acknowledged the fact that Rajavi has struck a heavy strategic blow on the organization by resorting to armed struggle and altered the development of democracy in the society for some decades.
Interestingly enough, Rajavi insists to instill the accuracy of his decision in entering the armed phase into the prior and present generations. However, he is well aware that the terrors like that of 1980s were so brutal, disastrous and unjustifiable that he can never rationalize them particularly at a time when a great number of critics and dissidents have accused him of terrorism and violence. At least the proven evidence is its registration on global terrorist lists regardless of being removed or maintained. Any explanation in this regard by Rajavi either for denying or accepting the responsibility of the actions may just result in the severity of his lack of political legitimacy. The review of such events and the position takings of Rajavi toward them may clarify the extent of the sympathy of Rajavi with the new post-election riots known as the green movement.
Now Rajavi is getting mired in a dilemma to clarify, now that he has started a review of his irreconcilable contrarieties with a revolution, who the perpetrators of terrorist deeds were and what he hoped to gain by these atrocities premeditated against noncombatant and civilian targets. He intentionally evades reviewing the events of the 20 June onward when Mojahedin, provoked by him, surfaced their opposition in the first mass movement on in 1981. He has to either bear the responsibility for engaging in bombings, assassinations and other committed series of atrocities, to force the population to rise against the regime or distance them, or put the blame on others; either of which have negative consequences for him. Can it be for any other reason when somebody as Rajavi, ideologically and organizationally prejudiced, begins to chronicle fragments from a nation’s post-revolution history?