the possibility of deviation of democratic centralism was a taken for granted issue and the separation of members did not necessarily led to a state of passivity and the cease of struggle, rather the separated members were obliged to continue the line of struggle and to unmask the deviants. Taking the possibility into consideration, the process of fighting against deviation of democratic centralism was thus phased
the term ‘leadership’ in the context of ideological revolution would be defined and compared to the statements made by MKO’s ex-members concerning anti-democratic nature of Rajavi’s personal leadership and its role in the strategic failures of organization. As such, three relative topics will be discussed: leadership in MKO, leadership in ideological revolution, and the reasons of the ex-members’ opposition to hegemonic and ideological leadership of Rajavi.
The failure of the operation Eternal Light (Forough Javidan) initiated challenges against Rajavi’s egocentric decision-making that led many forces of the organization to their death. Most of his critics believe that the operation was in no way correspondent with the organization’s line of strategy and that, Rajavi’s uncertain analysis of the post cease-fire situation compelled him ..
In MKO, similar to other cults, the partisans are under the influence that only those who adhere to the group’s ideology are on the right path. But to accept the cult’s proposed ideology, the insiders’ old system of beliefs has to be fragmented to be replaced with the revolutionary one. It is the prerequisite for the total obedience of the leader. Dennis Tourish expounding on the issue states that:
MEK ideology has gone through several iterations and blends elements of Marxism, Islam, and feminism.
a phenomenon that according to many critics and separated members was de facto manifestation of Mojahedin’s historical and ideological potential to evolve into a cult. In fact, now after nearly two decades of the events, there is not yet unanimity about its essentiality either in internal or external relations and also its applicable function in Mojahedin’s strategy.
I suggest perhaps that Ghozali should need two publications on the subject to find out about some of the activities of this so-called democratic movement. The first is ‘The Iranian Mujahedin’, a book by Professor Ervand Abrahamian who spent several years researching the group. The second is a book called ‘Masoud’ published by Saqi books and written by Masoud Banisadr …
No doubt, both in the issue of referendum and the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, Mojahedin were very critical, mostly not of the moves but of the contents. In fact, their dismay was the result of the group’s political and ideological teachings that did not evaluate the two moves coinciding with their strategic ends, that is to say, to escalate a gross military tension with the US.
Mojahedin insisted on holding in the schism at a time when such events and splits were common and inevitable in any revolutionary organization. But Mojahedin, believed to be a political group, chose to impart no piece of information. It could be that the group was worried to lose the support of the religious forces at the time.
The ideological issue is the issue of existence of a revolutionary organization, that of being or not to be. If in the theological philosophy of the theologians the issue of God is the crux of existence, for a revolutionary organization, too, the issue of ideology is a matter of existence. The existence of an organization and its how-to be is sourced out of its ideology